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Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL OPERATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE,
1966-1974

Edgar Gillenwaters	Washington Office Troubleshooter and Advocate for Commerce in California, 1967-1973
James Jenkins	Public Affairs, Welfare Concerns in Washington and Sacramento
Florence Randolph Procunier	Working with Edwin Meese
Robert Walker	Political Advising and Advocacy for Ronald Reagan, 1965-1980
Rus Walton	Turning Political Ideas into Government Program

Interviews Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris, Sarah Sharp
1982-1983

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To cite the volume: Internal and External Operations of the California Governor's Office, 1966-1974, an oral history conducted 1982-1983, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1985.

To cite an individual interview: Edgar Gillenwaters, "Washington Office Troubleshooter and Advocate for Commerce in California, 1967-1973," an oral history conducted 1983 by Sarah Sharp, in Internal and External Operations of the California Governor's Office, 1966-1974, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1985.

On behalf of future scholars, the Regional Oral History Office wishes to thank those who have responded to the Office's request for funds to continue documentation of Ronald Reagan's years as governor of California. Donors to the project as of May 1984 are listed below.

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PREFACE

California government and politics from 1966 through 1974 are the focus of the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series of the state Government History Documentation Project, conducted by the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library with the participation of the oral history programs at the Davis and Los Angeles campuses of the University of California, Claremont Graduate School, and California State University at Fullerton. This series of interviews carries forward studies of significant issues and processes in public administration begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. In previous series, interviews with over 220 legislators, elected and appointed officials, and others active in public life during the governorships of Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight, and Edmund Brown, Sr., were completed and are now available to scholars.

The first unit in the Government History Documentation Project, the Earl Warren Series, produced interviews with Warren himself and others centered on key developments in politics and government administration at the state and county level, innovations in criminal justice, public health, and social welfare from 1925-1953. Interviews in the Knight-Brown Era continued the earlier inquiries into the nature of the governor's office and its relations with executive departments and the legislature, and explored the rapid social and economic changes in the years 1953-1966, as well as preserving Brown's own account of his extensive political career. Among the issues documented were the rise and fall of the Democratic party; establishment of the California Water Plan; election law changes, reapportionment and new political techniques; education and various social programs.

During Ronald Reagan's years as governor, important changes became evident in California government and politics. His administration marked an end to the progressive period which had provided the determining outlines of government organization and political strategy since 1910 and the beginning of a period of limits in state policy and programs, the extent of which is not yet clear. Interviews in this series deal with the efforts of the administration to increase government efficiency and economy and with organizational innovations designed to expand the management capability of the governor's office, as well as critical aspects of state health, education, welfare, conservation, and criminal justice programs. Legislative and executive department narrators provide their perspectives on these efforts and their impact on the continuing process of legislative and elective politics.

Work began on the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series in 1979. Planning and research for this phase of the project were augmented by participation of other oral history programs with experience in public affairs. Additional advisors were selected to provide relevant background for identifying persons to be interviewed and understanding of issues to be documented. Project research files, developed by the Regional Oral History Office staff to provide a systematic background for questions, were updated to add personal, topical, and chronological data for the Reagan period to the existing base of information for 1925 through 1966, and to supplement research by participating programs as needed. Valuable, continuing assistance in preparing for interviews was provided by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which houses the Ronald Reagan Papers, and by the State Archives in Sacramento.

An effort was made to select a range of interviewees that would reflect the increase in government responsibilities and that would represent diverse points of view. In general, participating programs were contracted to conduct interviews on topics with which they have particular expertise, with persons presently located nearby. Each interview is identified as to the originating institution. Most interviewees have been queried on a limited number of topics with which they were personally connected; a few narrators with unusual breadth of experience have been asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. When possible, the interviews have traced the course of specific issues leading up to and resulting from events during the Reagan administration in order to develop a sense of the continuity and interrelationships that are a significant aspect of the government process.

Throughout Reagan's years as governor, there was considerable interest and speculation concerning his potential for the presidency; by the time interviewing for this project began in late 1980, he was indeed president. Project interviewers have attempted, where appropriate, to retrieve recollections of that contemporary concern as it operated in the governor's office. The intent of the present interviews, however, is to document the course of California government from 1967 to 1974, and Reagan's impact on it. While many interviewees frame their narratives of the Sacramento years in relation to goals and performance of Reagan's national administration, their comments often clarify aspects of the gubernatorial period that were not clear at the time. Like other historical documentation, these oral histories do not in themselves provide the complete record of the past. It is hoped that they offer firsthand experience of passions and personalities that have influenced significant events past and present.

The Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series was begun with funding from the California legislature via the office of the Secretary of State and continued through the generosity of various individual donors. Several memoirs have been funded in part by the California Women in Politics Project under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, including a matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; by the Sierra Club Project also under a NEH grant; and by the privately funded Bay Area State and Regional Planning Project. This joint funding has enabled staff working with narrators and topics related to several projects to expand the scope and thoroughness of each individual interview involved by careful coordination of their work.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobiographical interviews with persons significant in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D. Hart, Director of the Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office. Copies of all interviews in the series are available for research use in The Bancroft Library, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and the State Archives in Sacramento. Selected interviews are also available at other manuscript depositories.

July 1982
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Gabrielle Morris
Project Director

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*Deceased during the term of the project

INTRODUCTION

In Internal and External Operations of the California Governor's Office, 1966-1974, Ed Gillenwaters, Jim Jenkins, Florence Randolph Procunier, Robert Walker, and Rus Walton discuss a wide variety of episodes and topics which affected the conduct of Ronald Reagan's governor's office during his administration in Sacramento. While Gillenwaters and Jenkins also later held more visible appointments in Sacramento in the Department of Commerce, public affairs, and the Health and Welfare Agency respectively, and comment substantively on these positions, they also bring into view their responsibilities in, and the workings of, the governor's Washington, D.C. office, an element of the administration frequently understated.

Procunier details a very different perspective on Reagan's governor's office, one closer in: she describes her role as personal secretary to Edwin Meese when he was Governor Reagan's legal affairs aide and then executive assistant.

From his long-term, personal association with Reagan as a fellow Republican party campaigner in the early 1960s, Walker recalls his efforts to help Reagan win both re-election in 1970 as well as the national presidency (from 1968 on), both efforts conducted as external operations by members of Reagan's staff.

Rus Walton's personal recollections of his role in program development as an idea man for Governor Reagan, especially vis-à-vis other staff in the governor's office, contribute an additional perspective on the administration which complements the other oral history interviews in this volume. Indeed, Walker and Walton both demonstrate how external matters so affected the office's internal operations.

Taken collectively, these oral histories broaden our understanding of the responsibilities of the modern governor's office, and how that work is carried out and by whom; bring much new information into the foreground of research on Ronald Reagan's Sacramento years; and imprint candid, personal notes onto that history.

Sarah Sharp
Interviewer-Editor

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Edgar Gillenwaters

WASHINGTON OFFICE TROUBLESHOOTER AND ADVOCATE FOR
COMMERCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1967-1973

An Interview Conducted by
Sarah Sharp
in 1983



EDGAR M. GILLENWATERS

1982

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Two major efforts of the Government History Documentation Project, the Ronald Reagan Era, 1966-1974, are to learn about the careers of those persons who worked with Mr. Reagan in Sacramento as they reflect participation in critical episodes and policies, and to understand how these persons rose to these positions. In interviewees' discussions of their earlier positions and interests, the project benefits by gathering important side notes in the economic, social, and political history of the Golden State. Readers of many oral history interviews in this series will notice common threads of philosophy and interests which the interviewees share, as well as unique personalities and pasts. Such is the case with this volume.

In "Washington Office Troubleshooter and Advocate for Commerce in California, 1967-1973," Edgar M. Gillenwaters recalls his several positions in the governor's office and his years as director of the reorganized Department of Commerce. Especially valuable are his description of the operations of the Washington, D.C. office of Mr. Reagan during the early part of his governorship, and the accompanying illustrative anecdotes; and the interviewee's recollections of his efforts, along with those of Lieutenant Governor Edwin Reinecke, to expand economic development in California through the Department of Commerce.

Gillenwaters opens his interview with brief notes about his father, Theodore Roosevelt Gillenwaters, an attorney in the area of ocean law. While Mr. Reagan was governor, the elder Gillenwaters formulated the Pacific Basin Treaty which drew lines of cooperation among nations bordering the Pacific Ocean in the development of this ocean's resources. Ed Gillenwaters then considers his own work as a staff assistant at Rohr Aircraft Corporation, the reason for his move to Barnes Chase Company to work as an advertising account executive and in political affairs, and his early Republican efforts which led to his position in Washington, D.C. as an administrative assistant to Bob Wilson, congressman from San Diego. Several points of special interest highlight this early part of Gillenwaters's recollections: Rohr Corporations president Burt Rayne's interest in Ronald Reagan, the Republican-staffed Paul Revere Panel which followed presidential candidate John F. Kennedy during his campaign in 1959, and recollections of Congressman Wilson's responsibilities and of the rest of the California congressional delegation.

Between 1967 and 1971, Gillenwaters acted as Governor Reagan's liaison in Washington, D.C., and held several other positions. In Washington, although his official title was a deputy director of the Department of Finance, Gillenwaters reported directly to Governor Reagan, and actually represented the entire Sacramento administration. In the interview, Gillenwaters remarks that though he already "had pretty good rapport with the [federal] agencies," there was even a special benefit in working for this

governor: "As soon as I got across that this was Governor Ronald Reagan's Washington, D.C. liaison office calling, the wire started to spark. It was really fun to see the accomplishments it brought about." During Reagan's informal bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1968, Gillenwaters took a short leave of absence to tour important primary states with the candidate and to attend the Republican national convention in Miami Beach, Florida. After his return to Sacramento, Gillenwaters assisted Governor Reagan in intergovernmental affairs and, in 1970, was a liaison between the governor's office staff and the staff heading the re-election campaign.

Clearly the capstone of Gillenwaters's years in state government was his effort, after Governor Reagan appointed him director of the revitalized Department of Commerce in 1971, to bring development of the space shuttle to California. Gillenwaters enthusiastically relates the chronology of this campaign and shows how it complemented other activities within the department on behalf of the California economy.

This single interview session was held in the bustling lobby of the Marriott Hotel, nearby the Los Angeles International airport, at mid-day on 14 February 1983. Gillenwaters took time away from his current responsibilities at Coldwell Banker and Company in Los Angeles. The interviewer sent an outline of the topics to be covered ahead of time to the interviewee, which prompted a telephone discussion about selection of specific topics and about the overall oral history process. Gillenwaters reviewed and returned his transcript quickly, smoothing out rough passages and providing additional material.

Sarah Sharp
Interviewer-Editor

September 1984
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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please print or write clearly)

Your full name

Edgar Martin, HillmanatorDate of birth January 16, 1932 Place of birth Klamath Falls, OregonFather's full name Theodore Roosevelt HillmanatorBirthplace Maryhill, WashingtonOccupation Attorney, Financial ConsultantMother's full name M. Elizabeth HillmanatorBirthplace Lincolnton (Later called Klamath Falls) OregonOccupation Professional Singer & Musician (light opera, etc.)Where did you grow up? For Angeles, Wash DC, in CanadaPresent community Peter Venet Estates, CaliforniaEducation 2 years of College - Univ. of ColoradoOccupation(s) Commercial Real Estate BrokerSpecial interests or activities Equestrian activities, Tennis, Horseracing, Republican Party activities

Edgar M. Gillenwaters

Summary:

Executive career spans six industries and five areas of state and national government. Steady increase in level of responsibility and earnings. Strong personal motivation and organizational ability.

Experience:

Executive business management, commerce and trade management, financial and government affairs management, advertising and public relations management, and manufacturing and marketing management.

Positions and Accomplishments:

Vice President/Director, National Athletic Health Institute Inc., 1973-Present
Organized Board of Directors, administration, funding, operations and public identification of new research institute.

Director of Commerce, State of California Department of Commerce, 1971-1973
Created and carried out new economic development policies (and recruited personnel) that obtained major federal contracts, expanded tourism, increased foreign trade and attracted new industrial firms to California.

Assistant to Governor for Intergovernmental Affairs, Governor Reagan's Staff, 1969-1971
Increased participation of industry, counties, cities and action groups in state governmental executive branch decisions. Developed stronger liaison with other state governments on issues of common interest and concern.

Deputy Director of Finance, State of California Department of Finance, 1967-1969
Gained greater economic support for California government and industry by planning and conducting extensive liaison with White House, Federal agencies and Congressional leaders for Governor and State agencies.

Executive Assistant to U.S. Congressman, Congressman Bob Wilson (R) Calif. 1963-1967
Coordinated Armed Service Committee participation, Federal legislation, office administration, news media and public activities.

Advertising Executive, Barnes Chase Advertising Company, 1960-1963
Conducted successful campaigns that expanded savings and loan firm to tenth largest in nation, publicly identified new title insurance firm, and attracted sizeable national accounts to a Hawaiian financial institution.

Manufacturing and Sales Executive, Rohr Corporation, Edgemont Mining & Uranium Co., Uranium Engineering Co., Transportes Aereos de Jalisco-Mexico, 1952-1960
Initiated and carried out activities leading to increased efficiency and profit for firms in aerospace, mining and exploration, electronics and air transportation.

Personal Data:

Born 16 March 1932; married, three children; war veteran; University of Colorado, conversational Spanish; DOD secret clearance; health - excellent, 6'1", 185 pounds.

Organizations:

National Press Club, National Aviation Club, Town Hall, Heritage Foundation Advisory Board, Institute for Executive Research Advisory Board and Board of Directors of National Athletic Health Institute.

I PRELIMINARIES

[Date of Interview: February 14, 1983]##

Family and Early Career Notes

Sharp: Before we began you were telling me about your father, Theodore Roosevelt Gillenwaters. Maybe you could start by telling me a little bit more about him and about some of his work. We'll go from there.

Gillenwaters: He is an attorney by profession, but has been in politics since his early twenties. He was the district attorney in Klamath Falls, Oregon at twenty-six years old. Republican politics and government seem to have been an interest of his and carried on to most members of the family. He's still very involved and not retired from his career at eighty years old! He and my mother live in Newport Beach.

He was an advisor to now President, then Governor, Ronald Reagan in a number of fields. One I've mentioned to you earlier, the field of ocean science, ocean law, and oceanography. Another, serving on the Commission of the Californias. He had been in business in Mexico during one period of his career and was familiar with the political, governmental, and the industrial bases in Mexico.

What other information about him are you interested in?

Sharp: I'm interested in the part that you mentioned, for one thing.

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 37.

Gillenwaters: Oh, the Pacific Basin treaty! I believe it was called a pact. You could better expand on it by talking to him, but as I recall, it was a pact drawn up by him and proposed to all Pacific Basin entities, be they states of the United States or neighboring countries, Canada, Mexico. It concerned the use and abuse of the Pacific Ocean from the standpoint of pollution, from the standpoint of developing underwater mining, and developing energy and other ocean resources. He was determined to develop a strong spirit of cooperation between all entities bordering the Pacific Ocean. He did that through direct liaison with Governor Reagan. It was a subject that Reagan was very interested in.

Sharp: Yes, I know that he was from what I read. And certainly, just from what you've said about your work in the Department of Commerce about the issue of business and the future of California, it's a pre-eminent concern that would certainly fit in.

Did you and your father talk about the kinds of things you would do when you grew up? Did you sit around and--?

Gillenwaters: Not often, it was probably more of a case of "role model" than talk. [laughs] I can recall no conversation in the early years that would have guided me towards--in fact, I hadn't ever intended to go, in this direction.

When I first became involved in government and politics as a profession, I made a promise to my wife Jane that it would be very short, probably two years, maybe four, but certainly no longer than four years. It was a tour of duty just for the experience.

My thrust had been, and still is, to live in the sunny areas of California and to be associated with industry here. I had moved from the Rohr Corporation to an advertising company in San Diego. At one point San Diego's congressman, Republican congressman, Bob Wilson, was going to bring a group of United States congressmen through San Diego on what was called the Paul Revere Panel, in late 1959, I think. Perhaps you've come across this before; they followed Jack [John F.] Kennedy around during his first presidential campaign, setting the record straight on his issue positions. That was their mission.

I was called upon at the advertising agency at Wilson's request to set up a schedule and publicity and that sort of thing for the Paul Revere Panel. It turned out to be enormously successful. Much of that was a result of my effort, but also due to the times as they were in San Diego,

where people, being a navy town, were very interested in partisan politics.

As a result of that good organizing job, Wilson asked me to be his administrative assistant.

I had met Ronald Reagan several years before, when I was at the Rohr Corporation. He had come down to the Hotel del Coronado for General Electric and was giving a speech to a management seminar. I had been invited that night to a dinner by Burt Raynes, president of Rohr.

It was an awakening for me. My daily thoughts, involvements, and interests to that point in time had not really been stirred up philosophically. I was busy supporting a young family and getting established in San Diego and so forth. He really caused a political awakening for both my wife and me!

Sharp: She was there as well?

Gillenwaters: Oh yes, she was there, too. And after the speech, we made ourselves known to him, and we've laughed about that on a few occasions over the years since that time. But he is truly responsible for stimulating my interest and involvement in politics and government.

[interruption]

Sharp: How did he seem to you then--essentially an after-dinner speaker?

Gillenwaters: He seemed very credible. Unlike other political speakers, I could easily relate to him. His terminology and his sympathy for problems that business had, and that individuals had, seemed to come through loud and clear to me.

I am the world's worst banquet attendee! I can fall asleep at the drop of a hat. I'm not cut out for that role. But he has a different style that is convincing and sincere, the style of communication that he still has. If he believes in what he's conveying, he is probably the best in modern times at getting across.

Sharp: Was he the topic of conversation the day after at Rohr, or did it seem to make a dent?

Gillenwaters: Yes, oh, it definitely did. The president at Rohr was Burt Raynes, who was a moving force in San Diego and is still a good friend of mine. He was interested in what was going on

around the country. He too was highly impressed with Ronald Reagan. For instance, the John Birch Society was in the process of being formed about that same time, and he was very interested to know what it was all about. He had trepidations that it may not be a good organization. So we spent some time investigating that.

I was fascinated that someone, that high in business, cared. I was young at the time, and it was a great lesson to see a president of a corporation that size really care about what was going on around him. Not just as it would affect his profits, but he was heavily interested in how it was going to affect his company and the people that worked for him and so on.

Administrative Aide to Congressman Bob Wilson

Sharp: How did you then get from working at Rohr to assisting Congressman Wilson?

Gillenwaters: Because I ended up doing more and more political things at Rohr, and because they were federal contractors, we decided it would be better if I transferred to Barnes Chase advertising agency, where I could more easily participate in politics.

At Rohr, I had been in the contracts department, where I would work on getting new contracts for Rohr. So I went to the advertising agency, where I continued the political work that I was doing and developed new advertising accounts. I stayed in touch with Burt Raynes, but I was off his payroll.

I had Home Federal Savings and Loan's advertising account. Gordon Luce at that time was associated with them. He is now with San Diego Great American Federal. The chairman of Home Federal was Charles Fletcher, who was a former U.S. congressman. His son, Kim Fletcher, is now chairman of the board of that company. Fletcher was very interested in what was going on politically, too.

So although I did serve a major advertising function, handling their account and so forth, and other accounts, too, the political interest was of common ground.

That led into working for Congressman Bob Wilson, because he had asked me to organize the Paul Revere Panel, as stated earlier.

Sharp: Did you work with the San Diego central committee, the county Republican party, or was it solo?

Gillenwaters: During that event of the Paul Revere Panel coming to San Diego, I met Dr. [Gaylord] Parkinson, and Eleanor Ring [Storrs], Bob Wilson's local staff, and the state legislator, Clair Burgener.

I became a member of the newly formed Republican Associates, and Bob [Robert C.] Walker was part of that.* One event led to another, and it was an exciting experience. It was more exciting for me at that period of time than the humdrum advertising or industrial job. [laughs] I became very enthusiastic with the goals and objectives of Republican Associates, and I helped expand their membership via my family, social, and business contacts. That was just prior to moving to Washington, D.C.

Sharp: I was interested in knowing about your work with Congressman Wilson from several different aspects. The main one is that we know very little about the congressional delegation from California, how they work in Washington. Of course we understand, obviously, that they're responsible for initiating certain kinds of legislation, but just the operation of the congressional delegation is pretty invisible.

Gillenwaters: Yes, it's unbelievable, but California had never had a cohesive delegation. I worked on that in two separate roles back then. Because of the incredible impact on legislation, on such things as the immigration laws, on the problems that the tuna fleet had with foreign fisheries or fishermen coming in and overfishing our territory. There are so many enormous problems that could have been effectively dealt with had the delegation been more cohesive. First of all, you have the typical northern California-southern California division. Then there's the partisan division. Then there were jealousies over chairmanships and memberships in committees. So it was awkward.

But it did improve during the Reagan years from my point of view, Reagan's gubernatorial years. One reason was that we made it a point to keep the governor in full contact with the entire congressional delegation.

*Readers may be interested to see an interview with Robert C. Walker in this same volume.

I might note the obvious, but as administrative assistant to Congressman Bob Wilson, my assignment read something like this, that I was to coordinate his Armed Services Committee participation, the federal legislation in which he was interested, coordinate the office administration, news media and public activities that were required of him.

Sharp: It covers just about everything.

Gillenwaters: It did. He had a small office, but he had two women, and later three, who were very highly qualified and experienced. We ran a tight ship and had one of the best offices on Capitol Hill. I have to say, it was because of these two and later three gals who were very dedicated and skilled in their job.

Bob Wilson was also, at that time, chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee. Between being in the Republican leadership, the House Armed Services Committee, and the chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, his office was continually the focal point for the leadership from particularly the House side and sometimes the Senate side. People that now are in leadership positions, Bob Michael, Bob Dole, John Tower, it was not unusual for them to gather in Bob Wilson's office at the end of the day, and rap about what was going on legislative-wise, politically, militarily overseas.

Much of the time I was included in that, because I was Bob's administrative assistant. He dealt with the staff that way, where other congressmen are very "close to the chest." So I had a unique situation where I was thrust on the inside of a great many issues with those men.

Sharp: I'd like to have a better sense of some of the ways of your working. Just on a daily or a weekly basis. Maybe we could take the Armed Services Committee's work as one of the issues, if you recall any anecdotes about how you might have worked on that committee to assist Mr. Wilson.

Gillenwaters: The Armed Services Committee does now and did then have a very strong staff. They did a good job on preparing the pros and cons of any issue before the committee. But we would take that staff work and try it on in our district with military leaders, sometimes on the q.t. [quietly], San Diego being his home base, there was enormous military activity there. We would try it on with members of Congress in whose district other facilities were located. He would try it on with retired members of Congress who had been the route before, and they had good observations. He talked to trusted industrialists about it. The impact of this or that particular project or a weapons system or reduction or increase

being called for. We, I guess you would say, would double up on the staff work that was done to be sure of its accuracy and to add Wilson's views to the consideration.

Sharp: Did you find you yourself then meeting with some of these people?

Gillenwaters: Yes, but Wilson was very good at that. That was his first love. He was really interested and fascinated with the Armed Services Committee, and he did a very responsible job of personally reviewing and being involved in each issue. It wasn't just a matter of staff telling him, "We think you should do this. Go vote yes," which happens all too often.

I was included in a lot of those meetings, Department of Defense in particular, where I would meet on the staff level there with my counterparts or an administrative type. But Bob Wilson prided himself on his personal contact, and the trust that he had built up over the years, with key military and Department of Defense people.

Sharp: It sounds like you might have found yourself sort of immediately--

Gillenwaters: Immersed. I'm a flexible person. I liked that kind of activity. Nothing gets to me more than having to follow a repetitious routine that isn't particularly constructive. I had good staff backup in my office, and it allowed me to move with the congressman frequently. He was one of those people that liked to educate whoever worked for him.

Sharp: The Congressional Campaign Committee, was that really a re-election committee?

Gillenwaters: Yes, the thrust of the National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee is to elect more Republican congressmen to the Congress, to move the balance of the House to the Republican side and hold it. The Democrats have a counterpart to that committee.

Sharp: What's the connection between this particular committee, then and, say, the Republican National Committee?

Gillenwaters: The Republican National Committee is primarily interested in the presidential elections, but they also do contribute some time, energy, planning, and funds, to the congressional campaigns as well. I don't know the history of why the duplication has occurred. There is, to this day, a lot of party effort duplication and a lot of territorial feelings. I have just served as Finance Chairman for a local congressional race--Bart Christiansen. I saw the same duplication within those committees today as existed twenty years ago.

II LIAISON FOR GOVERNOR REAGAN, 1967-1971

Washington, D.C. Troubleshooter;
The 1968 Republican National Convention

Sharp: Now, with the state central committee, of course, there has been, for a long time, the Cal Plan. Is there any connection? Is there an attempt at any sort of cohesive working similarly?

Gillenwaters: Yes. It boils down to the personalities involved. When Gaylord Parkinson was state party chairman, the nature of his enthusiastic personality combined with his management abilities proved constructive. I always thought he was miscast in the role of a doctor. He was able to tie up all the party entities into a group that wanted to work together, and it has never been the same since then, to my knowledge. It just shows that it can be done.

Ed Reinecke is coming up now as state party chairman and will surprise everybody. I think he will do well. He thinks very much the same. Not quite as aggressive as Dr. Parkinson, but a convincing, enthusiastic man.

Sharp: Let's move on and talk some about the governor's office, which you came into in 1967. I'd like to know a little bit, first of all, about one of the governors' conferences, which I had a note that you had attended.

Gillenwaters: It depends on which conference you're talking about. I attended a lot of them.

Sharp: This is one that--

Gillenwaters: In Palm Springs?

Sharp: No, this is in Montana. The western governors' conference in Montana.

Gillenwaters: I remember it well. [laughs] I just had on Ronald Reagan's cowboy boots yesterday. He gave them to me because they didn't fit him. [laughs] They were a gift from that conference.

Sharp: So they're historical boots, then?

Gillenwaters: Sure, but I use them regularly when working my horses at home.

Sharp: I'd like to know how Mr. Reagan might have worked in that sort of setting. And also, something about the sense of expectations that other western governors might have had. There is always this feeling that the governor of California is--

Gillenwaters: Ominous.

Sharp: Something different. Something out of the ordinary. And what is it? Is it Mr. Reagan or is it the fact that he is the governor of California? In this early period.

Gillenwaters: Combination. This will be fun to talk about. First of all with respect to that mystique, number one, being from California is part of it. Number two, being from southern California is another part of it. And number three, having been an actor had to be a curiosity, but added to that is the huge margin of votes by which he was elected. Add to that the amount of attention paid by the news media to every step and breath that Ronald Reagan takes.

If you move a man like that, be it a Reagan or anyone else with a similar combination, into a group of politicians, whether they're congressmen or governors or supervisors at the county level, he seems to have what they all wish they had. Most of them don't for some reason come up with that same lucky combination. But they all recognize that he has the combination by which one gets elected to national office.

Rarely does a dull man get elected president. And so he had what I would term a constructive combination of factors coupled with the mystique that made him a very special attraction.

With regard to the conference in West Yellowstone, Montana, that is an experience I'll never forget. I stayed there two weeks. I was there as an advance man, had my

family with me, too. It was interesting that everywhere you went, my counterparts, the local people, the ranchers, the news media, all wanted to know about Ronald Reagan. Instead of, "What is the essence of this conference," and, "What are we trying to accomplish here," and, "What's the main thrust of our gathering?"

It was embarrassing to him. It was like a movie premiere, and it shouldn't have been that way, and he didn't particularly want it to be that way.

He spent an inordinate amount of time getting acquainted with each governor that attended. Some of them criticized him as they still do today, because they can't match his attraction. But most of them became strong allies. That caused the governors, in my opinion, to pull together. It was something new. It was giving hope that the gubernatorial level would get the attention that it had sadly lacked in Washington for a long time. Whether they were Democrat or Republican, in that instance, or downstream in other meetings or other situations, he seemed to bring a lot of focus on the power of the governorship that had been missing across the country in the past decade at least.

Sharp: Even in this very earliest--?

Gillenwaters: Yes. It came on very strong, very fast. I saw that. Being stationed in Washington, I could see the impact. I would dial the phone to the Department of Agriculture or wherever. As soon as I got across that this was Governor Ronald Reagan's Washington, D.C. liaison office, the wire started to spark. It was really fun to see the accomplishments it brought about. We can get on to that later if you want. But that, more than any other factor, helped accomplish important projects while I was in the Washington, D.C. office. If you said that you were Ronald Reagan's representative calling or that he wanted an answer to a question, it was the greatest short cut I have ever experienced. I had been in Washington four years up to that time with Bob Wilson and we had pretty good rapport with the agencies.

Sharp: But this new "tool" was really something quite different.

I have a few last questions then on the governors' conference, because there are these conferences, you know--

Gillenwaters: Ad infinitum. [laughs]

Sharp: Yes, all the time. What essentially was the purpose of the conference and Mr. Reagan's attending?

Gillenwaters: Primarily to work on issues of common interest, but it's hard for me to recall after fifteen, eighteen years. We used it to get him acquainted, as would be normal and natural, and to get him established as a constructive leader on behalf of other governors. He needed to get acquainted with and to set the stage for later working with, all the participating states. I can't recall now, but issues like water, energy, forestry, and fisheries. I'm sure those things came up, but "issue preparation" at that conference was not my role. That was someone else's responsibility.

Sharp: Let's go on to talk about your work in Washington. Before that, though, did you ever exchange any words with Mr. Reagan on why he wanted to go to this or what he thought he was supposed to do there?

Gillenwaters: To the conference?

Sharp: Yes.

Gillenwaters: To the best of my recollection, I was notified first by Mike [Michael K.] Deaver that they were going to attend, and would I do the advance work. [Tim M.] Babcock, as I remember, was the host governor, and I had met him before in Washington. Howard Kelsey was one of the local hosts. He was a rancher there, and a hotel owner, too. To this day he is still a good friend of Reagan's, which emanated from that particular conference.

##

Sharp: You were in Washington, you were not in Sacramento. How might the communication have gone back and forth on a daily or a weekly basis?

Gillenwaters: Frequent issues came up in Sacramento wherein Reagan wanted direct input. There wasn't a memo written to someone, who then called me, who then--. He just called me up and said, "Find out what you can about this." And I would do that and get back to him by phone or memo. He didn't have lots of "layers" in between us.

It was probably the single most rewarding period of my life in terms of, "you work hard and what did you get out of it [laughs], other than a paycheck?" Because they (the Reagans) appreciated my prior experience there, they trusted

me with a lot of confidences. Often the staff did not like the closeness.

I could tell you an incident along that line. It might be of interest. [laughs] I think it should be told. I used to get copies of all the correspondence that went out of his capitol office, which was his idea, so that I would know what was going on in Sacramento and could apply it to what was happening in Washington. By the same token, a copy of everything that went on in my office went to the executive secretary, whether it was Phil [Philip M.] Battaglia or Bill [William P.] Clark or Ed Meese [Edwin Meese, III] or Mike Deaver in his role as assistant to the governor.

I once complained to the governor when he was in Washington on one of his frequent trips that all the "good news" was going out under the staff's name, and all the "bad news" was going out under his name. I had been around politics long enough to know that's not how you conduct a governor's operation. That isn't how you run for president either! [chuckles] When you are accomplishing something, you're entitled to take credit for it.

He didn't believe it at first. He's not usually involved in that sort of trivia and is happy if he doesn't have to sign a lot of letters. But I kept peppering him with this, and eventually he told staff my observations and gave them examples of what was going on, and the staff was subsequently reorganized.

As a matter of fact, he ultimately even borrowed my secretary, Irene Phillips. She had been, in her earlier days, secretary to Herbert Brownell, attorney general. She had been on the original "Draft Eisenhower Committee." [laughs] If you can imagine that. So I had her for seven years, and I've never been able to function as an executive as well since! She was fabulous. He borrowed her for six months, and she reorganized the large correspondence unit of the governor's office so that the mail was finally handled right.

Sharp: I've seen a note somewhere that there had been a possibility that the Washington, D.C. office might be abolished after Mr. Reagan became governor.

Gillenwaters: We considered that.

Sharp: Why was it even under consideration?

Gillenwaters: Along the same line that we didn't really think the answer to economic problems could come through exhaustive expenditures of federal money, like OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] and some of the other programs, the social programs, as opposed to development of industry. We just weren't fascinated with the many extra layers of government. My own point of view was that you can do a better job for the state in Washington if you had just flown into town, had a deadline, a schedule to meet, were there for a single purpose, had a tight, organized meeting and returned to California. Send the agricultural man one time. Send the highways man the next time. Whatever the subject matter, send the party in charge from state government directly without having all this layer established in between. I didn't succeed with that idea.

I came around to the feeling that they needed the point of reference there, and that it was the congressional delegation that really had an impact, I feel, in keeping it there. They wanted a liaison with the governor, a single liaison with the governor. So it was decided I should stay, that the office should stay open. In those days I was funded as the deputy director of the Department of Finance, but I served as the director of the Washington office.

Some of the functions that were performed that I felt were particularly valuable were for industry, where a corporation that had a federal contract in California was not being paid or where the paperwork was bogged down and slowing the project and impacting employment. I was a troubleshooter for any company in California that was having a problem with the federal government. Not a lobbyist for them, but a troubleshooter.

I could make appointments for the chairman of the board of, or an attorney for, XYZ company coming to town by saying, "This is Ronald Reagan's office calling. We have the president of PSA Airlines in town and he needs to see the Deputy Secretary of Defense on xyz issue. Can you see him today while he's in town?" I'd go with him more often than not. Or would just set up the appointment.

We had, in my opinion, a great impact on the solution of problems.

As an interesting aside, I remember the Ets-Hokin company in San Francisco. They were electrical contractors. They had been working on a major dam in northern California that was washed out by a flood. The Disaster Relief Act had provided for, I think, \$3 million repayment of flood damage,

because the dam they had just completed was wiped out.

To make a long story short, all through the Pat [Edmund G.] Brown [Sr.] administration, Louis Ets-Hokin, who was then in his eighties, had tried and tried to get this money from Washington and had been given one run around after another.

One of the first successes we had was to get through to the White House (to General Lincoln) and break loose that payment. When I came out on my next trip to Sacramento, I brought the check with me, and the governor said, "See if you can't get Mr. Ets-Hokin over from San Francisco and we'll present it to him."

He did come over, and the governor called me in, and he said, "Rather than give this check to you myself, Mr. Ets-Hokin, I want you to meet the man that made this happen."

He had me give him the check. This is a small aside, but that's how the governor's mind runs.

That's another one of those many rewarding things that I talked about earlier. Here was a very prominent Democrat in San Francisco, Louis Ets-Hokin, and he just could never get over the idea that we would go to bat for him and be successful about it, and call him over, rather than just mail it to him, because he was a Democrat.

Cyril Magnin was another one who became a very good friend of mine and of Governor Reagan's for the same kind of service. Except that it was not a disaster, but because of the attention that his industry was getting from our administration.

Sharp: I was wondering how you would have assigned your priorities to what you were supposed to do in the Washington office.

Gillenwaters: Well, there first was the matter of legislation that impacted the state. I would let our office in Sacramento, the governor's office, know of new legislation and that sort of thing. Then they would get back to me. I was not saddled with having to figure out whether it impacted the state or didn't and how. That was done by each department in Sacramento.

I really functioned more as a liaison between departments and the committees, and most of the time was backed up by someone from Sacramento. Because Washington revolves around personal relationships, it was important to get through on issues that affected California, to have those

relationships which had developed during the Bob Wilson days. We frankly used those to the benefit of the state, and to the benefit of California's industries.

Sharp:

I want to push this along a little bit, but I had some notes that you had some contact with other California representatives who were in Washington, D.C. Mr. [John T.] Kehoe, for example, who was representative for the California state college and university system. I understand that some of what he did when he was in Washington before he came back to California was a matter of working with HEW [Health, Education and Welfare] and coordinating some of the federal monies that would come into California.

Gillenwaters: That's right.

Sharp:

Were there other California representatives that you remember working with and do you recall how that might have gone on?

Gillenwaters: Sure. The university system, the state college system, each had separate offices in Washington.

Sharp:

I have Mark Ferber. Is that right?

Gillenwaters: That rings a bell; I hadn't thought of it in fifteen years. [laughs] Yes, I don't recall who else. John Kehoe and I became friends. There was some constructive coordination between those offices. But a lot of them didn't have the need to go through us to accomplish something. We would back them up if they asked and if it were warranted. But they had been established a long time and had their own routes and acquaintances and were well acquainted on Capitol Hill. So they were there, and we worked together when the need arose. But we didn't have a structured--monthly meeting or system under which we operated.

I think probably to get the picture it should go without saying, perhaps, but with the enormous industrial base in California and the enormous government base in California, county government, city government, and so forth--with the size staff we had, which I think finally rose to five-- [laughs] it was a continually changing scene in the Washington office.

Every morning the priority shifted, and on top of that, then, you'd get notice that the governor was coming to Washington to accomplish a certain thing, either to speak before a committee, subcommittee, or to meet with the leadership or to meet at foreign embassies, whether it be

ambassadors or trade commissioners, and so that would always quickly shift priorities.

Sharp: I would think so. Now, with Mr. Reagan's coming back to Washington, he would come for all sorts of different events, I imagine, some committee hearings that he would present some material--?

Gillenwaters: That's right. There was the National Governors' Conference in Washington. He spoke to the League of Cities, as I remember. There were always invitations from every embassy in town. We went to a lot of those. My wife and I were going in different directions representing them. Sometimes we'd have to change clothes twice during the evening to adhere to varying formalities of the event. Looking back on it, I don't know how we survived. But it was a lot of fun. We had young children; it was tough. Reagan or his representative was very much in demand, not only socially, but by every entity in Washington with any connection with California at large.

Sharp: Did this accelerate from the beginning of the time to the end of the time?

Gillenwaters: Yes, greatly so. Greatly so. It apparently had been almost nonexistent before us. Though the Washington office was there, because of the unique combination of factors that make up Ronald Reagan, and because he was talked about in the press as being a contender for the presidency, that fed the demand for him.

Sharp: Did this work, then, even after '68?

Gillenwaters: Yes. It also had a very favorable impact, in my opinion, in getting governmental tasks accomplished, because people on the other end realized they were dealing with a potential president. He was from a major state. It just created a constructive advantage governmentally, not only politically, for him to be commonly thought of as a contender for the presidency. And we did use that.

Sharp: Now, I know that when Mr. Brown, Sr. was governor, there were all sorts of activities that the person in the Washington governor's office had, some of which were troubleshooting and working with federal departments and facilitating everything going to California, but also more strictly political activities. Would you have had some political chores too?

Gillenwaters: Well, I wasn't that familiar with the day-to-day of the prior operations. I have to say that in the four years preceding

(I was in Bob Wilson's office), that I had very little contact with the then-governor's Washington, D.C. office. So maybe they were working the Democratic powers in politics only. I don't know.

With San Diego as sizable and controversial and with the building of the Coronado bridge in San Diego and so forth, you would have thought that we would have heard from them more.

I knew who the people were, from social functions, but never had much contact from them urging support on behalf of this or that issue.

Sharp: You had mentioned when we talked earlier that you had taken a leave of absence to go to one or more of the conventions. Which one or more were they?

Gillenwaters: [laughs] Let's see if I can reconstruct it.

Sharp: If it was '68 or--?

Gillenwaters: Well, I was with Bob Wilson. We came out, the family came out to San Diego from Washington, D.C. the summer of '64. And Bob Wilson, being a good friend of Barry Goldwater [Sr.], was asked if he could find some people to shore up the campaign, which was sagging, in California.

So I went off the payroll and did work for the Goldwater campaign for, as I recall, a couple of months. It was an interesting experience. I traveled with Goldwater some short periods of time and ended up at the convention and served as a staff member on the platform committee of the convention.

Sharp: Did you then also go to the '68 convention?

Gillenwaters: Yes.

Sharp: What strikes you as being similar or different from one convention to the other?

Gillenwaters: Well, Miami was quite different. [laughter] Let's see.

Sharp: You had Mr. [Richard M.] Nixon's predominance and pre-eminence, of course.

Gillenwaters: Yes. In '64 I was not so involved in this delegate search, and the tensions within the party of one candidate over another. In '68 (it's been a long time since I recalled all this) I had a great involvement in the procedure involving

the state delegations and how they were inclined to go, and which ones were in need of being worked on. In a few cases, I traveled with Governor Reagan to those states. North Carolina being one. And Florida.

Sharp: The South, of course, was the particular trouble spot.

Gillenwaters: Right. Florida. You'll hear it a lot of different ways, but the bottom line was that during that convention six Florida delegates caved in (they had earlier committed to Ronald Reagan), and that caused an avalanche that was not anticipated. But for these six votes, he could have been president earlier, in my book.

I think it's probably just as well that he wasn't, from the standpoint that he went on to prove his leadership capacities with California in the years that followed, which I think are serving him well even now.

Sharp: What was the energy level like after everybody went home from the convention? You went back to Washington to go about your duties, and everybody else went back to Sacramento to go about their duties?

Gillenwaters: Well, there was the expected letdown in energy level. But not for long. One thing I have always been just almost stunned by with respect to Ronald Reagan is his consistency. First, he is fascinating because he understands how to keep himself healthy, both mentally and physically. It's a natural thing for him to do, whereas most of the rest of us have to work hard at it. Not overeating or eating the wrong things. He has a very distinct "inner peace" that allows him not only to stay together mentally, but to stay together physically.

Many times on the road I ended up sharing a suite of rooms with him, and he would jump up and do sixty push-ups in the morning on a "push-up wheel"--like a little wagon wheel with an axel through it--which makes it doubly or triply hard for push-ups. He does them to this day, I understand. I couldn't do it, and you know, he's twenty-three years older than I am. [laughs]

Sharp: I have visions of you both trying to do it at the same time, he giving you a lesson.

Gillenwaters: Oh, he'd give me a humorously rough time. He rarely ever had a drink. Occasionally would have one drink. The only time I've ever seen him have two drinks was when it was a tall orange juice with vodka, and then at home. He just doesn't

need it to relax. He doesn't need it to open communication. His energy level is phenomenal.

I do think he probably got a feeling of confinement for a while when he had to go back to Sacramento in '68. But he soon moved in other directions. That was about the time I came to Sacramento to a new staff position.

Sharp: That's really our next topic.

Let me just ask you one last wind-up question on these years in Washington. How were things different after Mr. Nixon became president for you in the Washington office?

Gillenwaters: It was tough at first. It was very tough. But through Dr. Parkinson and other leaders in San Diego, I had known President Nixon and a lot of his staff, and through Congressman Wilson, too, who was a very close friend of Dick Nixon. I had spent a little bit of time working on Nixon's ill-fated gubernatorial campaign [in 1962]. After people in the Nixon administration recognized that Ronald Reagan wasn't going to be a total ogre about having lost, and after they got through trying to punish us all for threatening Nixon's chance to win the nomination, relationships straightened out.

I knew Bob [Robert H.] Finch before, and Senator George Murphy was the greatest common line between us all. He was very close to Reagan and still is, and he was very close to Nixon and still is. When I would have a problem getting through--which we sometimes did--on behalf of the state or Ronald Reagan, I would go to George Murphy and he would take care of it by setting up appointments or making crucial phone calls.

Bob [H.R.] Haldeman I had known only slightly before. (I saw him a couple of days ago at a luncheon!) Like me, he's now also in real estate. My wife was heavily involved in the Junior League of Washington, which made a considerable difference, too. Many wives of key civil servants and of men in the Nixon administration were involved. It's interesting how, if you ride horseback with someone or play tennis, or whatever together, it often overrides other problems and makes a short cut for solving problems.

Sharp: What were some of the main sticking points with respect to Mr. Nixon's being president and issues that California needed to have the federal government deal with?

Gillenwaters: Are you asking me, during that period?

Sharp: Yes.

Gillenwaters: It's hard to recall those issues now, some fifteen years later. It really is. There were no significant ones. Nixon was a Californian, and they weren't going to punish the state by not helping. The Reagan staff and the Nixon staff had become at loggerheads over the tangle for the presidential nomination. But the congressional delegation was originally close to Nixon. It was just getting through on the White House level that was at first tough. On individual cases, where some Californian's papers had been taken from him in France, or somewhere overseas, and they needed help getting out and their congressman hadn't been of help to them. That's the type of thing. I really can't at this moment recall any particular state/federal issue so much as I recall the antagonism that existed but, for the most part, was finally dropped.

Sharp: Would you like to take a break? I have quite a few more questions, and I don't know how much more time you have.

Gillenwaters: It's up to you. I'm fine.

Sharp: Let's keep going, then.

Intergovernmental Affairs in Sacramento

Sharp: What then led up to your coming back to California to head up the intergovernmental affairs work?

Gillenwaters: Well, two things really. Probably more than two. But basically two. First of all, I touched upon earlier my complaints about how the staff had operated. I was frustrated by that, because I thought he should be served better by his staff. He finally came to recognize that, and I think my move to Sacramento was in his mind to involve me directly in the day-to-day staff function.

My family are all Californians. We grew up here. We wanted to be here. We had had several close calls with the family, two of them in one week, that had to do with near harm to the family. One my daughter, one my wife. We could have stuck it out, but we had lived there long enough, so we decided it was a good time to come home. And rather than leave the governor, he asked us to stay with the staff, which of course put us in Sacramento. We liked it there a lot. Tahoe and that area.

Secondly, he wanted to improve the liaison between the governor's office and California industry and business. At that time there were a lot of complaints that decisions were being made at the cabinet level without enough input from business and industry. As I recall, the only payroll opening on the staff was "intergovernmental affairs," so I was given that slot as a manner of paying me while I served in other roles, as well.

I did serve some functions which were attendant to the salary slot. But my thrust was to improve liaisons with the aerospace industry and shipping, airlines, tourism, world trade, to let them know what issues were coming up in the cabinet for discussion and to get their input to be sure that the governor was interfaced to a greater degree.

That led on ultimately to my becoming director of the Department of Commerce. Then, we totally gutted the department and reorganized with the emphasis toward attracting industry into California and expanding the industry that was here to increase employment.

Sharp: Let me back you up a bit then. Did you have a predecessor in the intergovernmental affairs role?

Gillenwaters: If I did, I don't recall now who it was. [laughs]

It probably was an opening that had not been filled, or had been used for another purpose. I think intergovernmental affairs may have been handled by Ed Meese directly.

Sharp: But not as a main function?

Gillenwaters: Or Ron Frankum, who had done some of those duties before.

Sharp: Was it a matter, then, of you and Mr. Reagan sitting down and carving out, writing up a list of things that--?

Gillenwaters: No, it finally evolved, as I recall, under Ed Meese's direction. As we were improving liaisons with business and industry, we also were beginning to interface better with county governments on the issues that were coming up for consideration by the cabinet.

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Gillenwaters: We would keep close liaison with other states on some issues but not too many, because basically, such liaison was conducted on an agency to agency level. But there were cases

where we talked to other governors' offices about issues of common concern.

Sharp: What is an example of one of those issues perhaps?

Gillenwaters: I can't remember such details fifteen years later, but I remember one conversation, or one exchange, that developed around flood control regulations at the federal level. I can remember conversations on armed services items with the state of Washington, Oregon, and California, where we were trying to get ship refitting and repair activities concentrated on the West Coast, because they had drifted to the East Coast and Texas. We were working on a three-state basis to get that kind of funding headed back this way.

I think most of my time, though, was spent leading up to the ultimate rebuilding of the Department of Commerce.

Sharp: Let me ask you a few more questions, and maybe that will help to fill that in. There was the issue of the veto power that was used regarding federal monies, federal grants, coming into California. I wondered if you could describe, if you have any sense of how priorities were arranged, how they were set up, about how that might have been used?

Gillenwaters: Are you talking specifically about OEO?

Sharp: More generally, actually. OEO might be an example, but more generally, the use of the veto power.

Gillenwaters: Which we did use a lot.

Sharp: Yes.

Gillenwaters: No, you really would have to get that from Ed Meese or, in the case of OEO--

Sharp: Is it Lou Uhler?

Gillenwaters: Lou, yes, you could ask him, or Jim Diese. He shouldn't be hard to find. I think he's in Oakland.

Sharp: The project has interviewed Mr. Uhler, but primarily on the Prop. 1 campaign of 1973.

Mr. Uhler's recollections of some of the federal monies coming into California were that they were not particularly--and this is a generous statement--well organized and that the

governor's office had some feeling perhaps that there was a need to coordinate some of them.*

Gillenwaters: That's true, and we felt there was a vast abuse of the OEO funded programs. Where at random, on an "amuck" basis, [laughter] many OEO applications poured into Washington for funds for make-work projects that were not priorities, nor a wise use of taxpayers' money. Yet there were some very good projects, too.

I was not party to forming the criteria that resulted in denial or approval. I do remember the function of reviewing the recommendations and adding my observations, but it was Ed Meese's baby.

Sharp: Is that how ideas flowed around within the governor's office, then, about what might have built up to a veto, that recommendations perhaps were circulated among a small--?

Gillenwaters: They theoretically came under my intergovernmental affairs umbrella. They didn't go to everybody in the governor's office. But if it were an education grant, Alex Sherriffs would have had a look at it. If it was legal, then it would have been sent to the legal affairs secretary for his input.

Sharp: You did have input, then, from other offices and agencies within state government regarding a particular issue, and you might have felt, indeed, some pressure about items, whatever that item was?

Gillenwaters: Yes. We always welcomed the input. Then it was taken apart and looked at apart from all the pieces and put together and looked at in context with the picture of the philosophy of this administration.

This was such a long time ago, and was more of an indirect responsibility than a direct one, so it's hard for me to recall it twelve or fifteen years later.

But I do remember that we had a struggle getting OEO channeled through the governor's office. I remember Frank Carlucci out for a meeting on several occasions with Ed

*See Lewis K. Uhler, "Chairman of the Task Force in Tax Reduction," in The History of Proposition #1: Precursor of California Tax Limitation, Oral History Program, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, 1982.

on this point. We summoned them together, asked them, insisted that Carlucci come out from Washington, and others, too, to understand that as governor of this state that Reagan had the prerogative of final approval or final denial of one of these grants. There had been quite a buildup in the years preceding Ronald Reagan of just random approvals. So.... That's about the most I recall.

Sharp: I wonder to what extent you might have felt, the governor's office might have felt, some competition with Washington in establishing the direction for programs that were going to be happening in California? It seems like there might have been two masters in some respects.

Gillenwaters: Yes. The Reagan philosophy was, of course, to bring the responsibility of government back to as close to the people as one could get it. Along that line, there was quite a struggle and a lot of resentment in instances where the federal government summarily overrode the prerogatives of the governor, the governor's office, or the governor's authority in the use of federal funds within the state. We made great progress during Reagan's administration when I was in Sacramento, toward that end.

Sharp: You were some few steps ahead because you had been in Washington and maybe knew some of the networks, at least some of the ways of working, so that you might have been of more help--

Gillenwaters: I think so. Mostly from the standpoint of "getting through" with the request or the call or the essence of the governor's feelings or his programs, whichever was the case.

Sharp: Were the OEO programs the most troublesome? Or were there others as well?

Gillenwaters: Yes, they were the most troublesome, during that period, the period of time when I was there.

Sharp: Unless you have some more things about OEO or you wanted to address the other CRLA [California Rural Legal Assistance] issue at all, we can easily go on.

Gillenwaters: No, I think we should go on. Others can better address that.

Sharp: You have some notes there?

Gillenwaters: I think we've covered most of them. I had written before, with respect to being assistant to the governor for intergovernmental affairs, that "the major thrust was to

intergovernmental affairs, that "the major thrust was to increase the participation of industry, counties, cities in state governmental affairs, in state governmental executive branch decisions, and we were to develop stronger liaison with other state governments on issues of common interest and concern." That kind of gives a capsule of what the assignment was.

For me, it was awkward at best. It was a frustrating period of time as far as I was concerned, because I was given a "charge," but I wasn't really given a firm rein to accomplish something really tangible, as is often the case in government.

From there I moved to the directorship of the Department of Commerce. I don't know if you want to talk about that or not.

Sharp: I did, quite a bit.

Comments on Reagan's Re-Election Campaign, 1970

Sharp: I didn't know if now would be a good time to talk about the re-election campaign, the 1970 campaign, and then we could do a long piece on the Department of Commerce?

Gillenwaters: Sure, timewise, chronologically, that's probably the best way.

Sharp: So you were on the big chart.*

Gillenwaters: [laughs] That's the first time I've ever seen that!

Sharp: Is that right? [more laughter] It's so neat and so tidy. It's the researcher's delight to have it all, to have everything put in boxes. But you were Sacramento liaison, whatever that was. Maybe we could just--?

*Interviewer refers to chart showing organization of the 1970 gubernatorial re-election campaign of Ronald Reagan. Gillenwaters was listed as the "Sacramento liaison." See following page for copy of chart, reproduced with permission of the Hoover Institution, Ronald Reagan gubernatorial papers.

R. R.

SAC.
Governor's Office
Exec. Secy:
Edwin Muese III

Co-Chmn: Holmes Tuttle, Tom Reed
Co-ordinator: Norman Wintz
Consultants: Spencer-Ruberts

Vice Chairman:
Frank M. Woods
Sec: S. Emerson
SF

Ass't to Chmn:
Gordon Brownell
Ex. Secy: J. Stone

Advisory Committee
Californians for Reagan
Co-Chmn: Shultra, Burns
Killion
Co-ord: L. Pantages LA

Labor

Special Groups

Sac. Liaison
Ed Gillenwater
916-445-8054
Sac

Campaign Coord:
Kay Riddle
Sac: P. Hosenblum
LA

Ass't. (9/1/70)
Pat Gayman

Advance Staff

Information System:
DM1
1300 W. Olympic
LA 90015
213-383-1317

Controller &
Contract Admin:
C. McAndrews
LA

Advertiser, P. II.
& Program Dev:
Dir: Itas Walton
AA: Stan Harper
LA

Press Dir:
Jack McDowell
Sec: Cheryl Bain
415-434-4157
SF

So.: Jan
McCoy
213-475-1151
North:
Terry
Eagan

Students for a
Creative Society
Ex. Dir: M. Kuhl LA

Budget Committee
Chmn: T. Reed

Executive Committee

Finance Com:
Chmn: J. Ilume
V. Ch: N. Wintz
Dir: Jack Hume
Ex. Dir: Tom Hume
LA 90019
213-654-2111
No. Calif. Ch:
Tom Hume

25a

Finance Com:
Chairman:
Ed Mills

Advertiser Agency:
McCann-Frickson
1125 Wilshire Bl.
LA 90005
213-1185-7302
AE: E. Doherty
D. Welch

SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA

Ch: D. James
V. Ch: Bob Salsbury
Dir: Gus Owen
Sec: Kathy Davis

Celebrities:
Goldie Arthur
Janice Vance
LA

Finance Committee
Chmn: J. Ilume
V. Ch: N. Wintz

NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA

Ch: P. Haerle
V. Ch: M. Owen,
T. Roberts
Dir: R. Woodward
Sec: C. Bruce
SF

Research:
Karen Pease
SF

SAC: Office of the Governor, State Capitol, Sacramento, Calif. 95814, 916
LA 1250 No. Western Ave., Los Angeles, Calif. 90023, 213-162-7111

Gillenwaters: Expand on that?

Sharp: Yes.

Gillenwaters: Well, as I recall, Tom [Thomas C.] Reed and Holmes Tuttle both were interested in cutting down the communication, the needless communication, between everyone serving on the governor's staff and the campaign, for two reasons. (I think the governor was also interested in this.) First of all, we wanted to limit that because there was the function of government that had to go on, and we felt that it was too much of a diversion from the other duties that the staff had to perform.

So rather than have everybody run to each campaign meeting, I would attend and report back to the executive secretary, the assistant executive secretary, to the governor, on occasion, and to the appointments secretary, and others on the staff who had a need to know what had transpired, what the plans were, what the required schedule was going to be, and help dovetail that with the governmental responsibility the governor had.

It was a lot of fun, very interesting to see both sides of the coin. And it worked very effectively. I would seek agreement, approval, upon such things as the use of the governor's time. There were great demands by then on his time for state activities. We were to blend the two together so that the government could function smoothly and the campaign, as well.

Sharp: Now, there are a couple of different theories about the campaign. There are some who felt that it was just a "piece of cake," that it was a very easy campaign as far as incumbent campaigns go. Others felt that it was somewhat less successful than anticipated. I wondered how you recall generally your thoughts about the campaign, if it was fairly easy and you expected success, and it was pretty straightforward, or if some things were troublesome?

Gillenwaters: I had been in other campaigns prior to that. Several with Congressman Bob Wilson. The Goldwater presidential campaign, Nixon gubernatorial campaign, and I thought that this one was highly organized with a minimum amount of confusion. "First-timers" may have thought it was very confusing. [laughs] But I thought it was very well done all the way through. I think it was hard on Ronald Reagan and Nancy Reagan, too, to be yanked in so many directions, but that's the nature of the beast.

Gillenwaters:

So I recall that it was particularly well run and operated, primarily by Tom Reed and Stu Spencer.

Some of the issues were difficult; some of the ballot propositions were troublesome to some people, and the press was not very objective toward Reagan.

III THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1971-1973

Resurrection and Revival

Sharp:

I have some questions, then, about your work in the Department of Commerce. When we talked on the phone, you said that one of the things you did was to assist in the revival and the resurrection of the Department of Commerce. Why?

Gillenwaters: First of all, in Washington I watched other states operate in their approach to bring federal contracts into the state and to bring companies, both foreign companies and domestic companies from other states, into their own. West Virginia is very aggressive, believe it or not! Michigan--very aggressive. And California just was not doing that. It fit so well into the Reagan philosophy that I felt that it was something we could be and should be doing.

The Department of Commerce had evolved into a deadly dull civil service-dominated operation, very concerned with monitoring California business, but not really contributing to the flowering of it. So we decided that the best thing to do would be to engage California's industrialists in helping to restructure, so that we could effectively build more jobs and attract more industry to California.

First we formed a division of business and industry. Out of that came the legislation to create the California Commission for Economic Development. On that commission we put the leaders of industry, such as Bob [Robert F.] Six from Continental Airlines and Cyril Magnin and Bob Smith from San Diego, and so on. As I remember, we had close to twenty members. It's been a long time, so that the memory may be off slightly. But they all gave of their time freely to help design, and legislate through, proposals that would increase business activity and attract companies.

We also went after corporations in other states. The most significant one that I can recall now was the Wickes Corporation, which at the time was a significant accomplishment. We attracted them from Saginaw, Michigan, and with the help of the California Chamber of Commerce, brought the corporate headquarters to San Diego. That was a multi-billion-dollar firm.

Also, we realized that the cleanest industry and the one that generates the most revenue is the tourism industry. Bart Christiansen came from United Airlines to form a tourism commission, and he reached out across the state to the leading travel agencies, airlines, hotels, and so forth, and did one hell of a good job. He never did get sufficient credit for it, because tourism to some people means a lot more people in California, but the ratio of jobs created without smokestacks and without building enormous ugly facilities and so forth, is phenomenal.

He also put together a brochure that was used around the United States to attract people to California.* It was a very successful program.

We also formed a product design and marketing council [California Council of Product Design and Marketing], which was to promote products, designed and manufactured in California, around the United States and elsewhere in the world. The sale of those products, obviously, resulting in increased revenue and jobs in California.

One of the major accomplishments that this council created, which was then headed by Carolyn [Mrs. Howard] Ahmanson, was the successful attraction of the fashion industry away from New York to California. That was a quiet but calculated effort. If you had declared war, you would have never won. But she and a group of astute people on the Product Design and Marketing Council, who were already involved in the fashion industry and clothing manufacturing business, systematically worked on a lot of the major manufacturers that you now see here, the designers as well as the major manufacturers. That had a great impact on moving the center of that industry from New York to California.

*This brochure was entitled, "Visit the world... in California," and was published by the Division of Tourism Development, California Department of Commerce. See the following page for an excerpt from this brochure.



Your **CALIFORNIA**

That's it. Your California. You have as much right to enjoy it as the Forty-Niners, and it's more enjoyable now than then. You can live with them for an afternoon in a Mother Lode museum, sleep in a hotel room where Black Bart slept, and then jet away to a day of skiing in the Sierra Nevada or Southern California. Or there's surfing off Malibu or Windansea. (That sounds strenuous, but then so does panning gold.) Just gazing past this pampas grass above Big Sur could use up our kind of afternoon. Or discovering what hides within that cloud bank between us and Mount Shasta. What we're talking about is rediscovering ourselves. John Muir and John Steinbeck knew. California is a glorious place to do it. It's the whole world in your hand. Helps you discover the whole you.

Contact your travel agent or airline reservations office for California tour information.

Sharp: I know that Mr. [Robert] Volk, as the Commissioner of Corporations, worked with the state legislature to revise the Corporations Code. I sensed it was part of this general activity to change the business climate somewhat. Did you also have occasion to work with, in a fairly tight fashion, some of the legislators, shifting legislation that might facilitate the attraction of some of these new firms?

Gillenwaters: Yes. [Robert J.] Lagomarsino was one. He was fabulous to work with. I'm having a hard time recalling who now. I could look through an agenda, but yes, we had legislative support for what we were doing. The members of our councils and commissions that I've just talked about each had assignments, and they systematically worked with legislators to help our program.

Sharp: What was the nature of the legislation that was necessary?

Gillenwaters: The best I can recall at this date is just the basic pieces that created the councils and commissions. But you mean that would have a tax impact or something of that sort?

Sharp: Of some sort, yes.

Gillenwaters: I should recall them, but too many years have passed!

Sharp: That would have been done by somebody a little bit lower?

Gillenwaters: The boards and commissions would have done that. Bart Christiansen might be able to answer some of that. Also, John [K.] Geoghegan. He's executive director now of Merchants and Manufacturers in Sacramento, the Merchants and Manufacturers Association. He was a member of my department.

Sharp: Oh, that's the name that I can't spell.

Gillenwaters: [laughs] He would be good to interview, because he stayed on the scene. He probably would be very valuable to you. He's still in Sacramento. He's working under Bob Monagan now.

Sharp: That's right. That's where I've seen his name then.

Gillenwaters: He might have a better technical recall than I do. David Pittman is another one who developed the foreign trade division. He works for March Fong Eu in the Secretary of State's office. In that case we were working to improve the balance of trade with mostly the Pacific Basin countries. We made one mission to the Orient, which was only successful in the number of appointments, and the amount of orange juice

and tea you could drink, [laughs] but it was necessary to open communication that had not existed for a long time.

Then thereafter we worked with the representatives of the major industries in the Orient to attract them to California. Orientals, it goes without saying, have a fascination with our unique state anyway, so it was an easy love affair for them to come to California.

Bringing the Space Shuttle to California

Sharp: How does all of this lead up to the space shuttle as a major--?

Gillenwaters: I'm glad you asked that! It's my favorite subject. [laughs] The major employer in the state, possibly outside of agriculture, has become the aerospace industry. High technology was still not thought of as a separate industry, though it was coming on fast.

Silicon Valley was just developing, and we could see that without a concerted effort the space shuttle program would end up primarily in Texas, or possibly Florida.

So I worked with Lieutenant Governor Reinecke, the California Chamber of Commerce, and with leaders, mostly board chairmen and presidents (in a few cases their designees), but by and large the top executives in most of the aerospace companies here and formed a huge committee, privately funded through these people. I went to Washington, made presentations on several occasions at the White House, to NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration], to the Department of Defense, to the California congressional delegation, and to select members of the leadership of the House and Senate, working to convince them of the need and the constructive function of locating the space shuttle program here.

Of all the various accomplishments, during the period of years that I was with the Reagan administration, I'm most proud of this one, and it was one that Governor Reagan cited me publicly for, saying that I was responsible for attracting that program to California.

Sharp: You must have had to work some with Washington then, and I'm interested to know--

Gillenwaters: Yes. It was my old "Bob Wilson contacts," again, that helped immeasurably, and the experience of knowing the staff members in NASA and the Department of Defense, on Capitol Hill and in the White House. We met in the White House on one occasion with several officials.

Ed Reinecke was the lieutenant governor, and Ronald Reagan wanted, number one, more visibility for the lieutenant governor, and number two, he felt that industry needed higher contact than an agency or a department, and so the Department of Commerce was moved under Ed Reinecke, and he was a heavy participant in the space shuttle effort.

Sharp: How was the work of the Department of Commerce connected with the council, the intergovernmental council? Mr. Reinecke was head of the Council on Intergovernmental Relations, as I understand it. I wondered what the connection was then?

Gillenwaters: There wasn't one that was obvious that I recall. It was a separate entity, treated as such. And I may be putting words in his mouth, but, being an engineer, I think he related to our activities and the functions of these boards, commissions, and councils to a greater degree than any of his other assignments. And he had a lot of other ones (commissions or boards). He served the governor well in many directions (he also chaired the Economic Development Council), but he did a notoriously good job with the Department of Commerce and on the space shuttle project.

Sharp: Let's go back and talk a little bit more about the space shuttle.

##

Sharp: With the space shuttle, whose idea was it to begin with?

Gillenwaters: As I recall, it was developed between myself and Ed Reinecke. Ed Reinecke, being an engineer by profession, was fascinated with the high technology boom that would come with the award of their project. That was the beginning of developments in California. We decided that it would take a combined effort of the governor, of the governor's staff, of state government, county governments, chambers of commerce, and most significantly, of professional societies, with officers from the aerospace industry and the corporations involved.

It was the single largest, single most significant thing we could do to increase the job base and to increase revenues in the state of California during the Reagan administration. We were talking about at least fifty

thousand new jobs being involved in the space shuttle program; if this was to be the base, here in California. So that's why we were aggressive in going after it.

We had to convince all layers of people in Washington, from the agency staffs to agency directors, to congressional staff, to congressional leaders, of the advantages of locating in California. We did that by extensive presentations of fact and supportive information developed from primarily industry, but also from professional societies and state government.

Sharp: With the state legislature, did they have any role in this at all? Was there any need for them to be involved?

Gillenwaters: They had no role, except to the extent that several legislators served on the Economic Development Commission, which was a part of the effort.

The California congressional delegation had a major role, and it was probably the most significant effort, combined effort, on their part during my period of working for Ronald Reagan. It's hard to get that delegation to move in one direction on anything. But in this case, they were unanimously in favor of it and joined in the all-out struggle to win, over other states, this program.

Sharp: Was it a matter of initiating legislation or supporting legislation that would have allowed it?

Gillenwaters: It was a matter of pure and factual presentations from the California delegation and our group to the Department of Defense, NASA, and the White House.

Sharp: You mentioned before the matter of various benefits that Mr. Reagan received as a result of his administration achieving the space shuttle's coming to California. You mentioned that, more clearly just politically, it was really advantageous.

That's really fascinating, because it's one of the less well-known aspects of political campaigning, how it comes about, how it's used and how it grows, how the benefits accrue.

Gillenwaters: Well, politically, many members of labor unions that typically would be disposed in a different direction partisan-wise, were for Ronald Reagan for having accomplished this. Labor union members, industry--even the real estate industry came forward through their associations in support of Ronald Reagan and his success in bringing this program to California.

It had an enormous impact politically. We're talking about vast new jobs and vast new revenue. The end of it hasn't been felt yet. The benefits still come from it.

Sharp: And now we're talking about a ten or eleven year gap.

Gillenwaters: This was probably '70 or '71. Seventy-one I think would be as close as we could get. So we're talking about twelve years later; we are still feeling the huge impact of that one successful effort.

Later, it was mind-boggling to me to see Governor Brown [Edmund G. Brown, Jr.] disband the Department of Commerce and the economic development effort. Later, during his administration he did revive the economic development activity to some extent.

Sharp: How long did you stay in the Department of Commerce?

Gillenwaters: Until May of 1973.

Sharp: And did you come back to Los Angeles then?

Gillenwaters: Yes. One of the activities that I was involved in in the Department of Commerce was the Committee to Expand California Shipbuilding. It was an informal effort of mine to increase shipbuilding in California yards. The industry was on the wane, and in a sense nearly out of business.

I became acquainted with Daniel K. Ludwig, who is the wealthiest man in the world, who was a Reagan supporter. At one point in time his C.E.O. asked if I intended to stay in government all my life, to which the answer was certainly, "No." [laughs]

He was interested in developing, D. K. Ludwig was (with two prominent doctors in Los Angeles), a sports medicine institute to bring recognition to athletic medicine. Research, sports medicine, as a separate medical entity. They wanted me to organize the National Athletic Health Institute. It was to be privately funded, and ultimately I left the Reagan administration to organize the new board of directors, much like I had the Department of Commerce. It was the same idea, but in the private sector. So I did that for several years, until it was on its feet.

Sharp: I'm done.

Gillenwaters: Good, so am I. [laughter]

IV CLOSING ANECDOTE: REAGAN IN AN INTERNATIONAL FOCUS

Sharp:

Before we close, we talked off tape but not on about Mr. Reagan coming back to Washington for the funeral of President Eisenhower. I would like to just recap it on tape, about Reagan's meeting President De Gaulle and the setting--

Gillenwaters: I'm trying to recall exactly what year that was. Perhaps your research will help me with that. [1969] When Eisenhower died. I should remember.

Ronald Reagan was relatively new on the international scene, and an enormous curiosity to people who had been in leadership roles for many years. Also, he was being talked about as a presidential possibility.

In any event, President Eisenhower died, and the Reagans at that time were in Phoenix visiting her mother, as I remember, mother and father. They were required to fly direct to Washington to the funeral services. And had only short notice to get there. In any event, we went to the series of memorial services and so forth, and the most significant one was in the National Cathedral, the funeral service. In a pew in front of us [Charles] De Gaulle was seated, President De Gaulle from France.

I was fascinated at one point to notice that his aide was writing on a small piece of paper (visible to me from the rear). "Ronald Reagan" was all I could read; it was in French.

De Gaulle put the paper in his pocket and, in a most uncharacteristic move, did a complete turn around in the pew of the church and looked eyeball to eyeball with Ronald Reagan for an extended period of time. He was fascinated and probably had heard--must have heard, so much about him in order to do that uncharacteristic thing in a serious funeral setting.

Then after the services were over, as we were leaving the pew, De Gaulle made a move to come to Ronald Reagan and shake his hand. It was a very extended handshake and, if you believe in "vibes," the exchange was loaded with vibes, back and forth. No conversation, nor usual courtesies, no "nice-to-meet-you" type exchange. He also took Nancy Reagan's hand and made the same gesture to her.

TAPE GUIDE -- Edgar M. Gillenwaters

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Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

James Jenkins

PUBLIC AFFAIRS, WELFARE CONCERNS IN WASHINGTON AND SACRAMENTO

An Interview Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris
In 1983



JAMES E. JENKINS

ca. 1973

Photo courtesy of Sirlin Studios, Sacramento

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

In this brief interview, James E. Jenkins provides a succinct view of key aspects of California health and welfare policy during Ronald Reagan's gubernatorial administration, and of the sense of continuity and loyalty that continued to serve him well in the presidency. The discussion was recorded on May 6, 1983, in Mr. Jenkins's cool, shipshape office in the White House, where he then served as deputy counsellor to the president.

Jenkins's Washington experience began in 1966, representing the City of San Diego in the nation's capital. A number of close Reagan advisors were also San Diegans, and Jenkins presumably was a logical choice when a replacement was needed in the governor's Washington office in 1969. That was the year President Nixon introduced the Family Assistance Plan to federalize welfare programs. After calling attention to contradictions between FAP and Reagan's philosophy, Jenkins soon became the "team leader" for the governor's efforts to prevent FAP from being enacted. It is, he notes, "a very touchy thing for a Republican governor of the biggest state to oppose a Republican president on an issue of such magnitude." This classic understatement, like Jenkins's solid presence and affable, deliberate manner, is a reminder that he is a former naval person, a professional in public affairs.

For Reagan's second term, Jenkins moved to Sacramento and became the governor's director of public affairs. The team effort continued, including additional testimony by Reagan before Congress and refining of earlier reforms in the state's health and welfare programs, which are discussed in more detail in interviews with Earl Brian, Robert Carleson, and others in this series.

In 1974, Jenkins became secretary of the California Health and Welfare Agency when Dr. Brian resigned that spot in order to run for the U.S. Senate. "So they appointed me to babysit the biggest agency in the government the remaining year of the administration. And it would have to be somebody with some public affairs skills, because that's where the governor was going to be most vulnerable if he did decide to run for president. His welfare reforms and Medi-Cal reforms might very well provide the basis for the heaviest criticism of him if we weren't very, very alert to go out with everything intact and no scandals and no mistakes." That Jenkins handled this delicate task well is evident in his return to Washington in 1980 as a member of Reagan's presidential team.

Jenkins received a rough-edited transcript of the interview for review in April 1983. Two weeks later he returned it with only minor revisions and style changes. He did not respond to an inquiry about discussing his

work with Governor Reagan further, but it is to be hoped that he will be interviewed again at a later date. In May 1984, Jenkins left his post in the White House to become executive vice president of an export-import firm headquartered in Washington.

Included as Appendix B is an article from California Journal, dated March 1973, which gives the reader additional information on Mr. Jenkins. It has been reproduced with the permission of the Journal.

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer-Editor

14 September 1984
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

I REPRESENTING CALIFORNIA IN WASHINGTON, 1969-1971
[Interview 1: May 6, 1983]##

City of San Diego's Interests in the Capital

Morris: When did you first become involved in California public affairs? Had you been working for John Connally?

Jenkins: No, when I was in the navy, I was the public affairs assistant to John Connally, but that was five or six years before the time we're talking about.

Morris: During World War II?

Jenkins: No, no, not that far back. [laughs] It was in '60 and '61. I stayed in touch with him, simply because we were good friends. When he got shot with President [John F.] Kennedy, I went down and helped the family for a day or so. It was that kind of a friendship.

When I retired from the navy in 1966, I was retained by the City of San Diego to be the director of their Washington office. They were the first city to open a full-time office in Washington.

Morris: Really? Whose idea was that?

Jenkins: City Manager Tom Fletcher, mostly. The City of San Diego is a very progressive city and was deeply involved with the federal government on several very expensive projects, so they felt they needed a Washington office.

Morris: Related to the fact that there is a large naval presence there?

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 18.

Jenkins: No, actually not; less to do with the navy than the demographics [that] made them eligible for all of the new poverty programs the [Lyndon] Johnson administration was putting in. It was kind of a farce, because San Diego's retired population came up demographically as being very needy.

Morris: Really? All those retired admirals?

Jenkins: Well, they're unemployed. But there's a huge retirement population that has nothing to do with the military, and they're relatively low income and no jobs. So they kept pouring federal money into San Diego, trying to cure this poverty problem. To deal with all of that, which the city was delighted to do, they opened a Washington office and put me in charge of it.

Then in 1969, when Ed Gillenwaters was head of the California state office here in Washington, he was called back to be on the staff in Sacramento, and he recommended to Ed [Edwin] Meese that I be his replacement.

Morris: Had you worked with Mr. Gillenwaters?

Jenkins: Yes, he was Congressman Wilson's AA [administrative assistant], and Congressman Wilson was from San Diego; we knew each other quite well for years before this.

Morris: So you had worked with him on some of the San Diego--?

Jenkins: No. By this time, he had then taken over the Washington office for the State of California. We really had no official relationship businesswise. The cities dealt directly with the federal government. They didn't go through the state.

Morris: Yes, that's been one of the complaints, hasn't it, as time went on?

Jenkins: Yes, and our new federalism program is supposed to change that. President Reagan wants to change that. Anyway, I took over the state Washington office from Gillenwaters in 1969. It coincided with the time when they were winding down Reagan's presidential--you remember [in] '68, he was very active in seeking the nomination, or at least his staff was. They were winding all that down, and Ed Gillenwaters had been an integral part of that.

Morris: As the Washington contact person?

Jenkins: Yes. He did a lot of fund raising up and down the East Coast and dealt with politicians and political leaders, all of which I knew nothing about. As a career naval officer, I don't know anything about fund raising or political leaders or anything.

Jenkins: Meese wanted to change the character of the office to a technical office dealing professionally in federal programs that the state was involved in, much like the city.

Morris: This was just shortly after Ed Meese had become executive secretary?

Jenkins: This was in July of '69. I don't recall when he--

Morris: Right at about that point, Bill Clark went to the state supreme court.

Jenkins: Was it? Not the supreme court; he went to superior court first.

Morris: That's right.

Confrontation Between Nixon and Reagan on the Family Assistance Program, 1969

Jenkins: I took over that office, and almost immediately I noticed that the state department of welfare, which was actually [in] the Health and Welfare Agency (Spencer Williams was the secretary), I noticed that they had endorsed President [Richard M.] Nixon's new Family Assistance Plan for completely reforming welfare. And I noticed also that there was a contradiction between what the Governor had been saying and the Family Assistance Plan.* So I got together some examples of this contradiction, and I went to Sacramento and talked to Ed Meese about it. They reaffirmed the fact that they opposed the President's plan and that Spencer Williams had been incorrect when he endorsed it.

Morris: Spencer Williams had endorsed that?

Jenkins: [He had endorsed] the President's plan without going to the cabinet and talking to the Governor or to Meese or anyone about it.

Morris: Oh, dear!

Jenkins: Well, he thought it probably all was in his purview. I didn't know him well, so I don't know why he did that.

During the ensuing months, I became the team leader for the Governor's efforts to prevent the President's program from being enacted, because the scene of the conflict was back here in Wilbur Mills's Ways and Means Committee and in the Senate Finance Committee in which Senator [Russell] Long of Louisiana was chairman. Those two committees became the battleground between Reagan and Nixon on the Family Assistance Program, and I was in charge of the Reagan strategy and tactics.

Morris: When you say team effort, how did that work and who [was on the team]?

Jenkins: It was necessary for me to find out that the Ways and Means subcommittee was going to have a hearing on caseload, let's say. And Bob Carleson was an expert on caseload. I would get Bob Carleson to come back here and testify. On another occasion it might be that the Medi-Cal portion of the reform was at issue, and I would get Earl Brian (Director of Health Care Services) to come back. In other words, I called the signals on who testified and what the strategy was.

Morris: Were there people in Congress that were supportive of Mr. Reagan's point of view?

Jenkins: Yes, Senator Long primarily. Jack Veneman, undersecretary of Health, Education and Welfare, was in charge for Nixon as I was for Reagan. He pretty well won the battle for Nixon in the House. But Senator Long was on our side from the start, and having the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee on your side is not too bad a way to start.

Morris: That helps.

Jenkins: So we didn't try too hard in the House. We made an effort, because it was necessary to keep the issue bubbling and before the public.

An interesting thing happened. Before we did anything, I drafted a letter which Meese and the Governor edited, and then the Governor signed it; a letter to Nixon telling him why we felt it necessary to oppose him. See, it's a very touchy thing for a Republican governor of the biggest state to oppose a Republican president on an issue of such magnitude.

Morris: Right. Particularly when they're both from the same state.

Jenkins: Yes. I still have the letter somewhere, or a copy of it.* I brought the original [letter] back here, went over here on the second floor of the EOB [Executive Office Building], in to see Vice President [Spiro] Agnew. And I said, "I have a letter from Governor Reagan that I am supposed to deliver to the President."

He said, "What's it about?"

I said, "Governor Reagan has found it necessary to oppose the President on the FAP"--the family assistance program--"and the letter is an effort to explain to the President our position on the matter."

*See Appendix A.

Morris: Why did you go to Mr. Agnew rather than to the President's office?

Jenkins: The Nixon administration was organized in such a manner that governors and mayors dealt with the vice president first, and if necessary they went--that was the screening area, the focal point for domestic policy, as it had been under Johnson. [Hubert] Humphrey was the liaison with governors and mayors.

Morris: How did that work? Did you find it a satisfactory arrangement?

Jenkins: It made it much more political than is propitious, I think, because the vice president is always very political. After all, he was elected to office and he had to run against an opponent. We have stopped that. This vice president has nothing to do with that. The office of liaison with local government is Rich Williamson's office over here, and he has as much to do with Democratic governors as he does with Republican governors.

Morris: It's a more effective process, do you feel, if you work with a staff person?

Jenkins: Yes, because it's less partisan.

Morris: If you work with a staff person--

Jenkins: Yes, who's not a politician; he's an expert. So the fact that you're a Democratic governor doesn't mean that you're going to get any less welcome a reception with your problem as it does any other. I always felt it was too political under Humphrey and Agnew.

Morris: Was there anybody in the President's immediate staff that you could talk to informally about that?

Jenkins: No. I didn't happen to know either [Robert] Haldeman or [John] Ehrlichman. I was pursuing the classic case of a governor sending a communication to the President through the vice president, and that's what I did.

Morris: And what was Agnew's reaction?

Jenkins: Agnew said that he was awfully sorry to hear that Governor Reagan had decided to oppose the President, and he would take the letter to the President. I said, "Well, the Governor had asked me to take it to him, so that we would get a reaction from him."

Morris: Face-to-face.

Jenkins: Yes. Agnew said, no, he would take it to him, and if there was a reaction, he would let me know. I don't know if it was ever delivered or not. We never got a response of any kind.

Morris: Was that customary in Mr. Reagan's communications with Mr. Nixon?

Jenkins: No, they talked on the phone a lot. But he preferred not to talk on the phone on an issue as complicated and as technical as this. His reasons, he felt, were sound, but he wanted them stated exactly in a certain way and not subject to reinterpretation or recollection of what was said on the telephone. He had no idea that they were bugged. [laughs] We chose that method, so that there was a letter there. Nobody could ever say he hadn't warned him. Nobody could ever say he hadn't given him his reasons. Nobody could ever say he was disloyal, because his reasons had nothing to do with loyalty.

Morris: When you took over the Washington office, did Mr. Meese or Mr. Reagan or both ask you to come back to California and talk to you about what they had in mind?

Jenkins: Yes. I went to Sacramento and spent a couple of days talking to them. Since there was going to be a change in concept, I talked to all of the cabinet members about how they are now going to have a representative in Washington who would look after their problems and keep them informed. Gillenwaters had strictly been in the political area, and the cabinet members who wanted something in Washington would get on an airplane and come back here and do it.

Morris: Was there also any contact with the legislative people, the California congressional delegation?

Jenkins: No, I did that.

Morris: And that was--?

Jenkins: Chet Holifield was the dean of the delegation, and I had known him from the time I was in high school. I used to run around with his daughter, and he had appointed me to the naval academy. So, although I didn't take the appointment, we were very close friends and still are. My mother sees the Holifields quite often. So it was simple for me to be in communication with the California delegation, because the dean of the California delegation was Chet Holifield, my patron for many years.

Morris: Why didn't you go to the naval academy?

Jenkins: I was at sea in the merchant marine midshipman program, and I couldn't get back. It was during the war.

Morris: They did have field appointments or something like that, people coming from active service back [to the academy].

Jenkins: Well, I didn't even hear about the appointment until two months after I was supposed to be at Annapolis. I was in the invasion of the Aleutian Islands at the time.

Morris: Oh, my goodness! That's good field experience.

Jenkins: Yes.

Morris: Was the congressional delegation organized so that Chet Holifield did deal with the whole--?

Jenkins: He had regular breakfasts for the California delegation. They now have separate breakfasts, Democrats and Republicans. But at that time, he was so powerful--he was chairman of the Government Operations Committee, and he was chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. He was probably the second or third most powerful man in the country. A lot of people didn't realize that. He was also quite moderate in his politics, and the Republicans didn't resent him. Especially at times like reapportionment, he kept them together, and he'd look after their interests in the best way possible. As a matter of fact, one time he asked me to intervene so that he personally could discuss a problem with the Governor, which I did.

Morris: On reapportionment?

Jenkins: Yes. I can't overemphasize how important it was to my position of representing the state back here to have the dean of the delegation a close personal supporter and friend of mine. It just opened all kinds of doors and solved all kinds of communications problems you would have under other conditions.

Morris: It's really useful to have this insight, because in many cases what you hear about is that there was not very good communication between the governor's office and the congressmen.

Jenkins: That's because Gillenwaters was strictly political, and he demonstrated his dislike of Chet Holifield as a person, his dislike of his politics and his philosophy. So it was tough. And he had no dictum to communicate with the delegation, because he was only involved in promoting the presidential nomination efforts, which did not require much liaison with the Congress. So all of that changed as rapidly as we could change it.

After we got into the Family Assistance Plan fight, it culminated in the Governor's personal appearance--his only appearance--before Congress while he was governor. (He did not appear as a labor leader.)

Morris: Only appearance?

Jenkins: While he was governor it was; before Senator Long's committee, to oppose the President's Family Assistance Plan.

Morris: Why did you decide it was time to ask Mr. Reagan to come--?

Jenkins: Like I say, we lost the battle pretty much in the House. The Senate held a long series of hearings and heard people on both sides. It was a very, very close issue. Elliott Richardson and Jack Veneman shifted their emphasis from the House to the Senate committee and were making considerable headway. Senator Long and I talked about it at great length. He's a great admirer of the Governor's, and he said, "There's one way to put the spotlight on it. There's no greater communicator than this guy. We've got to get him back here with the cameras going and have him testify on why this is such a bad program for the country."

He did, and I think we won quite handily, instead of it being a close issue. And thereby killed the President's program.

II RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, 1971-1974

Organizes New Public Affairs Office; Appointment as Secretary of Health and Welfare, 1974

Jenkins: In all of this process, I became identified in Sacramento as something of a welfare expert, which you have to be to lobby a cause. You have to learn all the ins and outs.

About six months after the end of the fight, I went back to the second Reagan inauguration [1971]. My wife and I were invited to come back and participate in the festivities. While I was there, Meese and [Michael] Deaver, particularly Deaver, urged me to come to Sacramento and take over the public affairs function of the staff. They were reorganizing the governor's staff, and they were creating a new position of director of public affairs. Under him would be the press secretary, the speechwriters, the community relations people (which is the minority relations), and the Washington office would come under him. In other words, it would be a sort of holding company, reporting then directly to Meese so that Meese didn't directly have to supervise so many different activities, as they had been trying to do.

I think the one main reason they offered me the position was because I was a career public affairs officer in the navy, and they knew all about that. So I took it and went to Sacramento from here. We organized it that way, and it went that way for three years. Then Earl Brian, the secretary of Health and Welfare, quit to run for the Senate.

Morris: How was that received in the governor's office?

Jenkins: Not too well. He is not a very ingratiating person anyway. By the time he quit to run for the Senate, he had irritated a lot of people. I don't know but what it was greeted with a sigh of relief in a way.

Jenkins: So all of a sudden they needed somebody to babysit the biggest agency in the government. And it would have to be somebody with some public affairs skills, because that's where the Governor was going to be most vulnerable if he did decide to run for president. His welfare reforms and Medi-Cal reforms might very well provide the basis for the heaviest criticism of him if we weren't very, very alert to go out with everything intact and no scandals and no mistakes

Morris: And some progress achieved.

Jenkins: Yes. So here I am with the public affairs machinery and experience, and also the only one who really knows welfare from three years before. So they appointed me to babysit the agency the remaining year of the administration. [January 1974]

Welfare, Medicaid, and Medi-Cal

Morris: Let me go back a bit. The interrelations between welfare and the Medi-Cal program are not really clear. Some people talk about them as one concept. In fact, I've come across the statement in some presentation or other that it was impossible to tell where health left off and welfare began. Then other people talk about them as really separate problems and separate solutions. How did you see that?

Jenkins: Medicare is the national program trust fund, funded out of Social Security taxes. Medicaid is tax-funded for welfare recipients. All welfare recipients are eligible for Medicaid, and Medicaid is known as Medi-Cal in California.

Morris: Of course California always has to come up with its own--

Jenkins: Yes. During the middle sixties, when these poverty programs--this is all part of Johnson's Great Society--were coming along, the states were all given the option, a long list of options, of benefits that they could opt for, provided their legislatures committed themselves to a matching amount of local and state taxpayers' money. Under Jesse Unruh, the California legislature opted for the whole ball of wax. They took every benefit that anybody back here could dream up, and they participated in that, too. So there's a huge commitment of State of California money to the Medicaid program, which they insisted on calling Medi-Cal, because it's half funded by the state.

Morris: It is as much as half participation?

Jenkins: Yes. That's why they insisted on having their own name for it, because otherwise it would sound like it's a federal program. It's half federal, but it's not all federal.

Morris: It wouldn't have been started in California and other states if there hadn't been federal legislation?

Jenkins: No, it would be too expensive. The states varied all the way down to, I believe, Alabama took the fewest benefits. I think Alabama has zero of the options. They just take the bare fifty percent federal money and match it with practically none. That's the medical attention that welfare recipients in Alabama get. So there's a huge gap between the Cadillac of them all and, say, Alabama, which might be a broken-down scooter. [laughter] But that makes it very, very political. All of those options in between become important, because they're all very expensive.

I don't know if I'm answering your question, but the reason people always talk about it in combination with welfare is because, in order to qualify for Medi-Cal, you have to be on welfare theoretically. Then they began adding. It's just like Social Security. It may have been solvent at one time, but they kept adding people to it who didn't contribute, and so it got all out of whack. There are medically indigent, medically needy, medically needy only--in other words, people who have quite a bit of money or assets--but they are medically needy because of the expense of their treatment, and so certain of them qualify for Medi-Cal, too. So that's why you'll never get a clear answer.

Morris: That makes it much more clear in my head. In the medical area, would you be involved with organizations like the American Medical Association or the California Medical Association? Were groups like that coming to you?

Jenkins: During that last year, the California Medical Association came around sometimes, but I don't recall any large issues that they were interested in. See, it would be the second year or a two-year legislative cycle, so they were mostly finished, or the commitments were made before that time. There was very little in the last year of a two-year session, and even less in the last year of a second four-year governor's term, that hasn't all been settled by then. Whether it's amiable or not, it's settled, and you don't get into these huge fights that you have at the beginning. So I don't recall, except with pleasure, some California Medical Association people that would come around. When they were having their convention, they'd invite you to the banquet and things like that.

Morris: It was more staying in touch, rather than some specific concerns that they had.

Jenkins: Yes.

Morris: How about other kinds of organized groups like that in California?

Jenkins: The Blue Shield and Blue Cross. The health-care planning groups. Those are the groups that, if you want to build a new hospital, you have to get a certificate of need from a health-care planning group because of the overbuilding problem.

Morris: That was also related to federal legislation, wasn't it?

Jenkins: Yes. They're federally funded. The federal government was trying to hold down the overbuilding, because suddenly hospitals became quite profitable, and everybody wanted to build one. So they established health-care planning councils, and you couldn't get a permit to build a hospital unless they had determined that they actually needed one in that place at that time. And it didn't work. People found ways to get around it. Like most planning activities, they sound great, but they don't work.

Morris: Now, that's an interesting idea in relation to Governor Reagan's operation. It is characterized by extensive task forces and study groups and planning committees, both within the governor's team and then pulling in people from the private sector, too.

Jenkins: Yes, but see, these are government employees--

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Morris: Did you find that the planning commissions weren't terribly helpful?

Jenkins: We were allowed to appoint members, and they were in close liaison with us, but they were federally funded and directed. I guess they still exist. I don't really know. I think they do.

Morris: You're thinking of the health-planning councils specifically?

Jenkins: Yes.

Morris: They've been reorganized several times, but they still exist.

Jenkins: They don't do anything. I mean, the cost of health care hasn't gone down.

Morris: Yes, that's still a knotty problem.

Cooperation Among City and County Lobbyists in Washington; the Impact of Partisan Politics

Morris: Aside from the health and welfare area, what do you recall were the things that Governor Reagan was particularly interested in having you stay on top of in the Washington office?

Jenkins: Oh, gosh. Towards the end, it took up so much of my time, I had to hire an assistant to do the rest of it, because I did that full time.

Morris: Who did you bring in as assistant?

Jenkins: A fellow named Ken Wade, who I had known in the navy, was a public affairs officer in the navy and experienced in Washington. So when I went back to Sacramento, he became the director of the Washington office. You might want to talk to him sometimes.

Morris: We would like to. We're budget limited at the moment.

Jenkins: He represents Alameda County here now, and he goes back to Oakland quite often. We play golf all the time.

Morris: Where was the office located here?

Jenkins: At 1101 Seventeenth Street, which is actually Seventeenth and K, I believe.

Morris: That's sort of within walking distance of Capitol Hill?

Jenkins: No, it's over here by the old Mayflower Hotel. It was downtown. Governor [Edmund G., Jr., "Jerry"] Brown's organization moved to Capitol Hill from downtown because--

Morris: Mr. Gillenwaters would be the person who would know about Pat Brown's operation.

Jenkins: Yes. That transition from Pat Brown to Reagan was run by Gillenwaters. The guy who had the Washington office for Pat [Governor Edmund G., Sr.] Brown was Irv Sprague. He's now in the Federal Reserve Board staff.

Morris: Were things bipartisan enough in terms of California services that your predecessor was helpful to you in developing ideas or--?

Jenkins: No, he was largely political, just like Gillenwaters was, as the City of San Diego representative, I never had anything to do with him. I did my thing. I hardly knew him. Nice guy, quiet. He became a staff director for John McFall when John McFall was the majority whip.

Morris: What about any kind of informal caucus between your office here and what sounds like a growing number of city and county representatives from California?

Jenkins: The National League of Cities formed a service called Man in Washington Service, and they had hired staff members on salary who would take cities part time. Most of the cities who had full-time representatives here--like myself, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Burbank, oddly

Jenkins: enough--we moved in with them for housekeeping. So we had a central reference library, accountants, and attorneys that we all used. So we were with the League of Cities at that time.

Now, I founded and organized an association called Golden Bears, which were all the California city representatives, the county representatives. Alameda County has an office here, L.A. County, and San Diego County. Those are the three.

Morris: San Francisco?

Jenkins: No, I don't think they do.

Morris: They use their congressman?

Jenkins: They may. The University of California has a guy here, Pete [Peter R.] Goldschmidt. Neat guy. The state colleges had a fellow here, and I can't pick up his name. And then Pacific Gas and Electric, San Diego Gas and Electric--golly, you know, any number of lobbyists for corporations from California. We had enough common interest to call ourselves the Golden Bears, and we would have a monthly luncheon and have a speaker. Usually somebody like Ed Meese, who was visiting, or--

Morris: Somebody from California?

Jenkins: Yes, or one of the congressmen, although the congressmen sometimes came as guests of the lobbyists. We didn't have many congressional speakers. We had people from the White House when Nixon was president. Johnson's people weren't all that interested in a Reagan-oriented--

Morris: Really?

Jenkins: No.

Morris: Even though your job was to deal with whoever was in office in California?

Jenkins: We didn't have all that much interest here in Jerry Brown, either.

Morris: Well, that's true.

Jenkins: That's just the nature of the business.

Morris: You deal with Republicans who are doing things that you are concerned with, rather than the governor's office when it's of a different party?

Jenkins: I don't think I ever met, even if I knew his name, the Washington representative for Jerry Brown. I don't even know where their office is. I may have heard his name, but I'm almost certain I never met him.

Morris: So in that case, the partisan interests are more important than the fact that you all have California experience?

Jenkins: You see, I was in that office only at the time that Nixon was president, but I knew from knowing Ed Gillenwaters real well that he had a terrible time getting access to the Johnson White House because he represented Reagan, and they didn't have any interest in helping Reagan or his Washington [office]. [laughs]

Morris: In the Nixon administration, there were several Californians in the cabinet.

Jenkins: That made it a lot easier. It was great. I could come over here and see Jack Veneman. I didn't happen to know Ehrlichman and Haldeman, because I could get anything I wanted anyhow.

Morris: What about Cap Weinberger?

Jenkins: Yes, Cap was very helpful. He was at OMB [Office of Management and Budget] and then later was at Health, Education and Welfare.

Morris: How did he come down on this Family Assistance Plan thing? You know, he'd worked for Reagan in California.

Jenkins: Yes, but he was at OMB, and he studiously avoided the conflict, as far as I know. He didn't move over to HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare] until the battle had been fought and decided. Then he relieved Richardson, and we saw him quite often, and he was amiable because the object of stress was gone.

Marketing Governor Reagan's Welfare Program

Morris: Were you back in Sacramento by the time Bob Carleson became director of the Department of Social Welfare?

Jenkins: See, when I arrived in Sacramento to become director of public affairs on the Governor's staff, the task force on welfare reform, which Carleson and Jim Hall and all those guys worked so hard on, had finished. They were getting ready to go public, and I jumped right into the public affairs aspect of that. We decided to print the blue book,* and the marketing of the President's welfare reforms

*Meeting the Challenge: A Responsible Program for Welfare and Medi-Cal Reform, Governor's Office, Sacramento, 1971. The report has a blue paper cover.

Jenkins: became a very large part of my responsibility. Carleson and Hall and all those guys were around there for a couple of years, it seems to me, before Carleson left to come here.

Morris: Given your experience here in Washington and then in California at welfare reform, did you know anything about Carleson's selection to come back here?

Jenkins: No. I don't recall anything. I was not surprised, because I knew something about welfare, but he knows all about it. He's the world champion right now.

Morris: Even though he started in city managing and public works?

Jenkins: Yes.

Morris: That's an interesting transfer.

Jenkins: He has the capacity to take any complicated subject and master it, which is almost a definition of a city manager. You can't be an engineer, a policeman, or a park and recreation person; city managers have to be generalists. They have to be able to go into any of those problem areas and understand it as well as the people who are in it when it's necessary. So public administration prepares people for a career like that.

Morris: To take on whatever the knotty problem is.

Jenkins: Yes.

A Philosophy of Public Administration

Morris: There are a lot of you, too, who have military experience and background. Is there some kind of transfer of experience in the armed forces to dealing with knotty governmental problems?

Jenkins: Do you mean in the Reagan administration?

Morris: Yes. What I've heard from several people is, "I enjoyed my time in the service," and these military training manuals, and things like that. They seem to have been used in some of the criminal justice planning and things like that.

Jenkins: Oh, that's because of Ed Meese. Ed has been active in the army reserve for many, many years. He used to quiz me--he found out I went to the war college--and he would quiz me on the navy's methods of management and the science of managing vast, diverse organizations,

Jenkins: as it was taught at the war college. He's still got all my textbooks! [laughter] So that dribbled down into the justice planning and all that. He had those National Guard guys in there, and I can see that, but not really regular military people. I think I was the only one. General [Edwin] Wheeler was one. He was deputy secretary of Health and Welfare [for operations, 1973-1974]. He's a retired marine general.

Morris: I'm enough of a civilian so that I don't see the distinction that you do between regular army or navy and somebody who served their three or four-year hitch. If it takes for those three or four years, it seems to me like there's some carry over.

Jenkins: Well, not much, really.

Morris: But you did go to the war college and get training in management of large enterprises?

Jenkins: Yes.

Morris: Are those the same principles that work in running a large enterprise like a state government?

Jenkins: Oh, yes, the principles are the same. You have to assign responsibilities. You have to have clear lines of communications. You have to divide up the authority to match the responsibilities. They do that in the military just like they do in a big corporation. And in government.

Now, the classic case is Jerry Brown's administration. He gave people authority far beyond their responsibilities, and he gave people responsibilities far beyond the authority he would give them to solve the problem. That's why they appeared to be in disarray all the time and incapable of responding to fruit flies.* [laughter] They never said who was in charge. I don't think there was a manager amongst them. Management is Ed Meese's avocation.

Morris: Taking the fruit fly as an example, my recollection of that is, the scene was kind of waiting to see what would happen.

Jenkins: Yes.

*When the Mediterranean fruit fly appeared in numbers in the Santa Clara Valley in June 1980, threatening fruit and vegetable crops, it became a focal point of political controversy that continued until 1982.

Morris: And if Mr. Reagan had been governor, I suspect the approach would have been to have a plan ready to go in the case of something like--

Jenkins: You'd have an organization ready to go. But the first thing you'd do is very quickly send a top-flight, fact-finding team in there to find out the facts. I mean, it was months. They kept dickering around with whether or not they really had a problem. [laughs] We would have found out, one way or another, whether we had a problem or not, and then gotten the best brains and experience there were to find out how to cope with the identified problem. It's just a series of steps. You can't solve a problem until you know what it is. And all of that seemed so lacking.

You remember when the ammunition trains blew up in Roseville* one time?

Morris: I certainly do. Yes.

Jenkins: There's no precedent for that. But justice planning had worked out mutual assistance agreements between counties and cities all over California for disasters. I well remember, Ed Meese had two radios in his car, and the executive secretary to the governor has no business getting involved in that. But he went out there and took over and ran the whole thing, and it went very nicely. He knew who to talk to. He had seen the plans for the sheriffs helping the police and how much National Guard you needed and who's in charge. He sat in his car in the middle of the railroad thing running everything.

Morris: Wasn't there somebody else who could have taken over that operation?

Jenkins: I think they would have had to have designated either the sheriff or the police or the National Guard. He didn't designate anybody. He just went and did it. But they could have done it. You're right. Except that's what he likes to do, manage things.

Morris: Yes, and to manage a real live natural disaster is kind of exciting. Well, my clock says it's ten-thirty. Thank you. I've really enjoyed this.

Jenkins: You now know all I know.

Morris: I doubt it. But you've provided a lot of very useful things for future persons, and that's very helpful.

*An ammunition train exploded near Roseville, California, on April 28, 1973, resulting in fifty-two injuries and over \$10 million in damages. Over three thousand people were evacuated within three miles of the explosion.

TAPE GUIDE -- James Jenkins

tape 1, side A

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tape 1, side B

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State of California

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

SACRAMENTO 95814



APPENDIX A

RONALD REAGAN
GOVERNOR

April 29, 1970

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
 President of the United States
 The White House
 Washington, D.C.

X file

Dear Mr. President:

My attempts to reach you on Monday and Tuesday having failed, I spoke with John Ehrlichman last evening. He felt that Mr. Nathan, of the Bureau of the Budget, might help answer some of the serious questions, concerns and reservations we have regarding the Welfare Reform Act, as it came out of the House, and is now being considered by the Senate.

Mr. Nathan consulted with my staff at length. He is thoroughly familiar with the Act, and the rationale supporting the various provisions. However, our general objections and reservations were outside his scope of authority. Additionally, while he expressed agreement with some of our objections, and even shared our concerns with one or two aspects, we received no assurance of what, if anything, the administration intends to do to amend the Act accordingly.

Meanwhile, I have today received a telegram from Chairman Long requesting my views on the proposed Act. I intend to answer him fully and completely. I have been contacted by other Governors and expect to have further conversations with them. In fairness to you and your administration, I hasten to send you herewith the essence of those reservations.

In our meeting at San Clemente last August 13 when my staff and I had the opportunity to discuss welfare reform with you, we were elated at the proposals you outlined and, as I recall, offered to serve as a test state for the contemplated work incentive part of the program you outlined.

Since then, we have followed the progress of your program with a great deal of anticipation and, lately, apprehension. The evolution of the Welfare Reform Act -- from your original message to the Congress on August 11, 1969, through Representative Byrnes' bill, to the Ways and Means Committee bill (HR 16311) as amended and passed by the House last week -- has caused me increasing concern. Possibly you share that concern.

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My reservations about the Welfare Reform Act stem from a deep philosophical antipathy toward a government-guaranteed income and increasing federal intervention into state operations, and also my conviction that the bill will not accomplish your purposes as set forth in your August message to Congress. In addition, I have a real apprehension that the costs of the Act will be excessive at a time when the taxpayer is already struggling to make ends meet.

Let me set forth some of my specific concerns:

Work Incentive -

In your August message, you said, "I propose that we make available an addition to the incomes of the 'working poor' to encourage them to go on working and to eliminate the possibility of making more from welfare than from wages."

It seems to me that the Act as passed by the House does not eliminate the possibility of making more from welfare than wages. It would be entirely possible for a family in which the father is fully employed to have less income than a family in which the father is working only part time -- and only slightly more income than if the father were not working at all. If you wish, we can supply specific data to support this statement.

Further, the Act would encourage many now working their way off of the welfare rolls to fall back into a state of federal dependency.

Family Solidarity -

In your message to Congress, you said, "The new plan rejects a policy that undermines family life. It would end the substantial financial incentives to desertion." This is an objective which I support wholeheartedly.

But, under the Welfare Reform Bill as amended and passed by the House, very substantial incentives for desertion would remain. The bill could actually weaken incentives to maintain traditional family relationships and in some cases, may encourage dissolution of families.

Costs -

The Act, as it came out of the House, appears to have all the earmarks of the open-ended welfare programs of the '60s -- such as Medicare and Medicaid -- whose costs have escalated beyond even the wildest sums predicted by their original opponents. Some of our staff predict -- as do others in both the public and private sector -- that the costs of this Act could run as high as \$15 billion.

I am convinced that, unless the Welfare Reform Act provides for funding solely from a specific surtax or dedicated tax, the taxpayers will be unaware of the extent of the real costs of the program and these costs will soon outpace any benefits which might be derived.

Government Income -

Although proponents of the new Act claim it does not provide a government-guaranteed income, under this bill, no work-qualified head of household need actually work. He, or she, is simply required to state a need and agree to work or train for work to receive benefits. This is -- in fact -- a guaranteed income. I must oppose such a proposal.

Federal Controls -

In order to advance your concept of "New Federalism", those states which are able and which desire to administer the program themselves should be paid rather than penalized for performing services for a Federal program. Those states which are unable to administer their own programs, or do not desire to do so, should be charged -- not rewarded -- for having the Federal government perform the services for them.

The dis-incentives in the Act encourage states to surrender their administrative operations to Washington; this can hardly be compatible with your desire for a "New Federalism."

The Act delegates to the Departments of Health, Education & Welfare and Labor unprecedented administrative powers. This makes it impossible to assess how various provisions are to be applied, and what impact these will have on state operations now and in the future.

(It seems to me that one of the stultifying effects of the Act will be to impede, in some cases destroy, the growing and creative work program efforts being put forth by the private sector. This will stifle ingenuity and freeze failure; and, this is completely out of phase with emerging programs to solve these welfare problems at the local level. It is of deep concern that there are no provisions permitting the states to engage in, or continue, pilot projects which might prove more responsive to state or local needs.)

In order to support healthier relationships between the Federal and State governments -- and your efforts to limit the expansion of bureaucracy -- the Act should be amended to prohibit the formation of any new administrative organization except that which is necessary to audit and reimburse those states which administer their own programs, and to provide administrative services for those states which do not. This latter organization should be only as large as can be funded by the charges collected from those states

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which are serviced.

In summary, Mr. President, your original proposal sought to reduce the welfare rolls; the bill passed by the House does not even mention this as a goal or purpose. It will add 15 million persons to the system, with no significant reduction in sight, based on HEW estimates of continually rising costs.

Your stated goal was to reduce welfare costs (also not mentioned in the new Act); this program will cost additional billions, based on HEW estimates.

Your message to Congress specifically rejected the concept of a guaranteed income; the new bill provides every family with an income floor.

You called for manpower programs to get individuals off of welfare and on to payrolls; yet many, if not most, of the "working poor" to be added to the rolls under the House-amended bill live in rural areas where there are no training facilities and where there are, in fact, no jobs to train for.

I'm sure you know how painful it is to find myself in the position of opposing this measure. Only the strongest convictions could bring me to this, but after struggling with the ever growing problems of welfare these past few years, I'm convinced this is the greatest single domestic problem facing the Nation.

It may be that working in concert we can remove the evils and correct the weaknesses of the House-passed bill and I offer my assistance.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN
Governor

RR:pj

APPENDIX B

Administration Strengthens Its Public Voice by Adding Top-Level Information Jobs and a Dial-a-Release Service

BY BRUCE KEPPEL

Three separate studies of the state public information program were undertaken last year, as noted in the June-July issue of California Journal (p. 190); the State Personnel Board investigated the need for higher information officer grades; the Governor's Office "inventoried" information office personnel out of concern that the administration's accomplishments were insufficiently appreciated by the public; and the Assembly Committee on Efficiency and Cost Control was probing "the nature and extent of advertising and public relations conducted by the various agencies of the state government and the amount of public funds being expended for those purposes." The legislative study, which was requested by Assemblyman John Vasconcellos in the wake of the television documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon", has yet to produce anything. But the other two investigations have resulted in a substantial top-level augmentation of the public information bureaucracy, a development described below.

On the second floor of Office Building No. 1, just across 10th Street from the Capitol, an electrical circuit clicks shut and a tape cartridge begins to unwind its message into a telephone. The caller is one of the state's 355 radio stations, and the message going out from OB-1 is a government agency's account of something it is doing, has done, or plans to do that it thinks the public should know about. The tape recorder is located in the newly decorated quarters occupied by the Office of Broadcast Services, which began operation in December as, in the words of its manager, Bob McCafferty, "nothing more than a facility for putting press releases into audio form tailored to broadcast needs." This, he points out, may be new to California, but it has been done for a number of years in Illinois, on whose operation his is based. The hiring of McCafferty to open the service is only the most visible of a number of substantial changes made in the state's information program in recent months by the Reagan administration. Not only have these changes considerably enhance the potential of state agencies and departments to publicize their activities effectively; they have also created a new, management-level layer of communications specialists whose aim is to improve and coordinate the administration's public voice.

The view from the top

The architect of this new structure is James E. Jenkins, Governor Reagan's Director of Public Affairs. It was Jenkins who last year expressed dissatisfaction with the state's information program, then explained at a workshop of civil service information officers that "this administration doesn't have any problem along

the public-communication line if everyone . . . in the public-information field does his job well." When Jenkins turned to the non-political information programs in the various agencies and departments, he discovered that he had no idea what was being done, nor any administrative means of finding out. So he began "inventorizing" information personnel to learn who did what in which offices and how well.

This "inventorizing", as Jenkins referred to it, yielded no public report, but it did result in some shifting of civil service personnel. It also strengthened Jenkins' conviction that the information program was unorganized and outmoded, and that not enough attention was paid to the broadcast media. No broadcast facility was available to state information officers, he realized, but he also discovered that few of them were familiar with anything other than the written press — and some not even with that. Thus, Jenkins' first move was to hire McCafferty, news editor at KXTV Sacramento, to set up a broadcast service. Four management-level communications specialists were added to the four state agencies to fill the missing link in Jenkins' information chain of command. And Harvey Yorke, press advisor to Dr. S. I. Hayakawa, President of San Francisco State, was hired to provide coordination through a new State Office of Information. Yorke will work with the new agency specialists and help them improve the civil service information personnel they have to work with—including alerting them to the potential of broadcasting. Finally, Jenkins opened a southern area office, under Yorke's supervision, to work with state offices in the Los Angeles area, and to assist Sacramento-based information officers in dealing with southern California news media by arranging press conferences and talk-show appearances, for example, for visiting state officials.

New grades approved

Until Jenkins began revising the system, the highest civil service grade for information officers was IO-II. The State Personnel Board rates this job as being on the periphery of management but rarely involved in policy-making. The salary ranges from \$1,317 to \$1,603. Last September, however, the board approved an administration request, submitted by the Business and Transportation Agency, to create two new management-level grades in a category of civil service known as "career executive assignment". C.E.A. jobs are filled, according to state regulations, by "competitive examination of persons with permanent status in the civil service who meet such minimum qualifications as

the [State Personnel] Board may determine." Because appointees serve at the administration's pleasure but are assured a job at their former grade and pay if the C.E.A. classification is withdrawn, career executive assignments theoretically combine the responsiveness of political appointments with the training and experience of civil service advancement.

The board approved an IO-III rank, with annual salaries ranging from \$18,300 to \$22,260, and distinguished the new grade from that of IO-II by three tests:

- The Information Officer III will *only* be used in departments with the most visible and complex program in which there is a unique or highly unusual amount of public interest, or in a multidepartmental setting where the information officer has responsibility for several departments and reports to the agency secretary and department directors.
- The Information Officer III will *always* be part of the top management group and will therefore have an input and influence on policy and program development and implementation.
- Positions in the Information Officer III class will always supervise lower-level technical staff.

A pool of 14 qualified information officers was established by the board, with Yorke sitting on the qualifying panel, but so far only Bob Nance of the Business and Transportation Agency has been named to an IO-III job. He will supervise information programs in the agency's "public safety group", which combines the California Highway Patrol, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the Office of Traffic Safety.

The other top-level position approved by the State Personnel Board was that of Public Affairs Assistant to the Agency Secretary, which was given a salary


range of \$20,184 to \$24,540. According to the personnel board's job description, the public affairs assistant works "under general administrative direction of the Agency Secretary and, as a member of the Secretary's management staff, to plan, organize and coordinate the departmental public information programs of the Agency; to advise and consult with the Agency Secretary, Departmental Directors, and Information Officers on the formation, composition and timeliness of departmental policy and programs as related to the informational impact; to the formal contact point for all media and information contacts for the Agency; and do other work as required."

Despite the board's approval of the Public Affairs Assistant to the Agency Secretary as a career executive assignment to be filled by permanent civil service personnel, only Dean Thompson, formerly the water Resources Control Board's executive secretary, enjoys C.E.A. status (though he's serving on a temporary basis pending outcome of the examination recently conducted for the new job.) The other three agency communication specialists are actually political appointees filling vacant non-civil-service slots and having no standing in civil service, and all four are now working on a contract basis. "My guess," suggested Jack Woodard, one of the three political appointees and former capitol correspondent for the *Sacramento Union*, "is that the administration wanted to get this thing started with people who could bring a fresh view of the system, who were outside the system, but that eventually career people will be brought into these posts."

Legislative review

As Jenkins, Yorke, and McCafferty describe their new operations, they are at some pains to impress upon listeners that the changes they have wrought are not politically motivated, aware no doubt of some legislative and press skepticism toward any augmentation of state information programs. "This will free up the flow of information from the state government to the

REORGANIZATION OF STATE INFORMATION PROGRAM



people," Jenkins maintained in a recent newspaper interview. "If it doesn't do that, we'll close it up." All are optimistic, however, that the results will eventually speak for themselves — and so convincingly that Yorke believes that whoever succeeds Governor Reagan will adopt the program. The reason, Yorke explained, is that the new structure meets a long-standing need to reorganize the informational services in order to catch up with such recent changes in governmental structure as those that created the agency secretaries to coordinate the activities of a number of related departments.

The cost of Jenkins' innovations, according to Yorke, is "in the \$200,000 ballpark", though the net additional expense is not yet known since, in some

INFORMATION OFFICER SALARIES

IO-I: \$1,084-\$1,084

IO-II: \$1,317-\$1,603

IO-III: \$1,525-\$1,855
(C.E.A.)

P.A.A.: \$1,682-\$2,045
(C.E.A.)

Source: State Personnel Board

cases, personnel were shifted to positions within the new structure and their former jobs have not yet been filled. "The largest single item, aside from salaries, is installation of the broadcast service," York said. None of the present cost was approved by the Legislature for this purpose but was met administratively by using unexpended funds from other programs. The Legislature will have its first opportunity to consider these developments as it reviews the Governor's 1973-74 Budget. That they won't pass unnoticed became clear last month, when the Legislative Analyst's Office recommended that funds to pay the agency-level information jobs in Agriculture and General Services, and Business and Transportation be deleted as unnecessary, in part because of the presence of a number of information officer jobs already in the departments under their supervision (one reason the administration wants the new positions). The Human Relations Agency's budget for "communications" personnel is also undergoing close scrutiny by the Analyst's office, partly because of the merger of health and welfare responsibilities. Several analysts expressed concern over the number of agency jobs contained in the Governor's Budget that are filled by contract, a device used generally to meet an unusual or temporary need. At this point, only the Resources Agency's request for the new C.E.A. job has been judged as justified.

As for Yorke's office, it is likely to be safe from legislative budget-cutters, because, despite its location outside the Capitol, it remains a part of the Governor's Office.

The new program

According to preliminary indications, the broadcast service is being well received, say Yorke and McCafferty. Small and large radio stations around the state can call Sacramento on three toll-free lines to obtain at no cost the voice of a "news-maker" in state government — a department director or agency secretary, perhaps, reading a statement that was distributed to the capitol press corps at the same time. ("It's really no more than the postage we pay to mail out a press release," McCafferty says, regarding the toll-free service.)

This "actuality", as broadcasters refer to getting news from the source's mouth, is preceded by a "bulletin board" that outlines in a few seconds the stories available. Each cycle contains up to three stories, and the cycles change at 10 a.m., 2 p.m., and 5:30 p.m. Each of the stories offered for recording by the participating stations includes a "wrap-around" by McCafferty or one of his staff — that is, a brief introduction and conclusion. This enables stations with only a "rip-and-read" news capability, with no writers of their own, to use the complete tape without editing, if they choose, in which case the reporter is identified as being with "the State Information Service". A station can also, of course, use the recording merely as raw material for its own story, much in the way that a good correspondent will add necessary background and perspective to a press release before submitting it for publication.

Two additional lines are provided for metropolitan stations willing to pay a monthly fee for use of the state's leased-line system and run less chance of getting a busy signal.

In the service's first 10 weeks, 174 "actuality" press releases were made available to broadcasters, and the meters attached to the telephones registered 5,857 calls. Now, McCafferty is surveying the state's stations to determine how many of those calls represent actual usage of the new service.

Coordinating and upgrading

Meanwhile, Yorke is working with the new public affairs assistants for the agencies and his southern area office to improve coordination of informational activities. This month will see the appearance of an "Information Release Forecast" designed to let editors and correspondents know weekly what potentially newsworthy events are scheduled. Yorke also plans, for internal use, a "pending item list" of coming events so that agencies and departments can pool their informational resources and avoid needless scheduling conflicts. "There's no point trying to make headlines the same day the Governor releases his budget," Yorke observes. Other projects include refining, centralizing, and computerizing state press-release mailing lists and compiling a catalogue of the state audio-visual and reproduction facilities available for public-information use.

To improve the product, Yorke plans a regular series of day long workshops, which he expects the State Personnel Board to accept as on-the-job training. "The professional upgrading effort," he says, "has been long neglected." He, McCafferty, and the agency public affairs assistants conducted a news orientation session in January, and the first daylong workshop, drawing on outside professionals as seminar leaders, is scheduled for Los Angeles March 22nd.

The goal of all his efforts, Jenkins maintains, is simply to "maximize the full use of government facilities and more effectively respond to newsmen's needs," while improving communication between the Governor's Office and the state agencies that carry out administration policy. "We're not telling anyone what to do," Yorke says. "I will not get involved in the content of press releases or policy-making."

In any case, democracy, it might be observed, has yet to founder on too much information, so the test of Jenkins' operation, as far as the public is concerned, may not be how well the government can tell its story but, rather, how readily the press swallows it. ■

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Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Florence Randolph Procunier

WORKING WITH EDWIN MEESE

An Interview Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris
in 1983



FLORENCE RANDOLPH PROCUNIER

ca. 1983

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Florence Randolph (now Procunier) in this short interview gives a cogent account of day-to-day operations in the California governor's office. As secretary to the governor's legal affairs assistant, first John McInerny and later Edwin Meese III, she served the administrations of Pat Brown and Ronald Reagan with equal devotion and competence.

Like a number of people in government, she took the position on a temporary basis. Finding the job congenial, she stayed. When Meese was appointed legal affairs aide in 1967, "John McInerney and Ed Meese had been good friends--he didn't have any girl to work for him, so he kept me on."

Maintaining liaison with other sections, keeping the paperwork moving, managing busy schedules, dealing with all those who wanted to see Meese in person were her sizable tasks. "One thing that I liked about, and still like about, Mr. Meese is that no matter who they are, or who they were, if they are his friends, he would try to work them in, even if it was just for a few minutes." She also comments on the thoroughness with which Meese dealt with the review of all clemency and extradition requests, and her own satisfaction when former prison inmates qualified for certificates of rehabilitation.

In November 1968, when he became Reagan's executive assistant, Flo Randolph went with Meese to the office facing the governor's suite. She recalls that, although his responsibilities became much broader, Meese continued to stay in close touch with statewide law enforcement matters. Circumspect in commenting on specifics of Meese's thoughts and opinions, she emphasized that he is a good person to work with, as was the group in the governor's office as a whole.

The interview was recorded on May 4, 1983, in Meese's sunny, spacious office in the White House while he was away on business, where she continued to be his executive secretary. Trim, blond, and intense, she answered the interviewer's questions briefly but cordially. She was remarkably matter-of-fact in discussing her work of keeping tabs on the boss's current workload, as she was about his responsibilities in Sacramento. She was concerned primarily about the press, whose coverage she found questionable.

In addition to providing this informative interview, Flo Randolph was helpful with arrangements for other interviews for the project, through her many contacts with "the alumni"--some fifty veterans of Reagan's gubernatorial administration then serving in the Washington, D.C. area. One of them was Raymond Procunier, former California director of corrections, whom she married in June, 1983. A copy of the interview was sent to her for review in New Mexico, where she and Mr. Procunier moved later in the year. She returned it with only minor revisions and also provided the informal photograph that illustrates the manuscript.

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer-Editor

CLEMENCY AND EXTRADITION PROCEDURES, 1964-1968

[Date of Interview: May 4, 1983]##

[Preliminary discussion of the Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era Project]

Randolph: I was married the second time, and, as all good wives do, you go where your husband goes. We moved back to Iowa; I lived in Davenport, Iowa, for three years.

Then we moved back -- I'd always liked Sacramento. Of all reasons, would you believe (the best reason, I'd say) is because I love the trees there. So I decided I wanted to move back to Sacramento, and that was perfectly agreeable to him. So we did.

[Tape interruption; telephone call]

Randolph: After I made the arrangements to do the federal and state tests, I went to the [state] Department of Employment. Now, this was when Father Brown (that's what I call him: Father Brown) when Pat [Edmund G., Sr.] Brown was in office. So I went to the Department of Employment and was interviewed by a young girl. This older woman was listening and asked me to come over.

She asked me, "Would you by any chance be interested in going to work for a temporary position in the governor's office while you're waiting to take your state and federal tests?"

I said, "Fine."

Randolph: She said, "I'd like you to be interviewed by John McInerny," who at that time was executive clemency and extradition secretary to Pat Brown.

It turned out it was a permanent position. So I was among the people who were interviewed and was hired for a permanent position as second girl in the clemency section for John McInerny, who is now a judge in Santa Clara County.

Morris: When was this?

Randolph: This was in the fall of '64. So I went to work in the Brown administration. When Governor Reagan came in, and Mr. Meese came up to Sacramento--John McInerny and Ed [Edwin] Meese had been good friends--he didn't have any gal to work for him, so he kept me on. And I became number one girl for him in that section.

Morris: Clemency was a different operation, wasn't it, under Pat Brown?

Randolph: What do you mean by a different operation?

Morris: It sounds like when Mr. Meese took over the job, he had some different ideas and the Governor had different ideas--

Randolph: No, it was the same job, only they just strictly changed the title. They changed it, after Mr. Meese came in, to Legal Affairs Secretary instead of Executive Clemency and Extradition, but it was all the same duties. They just decided to change the title of the department.

Morris: Were you there after the clemency hearings on the Caryl Chessman case?*

Randolph: Yes, after that. I wasn't there at the Chessman time.

Morris: Was there any sense that the uproar over the Chessman case had any effect on how clemency matters were handled?

Randolph: Not to my knowledge. I don't think so.

Morris: That's a very important spot in the governor's office.

*In January, 1960, Pat Brown granted Caryl Chessman a sixty-day reprieve from execution amidst strong opposition by the legislature and the press. Chessman was eventually executed in 1961.

Randolph: I think so. It was very important to me. I learned a great deal in that position. You don't think too much about people that write to the governors until you're actually in that position. I never gave it a thought that people wrote to the governor. All the prisoners write to the governor; of course, all those letters, all the inmates' letters, came to that section.

I found out there were a lot of them that just wrote because that's all they had to do and they figured they'd try and get help wherever they could. But there were many inmates who had gone to the law libraries and really researched things before they wrote to the governor. And a lot of them are very intelligent people.

Morris: They were all making some kind of an appeal?

Randolph: Appeal, writs of habeas corpus, different kinds of writs. They were being held and brutalized. You know, a lot of these, they were just writing to be writing. But there were a lot of them who had sound arguments. And you learn to determine which letters were just--

Morris: Crank.

Randolph: --Just crank letters. And those that weren't. Mr. Meese and our section, we researched a lot of those. He researched those that had really sound arguments; whether they were true or they weren't.

It was just very interesting to me. They would write about certificates of rehabilitation, which gave them back their voting right and that type of thing. Certain inmates that had gotten out would write to get their--there were specific types of crimes [for] which you had to get a certificate of rehabilitation and specific crimes for which you got a pardon. And, of course, if you were out of state, it always was considered a pardon. Inside the state, it depended on the type of crime you had committed, whether it was a certificate of rehabilitation or a pardon. Each of those depended on the crime as to how many years they had to be crime-free--so many years and so many months for each particular crime--before they could get their certificate of rehabilitation or pardon.

Morris: And every person who's been in prison has to apply for this?

Randolph: Has to apply for that, yes. It isn't automatic.

Morris: And your section had to review them all, every single one?

Randolph: We handled all of those. So I wrote up all the letters on the CRs and the pardons: you get so you know exactly what to tell them, what they had to do, how many years it took, and then to reapply.

Morris: So you handled a lot of administrative details?

Randolph: Yes; oh, yes. A lot of them for the pardons. When I had been with Governor Brown, they issued the pardons at Christmas time, which was good. They still did that after Mr. Meese came into office. Then they got so that we would do it periodically, every three months or so, so that they didn't have to wait until Christmas time. They changed those procedures, so that they--

Morris: Was there an increased number of them?

Randolph: I don't recall that there were. But there were a lot, always a lot. And there was a lot of detail, a lot of detailed work to those. It meant a lot to those people to get their pardon.

I remember one specifically. I do not recall the gentleman's name, but he had been in and out of prison for years. He worked on a ship. I keep feeling that he worked in the chef's department; anyway, on a ship. And he finally, I guess, decided, after he'd been in and out for years. to mend his ways.

Morris: He'd go to sea and get into trouble and get back into prison?

Randolph: Yes, back into prison. He actually mended his ways finally, and he wanted his pardon. It meant a great deal to him. I wish I could remember the gentleman's name. When he finally got his pardon, I guess it just meant a great deal to this man. But I only remember that specific case. It just struck me as funny that he finally decided--they say in this recidivism, how people end up back in and back out. But there were some that really did decide to rehabilitate themselves.

Morris: That was what occurred to me, the debate about whether prison does rehabilitate, that some people do--

Randolph: Some, it really does. They really do rehabilitate themselves. There are those young kids, I think, where they can get their CRs and it wipes their slate clean, where I really think it should because I think it carries on in their life, where it's so much against them. If they've been in for something minor, and if they can't wipe their slate clean, it's just a blot, a blot on them. It really is. So I think it serves its purpose.

Morris: How about extradition? That was also in your office.

Randolph: Yes, I got into that. That wasn't my primary job, but I did learn how to do all of that. I think that Mr. Meese and the Governor were weighing decisions very carefully on extradition. There were, I guess, some cases where they had no choice; they had to extradite in specific instances. But when there was a choice, I think that

Randolph: they weighed their decisions very carefully, as far as the man was concerned, as to whether he should be extradited or not, whether it was cruel and unusual punishment to do so, whether they really should do it. I think they weighed their decisions very carefully in that.

Morris: Would you consult with Ray Procnier and people in the Department of Corrections as to whether somebody should go?

Randolph: As I recall, I believe Mr. Meese did consult with other people, and go into the case to delve into it to find out whether it should be done or it shouldn't. In those cases which they thought it was warranted, they always had a hearing, an extradition hearing, so that they could hear both sides from the attorneys, and then determine after that if they should or should not extradite.

Morris: Are these usually people who are in prison? They are not people who are being held in--

Randolph: Well, they picked them up. Like in divorces and stuff, if they hadn't been giving their alimony and child support and all, they'd pick them up. Normally they weren't in prison, but they would pick them up. Then I guess they'd have to put them in jail, or maybe they were out on their own recognizance at that time, depending on the type of crime for which they were picked up for.

Morris: But something like child support, that is a civil matter rather than a criminal.

Randolph: A civil type, yes. But they had to pick them up, and then I suppose they were held or out on their own recognizance until their hearing came up in the governor's office to decide whether to send them back or not.

TRANSITION BETWEEN THE BROWN AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS, 1966-67

Morris: How had Mr. McInerny handled the job? Did Mr. Meese make any major changes when he came in as legal affairs secretary?

Randolph: No, I think they both handled them the same. John McInerny was a lot like Mr. Meese. They are both very sincere and honest men. And weighed things about people very carefully. Always. Both of them. I think they were both very good. They both had a very great feel for people. I think they both weighed decisions very carefully.

Randolph: I don't recall that Mr. Meese changed procedures too much. If he did--if there were any major changes--I think they would come to me, even at this late time.

Morris: You'd be aware of some kind of an evolution?

Randolph: Yes, it would come to me. They both handled those kinds of cases very much the same way, I think.

Morris: Were there a number of other people who were carry-overs from Pat Brown's years?

Randolph: Yes. Of course, all of the senior officials, naturally, they all went because that always happens. But on my own level, and even up to office managers, all of the office help were interviewed and screened very, very carefully by quite a few of the Reagan staff. But I would say that, of the clerical-type help, from the office manager on down, fifty percent of them were kept.

Morris: Really?

Randolph: Yes, I'd say about fifty percent.

Morris: In terms of being already familiar with the filing system and the kinds of things--?

Randolph: Right. I think they were very smart in that respect to keep key people, so that they would know how to handle things. I think that was very intelligent on their part.

Morris: So that, at that level, there's a lot of advice right there in the governor's office about what the governor does in the day-to-day operations and what happens next?

Randolph: That's right. I can remember Bea Smith, who was the office manager. She's retired since then. But I think in politics--which is wrong, and I think they do it in every administration--you see, I have been a Democrat, am a Republican, and I--

Morris: When did you change?

Randolph: I had been on Governor Reagan's staff for maybe two years. I was not pushed or anything at all. On my own accord, my philosophy changed, and I became a Republican. But they did not ask me to. There was no suggestion that I should or any of that. Nothing at all. But I truly feel that, at my level anyway, at the administrative level even, that you are loyal. You respect the man you work for, and you're loyal to the person you work for, whether he's a Democrat or a Republican. And as long as you can respect the way

Randolph: they feel and how they do their job, I don't see any adverse loyalties at all, whether you're a Democrat or a Republican. Now, a lot of people in politics somehow can't feel that way, but I do.

Morris: That even though the person in that position changes, the loyalty is still to the position rather than to the individual?

Randolph: I think so, yes. I really do.

Morris: Did they screen you?

Randolph: Oh, very definitely they did, and I told them how I felt. I remember George Steffes--I'll never forget him. He was the one who interviewed me. He said, "Well, we don't feel that way."

I said, "Well, maybe you don't, but I certainly feel that I can do as good a job for a Republican as I did for a Democrat, because it's the man you work for." And I truly feel this way.

Morris: You must have convinced them, because you say they kept about half of the people.

Randolph: They did, yes. Of course, in due time, a lot of them left or went to other jobs.

Morris: Yes, but there's some sort of a normal turnover.

Randolph: That's their normal turnover, yes.

LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS UNIT; KEEPING A CLOSE EYE ON GUBERNATORIAL STATEMENTS

Morris: Wasn't there a legislative analysis unit in the governor's office?

Randolph: Oh, the legislative section, yes.

Morris: Yes, and there were some of those people, I understand--

Randolph: They were kept. That's right. I remember two of the gals that they kept there. They were smart in keeping people that knew what they were doing and knew how to work with the legislature.

Morris: Down below; that's where George Steffes ended up, in the legislative--

Randolph: Right, in the legislative section, and the two gals there were just fantastic people.

Morris: Did they help him with who you deal with and to get squared away?

Randolph: That's right. They were very smart in that respect, I think.

Morris: So many of you are assigned to individual people in the different governor's units. What did Bea Smith do as office manager? That's unclear.

Randolph: She, officewise, was over all of the gals, no matter what unit they were in. She handled all of the clerical, like the letters that went out of that office. She had her own people under her, as well. But any letters that went out over the Governor's signature were all screened by her section, so that they were perfect when they went out, grammarwise, how things should be handled, everything. They all went through her section.

Morris: Really? In other words, if you typed a batch of letters for Mr. Meese, they'd be read by her?

Randolph: Not necessarily--not Mr. Meese. But we did a lot of letters over the Governor's signature, and anything that went out over the Governor's signature, no matter who dictated it, went out over there, had to be checked out to make sure--

Morris: Somebody in her section proofread everything?

Randolph: You better believe it.

Morris: Really?

Randolph: Yes, indeed.

Morris: Now, was this the way she operated under Pat Brown?

Randolph: Yes, and it's traditional that they want to make sure that any letter that goes out over the governor's signature doesn't violate anything legislativewise, or say anything it shouldn't say.

Morris: For content?

Randolph: Yes, very definitely.

Morris: That's an incredible kind of a task. I wish I had somebody like that to go over what our office puts out!

Randolph: And she had a woman there by the name of Wilma Wagner. I don't know, it seems like she had a personality conflict with someone and was eventually let go. I can remember when I first went to work there under Pat Brown, when I saw her coming my way, I thought, "Oh, gosh. What have I done now?" [laughter] I'll never forget that.

Morris: She was a real dragon?

Randolph: Yes. Under Bea Smith. She was what you would call the dragon, and all the girls would be scared to death: "Uh-oh, I've done something wrong."

Morris: Oh, dear. But she really knew--?

Randolph: She knew her stuff. Oh, yes, she sure did. She knew her stuff. They wanted to make very sure that the Governor's image was intact and that nothing would go out of that office that was wrong. They were very careful about it.

Morris: How many letters would get turned back, would you say?

Randolph: I don't honestly know. I didn't get many turned back to me, but occasionally I did. Occasionally.

Morris: That would really keep you on your toes.

Randolph: You'd better believe it!

Morris: That's a check not only on the secretary typing the letter, but on he who dictated the letter and drafted it.

Randolph: That's right. And if it was something that was drastic, then they would have to come back and talk to your boss, too, but that didn't happen very often. Normally we could take care of it with no problem, or we'd go back and talk to our boss and discuss it. If it's something that they're adamant about, that it's going to go, it'll go, regardless.

Morris: I can imagine screams of wounded eagles. [laughter]

Randolph: True, true. But they were careful about it, and rightfully so.

Morris: We've talked to secretaries back through the years, and that's a useful point which we hadn't picked up, that the governor's office keeps that much of an eye on, is concerned about how it--

Randolph: That's right, you've got to be careful for the governor's sake because the press is so bad, and they seem to get worse every year. To my notion, it used to be that, sure, I know the press writes the truth, but they also color it so much, and it seems like now that they do anything to sell newspapers. There are the few that are really good. I know there are some good newspapers. But I just get so upset when I read so many things that are in the newspapers.

Morris: Is this from sitting in on press conferences, or is this just keeping an eye on the papers?

Randolph: Just things that come out from interviews from different people, the things they say. Oh, I just worry about that all the time. I worry about him all the time. It just seems like they don't want to write good things about people. All they seem to care about is anything that they can stir up to sell newspapers. I just hate that. It seems like it's getting worse all the time.

[tape interruption; Marilee Melvin comes into room to say hello]

Randolph: We do all the scheduling [in Washington] and she [Marilee] does the social and the invitations and the speeches, that type of thing. She's real nice, a real good gal.

LEGAL AFFAIRS SECTION; NEW ROLE AS ADMINISTRATIVE LIAISON

Morris: Did the unit change at all when Phil [Philip] Battaglia left, or did you stay in the legal affairs unit?

Randolph: We were in legal affairs until Bill Clark was appointed a judge, and then right after that, when he left, Meese and I went around to be-- he took Bill Clark's place.

Morris: Was the office support staff affected by Battaglia's departure?

Randolph: I don't recall that it was. I'm trying to remember what Bill Clark was doing at that time.

Morris: He and Michael Deaver were cabinet secretaries.

Randolph: That's right. Then he went in as executive secretary. I know our section stayed exactly the same. I don't recall that there were that many changes made, really, at that particular time.

Morris: It got a lot of coverage, of course, in the press at the time, and Lou Cannon talks about it in his book in terms of its political impact.* I wondered, in terms of the people getting out the chores, if Battaglia had been a presence that was causing any concern and if his departure made a difference?

Randolph: I don't think it did. I had very little to do with Battaglia's department. I knew them very little there, so I don't really feel qualified to say too much. But, as far as I'm concerned, it didn't seem to cause any--

Morris: Was there some speculation when Mr. Clark went to the court about who was going to be executive secretary?

Randolph: You know, it's funny, I don't recall that there was. It just seemed like kind of a--

Morris: Automatic advancement?

Randolph: I don't know. Yes, I have that feeling, that that's the way it was.

Morris: He and Mr. Deaver had been there all the way through, and I had wondered if they worked it out between themselves as to who would--

Randolph: I don't recall that there was any furor about it at all. I think it must just have been kind of an expected thing, that he would be the one.

Morris: And did Mr. Meese talk to you about whether you wanted to stay in legal affairs or whether you wanted to move over to the executive--?

Randolph: I think he just took it for granted that I would go with him.

Morris: How did you feel about that?

Randolph: It was fine with me, because I just adored him. Still do. We worked very well together, and always have.

Morris: That's good. He's reported to be involved in a terrible amount of detail work on a huge amount of subjects.

Randolph: Oh, he is, and he's very much the perfectionist. Very much so.

Morris: Do you funnel that sort of thing through him or keep on top of it for him? Do you have to stay on top of all those things, too?

*Reagan, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1982.

Randolph: Yes. Oh, gosh, there were a lot of things to keep on top of. I remember he was on the California Council of Criminal Justice and, of course, we had clemency hearings. There were so many different kinds of hearings. Yes, I had to keep pretty much on top of everything.

Morris: How did you define your tasks when you moved over to the executive secretary post?

Randolph: I was a liaison between him and the other sections he was over. They had what they called a cabinet liaison, and I worked with him to schedule different types of meetings and keep on top of the meetings that had to be done. Scheduling was a good part of my work then, and, of course, all his legal books and things in there. He was over so many different things. I guess I had a good rapport with all the different people in the different cabinet sections.

Morris: When you say cabinet liaison, is that what people like Win [Winfred] Adams, who was a cabinet secretary--?

Randolph: Yes, that's right, in with all the other agencies within the [governor's office].

Morris: And Ed Thomas.

Randolph: Ed Thomas, right.

Morris: Those people who worked directly with the agency secretaries?

Randolph: Right, with the agency secretaries. I had a good rapport with all of those as well, and with their gals.

Morris: Because all of those people are wishing to see Mr. Meese and Mr. Reagan. Did Mr. Reagan's scheduling work through you, too?

Randolph: No. That was strictly--they were right across the hall--that was a different thing completely. That was different completely.

Morris: Who was in Mr. Reagan's private office across the hall handling scheduling for him?

Randolph: Of course, Helene von Damm was there.* Helene von Damm and Kathy [Kathleen] Osborne were there. Helene von Damm was his main one, and then Kathy worked for Helene.

*Helene was Governor Reagan's personal secretary. A separate office (Patricia Gayman headed Scheduling) next to Helene's handled the Governor's appointments.

Morris: Did she remarry? Was she von Damm when she was first there?

Randolph: She still goes by von Damm, but she's remarried now.

Morris: How would you work things out with the Governor's scheduling people? Did the two of you have to dovetail?

Randolph: Yes. We did. It wasn't nearly as hard to schedule things then as it is now. Everything was on a smaller scale, on a much smaller scale. It was on a big scale, but it was still smaller there. It wasn't as difficult to work his schedule in there.

Phone calls, though, people that wanted to see Mr. Meese, that was just as bad then as it is now. I used to have the same problem then as I do now, trying to nicely make people understand that they just couldn't come in to see Mr. Meese whenever they felt like it. But you learn to do that.

Morris: Is it government people or people from community groups who think they can just drop in?

Randolph: All kinds of people. People in community groups, people that were friends of Mr. Meese when he was in Oakland when he'd been deputy district attorney, just people from all over that wanted to come in to see Mr. Meese.

Morris: What kind of criteria do you develop for who gets on the schedule?

Randolph: Well, you learn. I would run them all through Mr. Meese, and he would decide. You knew certain people that wouldn't get in. But even so, one thing that I liked about, and still like about, Mr. Meese is that no matter who they are, or who they were, if they are his friends, he would try to work them in, even if it was just for a few minutes. If they had problems, he would try to listen to them first and then funnel them to where they would go. I would work it out with the other departments, and we managed for them to see whoever it was necessary to see. He was always very good about people. There were some, of course, that he wasn't able to see, but even so, he took the time to make sure that their needs were met in some way.

Morris: So that all requests that came into the office--

Randolph: Were handled one way or another.

Morris: You would find some way to have somebody talk to them if Mr. Meese couldn't.

Randolph: That's right.

Morris: After a while, could you sort the enquiries into files?

Randolph: Yes, you could sort, that's right.

Morris: These look urgent, and this looks interesting, and you'd send these off.

Randolph: That's right. You know how to establish the priorities. That's right. But it used to tickle me when these people would call and they'd say, "I went to grammar school with Ed Meese." You know, I'd think, "Oh, my God." And I'm not kidding, clear back to grammar school, or "I lived next door to Mr. Meese when he was at--" And [it was] so funny. It used to tickle me. And I get them still today like that, too.

Morris: What do you do with that kind of a request?

Randolph: I put it through to him. I type up a little memo, run them all through him. He may or may not remember, but most of those people-- he has a fantastic memory. I have never seen anybody with a memory like Mr. Meese's.

Morris: For people and names, as well as the ideas and the--?

Randolph: Oh yes. I wish I had the capacity for remembering names like he does. He is remarkable, absolutely remarkable. He always has been so good, with people, as Governor Reagan was always so good with people. That's something that I remembered about him, and it stayed in my mind. No matter how busy he was, he always--

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RONALD REAGAN AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS; A FEELING OF FAMILY

Morris: The report is also that Mr. Reagan would occasionally make a special tour and come around the office and talk to everybody.

Randolph: Oh yes, he did.

Morris: What would that be? If he was out of town for a long time or something?

Randolph: It didn't have to be any special time. It would be a surprise pretty much to everybody. He would just come around and say hello to everybody, sometimes shake their hand. And you knew that he was so sincere about it. He meant it. Mr. Meese used to do that, too,

Randolph: visit the offices. It meant a great deal to the people for them to come around and know that their hard work was--you know, a little pat on the back means a great deal to everyone. It meant a great deal to them.

Morris: Was part of that because of the way the office is laid out, that in some sections you couldn't really be sure whether the Governor was in town or not, and you could go for weeks without seeing him in the normal course of--

Randolph: Well, I don't know whether that had anything to do with it or not. I just think that both the Governor and Mr. Meese just felt that it was good that they should go around and see the people that worked for them occasionally. I don't think it had anything to do with the layout of the offices, really. I just think that they both felt that they should be in touch with the people that worked for them. I really do.

Morris: That's nice. And Mr. Reagan, too, could remember your name and what you were doing otherwise?

Randolph: Gosh, I don't recall. I think he did some of us that he saw all the time. But I don't know whether he remembered the names as well or not because he saw so many more people. But Mr. Meese was fantastic with his recall.

Morris: When the Governor was out of town, did that make a noticeable difference in what the workload was around the office?

Randolph: Not necessarily. No, I don't think so. We had a heavy workload . regardless. It was always heavy regardless.

Morris: You said that you also would occasionally handle letters for the Governor himself. How often would that be?

Randolph: Those letters, all the letters, unless they were from personal friends of the Governor, went through Bea Smith's section, and they were separated into where they would go, into the different units-- those that Mr. Meese would handle for the Governor--each section; they were divided.

Morris: According to what the issue was?

Randolph: According to what the issue was, that's right. So it's hard to say. I have no idea how many of them came to each section, but they were all equally divided as to the issues. Whatever issues that Mr. Meese handled for the Governor would come to us, and legal affairs would go to legal affairs.

Morris: But Mr. Meese did continue to stay in pretty close touch with the Council on Criminal Justice? Even in the executive office?

Randolph: Yes. Even there, yes. I can't remember what his title was there, but he was kind of the executive director to that for a while. I don't remember the length of time. But he was always interested in things like that. He kept on top of so many things for the Governor. Then, of course, they had the Office of Emergency Services, disasters. He kept tabs on everything like that for the Governor. He reported to him on all those things, through his cabinet and through the people in the office that worked for him.

Morris: Would you go along and take minutes and notes of some of these--?

Randolph: The Council on Criminal Justice I did for a while, yes, and then in any clemency hearing. Now, of course, in the extradition-type hearings, they would have another gal that would come in. But we always had gals that would take notes on hearings. Then when they'd have their cabinet meetings, there was always a gal that went in and took notes for their cabinet meetings, where Mr. Meese was and all the different cabinet people.

Morris: But she'd be a secretary to the cabinet secretary?

Randolph: Right.

Morris: You didn't use tape recorders? You did it in shorthand or--?

Randolph: Now, they may have in some of their others, but I did mine in shorthand.

Morris: That's quite a task, to keep trace of the conversation and--

Randolph: Yes, you couldn't take everything verbatim. But you still got most of it. I'm not sure in their cabinet meetings whether they did that by tape recorder or not.

Morris: They seem to have switched over at one point from fairly full narrative minutes to the action-minute kind of thing.

Randolph: You see, I did not sit in on any of the cabinet meetings, so I don't know how it was handled.

STAFF STRUCTURE DEFINED BY HIERARCHY OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Morris: How often would Mr. Meese have to be out of town on business for the Governor?

Randolph: I don't recall that he was out of town too much. He was always there handling things when the Governor was out of town. I don't recall that he was out of town that much; not nearly as much as he is now. It seems as though he was there a lot. He had to go out of town some of the time, but I don't recall that he was out of town all that much. It's hard for me to remember back. It seems so a matter of course. It seems as though he's out of town more now than he was then. But he was always there to handle things when the Governor was out of town.

Morris: That was more really to keep the organization of government going there in Sacramento?

Randolph: Right. I think so.

Morris: And this is more of a going out and--

Randolph: Now I think it's different, because you have different--like the way they call it, the Big Three or the Big Four, however you want to call it now. They make sure that there's somebody with the Governor, or President, at all times. They also make sure there's somebody here to handle things, which is what they did there, too--which I think is very smart.

Morris: Were there a group of assistants to Mr. Meese in Sacramento, as opposed to the people who were like Mr. Deaver, the director of administration and office of planning?

Randolph: He had his own assistants that worked directly under him and handled things for him.

Morris: Who were those?

Randolph: Of course, he had Mike Deaver at that time, and then there were also assistants under Mike Deaver. There must have been, oh, Mike Deaver, two others--there must have been at least three or four that worked directly for Mr. Meese at that time. Then, of course, the others that were under him from that level--the cabinet and the appointments secretary, all those--had direct liaison under him as well.

Morris: That was a kind of hierarchy?

Randolph: Yes, like on a chart, there would be the President [Governor], then there would be Meese next. Then there would be under him over here at this level certain things. Then from under there, cabinet people stretching over here.

Morris: And their work fed into Mr. Meese, and he would say yes or no or let's do it this way?

Randolph: Yes, because he couldn't handle all those things himself, so he would have his own people that would handle certain things for him. But it gave him--he was able to keep tabs on--

Morris: Then on the staff rosters there are people called special assistants to the governor, and it's unclear whether they're on temporary duty for some special project, or whether Mr. Meese worked out some particular area that they were to deal with.

Randolph: Some particular area that they would deal with. It wasn't temporary, they were full-time. But they had specific areas that they handled.

Morris: Then in 1971 or so, the organization takes a much more specific form. Mr. Deaver becomes director of administration. Was that a change from your point of view? Could you see a change in function, or was it sort of a rearrangement?

Randolph: I felt like it was a rearrangement. I don't recall that I felt that Mr. Meese's duties changed really that much. Now, maybe, like Mike's--he may have been given more responsibilities at the time. I would say that that probably happened. But still, I don't feel that Mr. Meese's job changed any really.

Morris: This would be very helpful for talking to him and trying to understand--

Randolph: Now, I could be wrong, and he'll probably have some different viewpoints, but this is just strictly the way I felt.

Morris: Well, it sounds like it didn't make a difference to what your work involved.

Randolph: No, it didn't. So that's probably why I feel like it didn't change any as far as Mr. Meese is concerned.

Morris: That's a useful insight.

TROUBLE-SHOOTING FOR THE GOVERNOR

Morris: What about some of the trouble spots, like the People's Park [in Berkeley] and the troubles in Santa Barbara? Did Mr. Meese go and be on site to keep the Governor in touch with what was going on?

Randolph: I don't remember. I can remember him going down to Berkeley. Didn't they have problems in Berkeley, too? It seems as though he went to a few of those trouble sites, but to be perfectly honest, I cannot remember which specific ones he went to. I wish I could remember for sure, but I'm not sure of that. You'll have to get that from Mr. Meese, because I don't remember. I hesitate to say.

Morris: Would something like that mean that you have to stop everything that's going on and rearrange everything so that--?

Randolph: If something like that happened, you better believe it! You rearranged the whole schedule, and anything that wasn't important, you just rescheduled for another time. When they had emergencies, those took priority.

Morris: How often did something come up that was considered an emergency?

Randolph: Gosh, that's hard to say, too, because, gee, you could have two or three of those things that might come up in a month, and maybe there won't be anything else like that for another three or four months. It's just like the disasters they have now, like this earthquake that came up. I don't think you could give any specific times that those would come up.

Morris: I know you can't say, "We're going to have one next week." At least, I certainly hope not.

Randolph: They would come up frequently, just like they do here.

Morris: Would Mr. Meese have to go all the time, or were there--?

Randolph: No, not necessarily.

Morris: He'd send somebody else?

Randolph: Yes. Right.

Morris: With all the planning and attention to organization and training that was going on in the governor's office, to what extent could they actually develop stand-by procedures for normally dealing with--?

Randolph: They had different sections for--it's just like disasters. The Office of Emergency Services, in any specific disasters, they're first on the scene to find out how bad it is. In each area, it's the same way. They always had somebody beneath them that would be there first to find out just how serious the disaster was--economic or whatever it was--and then they report it in and go from there. You can't handle everything yourself. You've got to be able to have people, good people, underneath you that can go firsthand.

THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE DURING ELECTIONS: BUSINESS AS USUAL

Morris: How about when election time came around? Did that make a noticeable difference in how things went in the governor's office?

Randolph: Do you mean before Reagan--?

Morris: I was thinking of 1970, when he was running for re-election, and then when there were congressional elections going.

Randolph: Well, to me, the work went on the same. Everything was the same, regardless; that had to be over and above, as far as I'm concerned. It didn't change our duties any. It was business as usual, so to speak.

Morris: The mail still had to get out, and the schedules.

Randolph: You better believe it; everything had to.

Morris: But were more people needing to see Mr. Meese or the Governor in terms of political planning and crises and things of that sort?

Randolph: Evidently, it must not have, because that would probably come to my mind. I'm sure there were a few that wanted to come in and discuss things about running, but I don't think so. I think that's kind of an ongoing thing.

Morris: Yes, I think you're right to a great extent. In your eight years working with Mr. Meese, did he turn over more administrative details to you and ask you to lend a hand with--?

[a beeper sounds in the office]

Randolph: I think that's somebody else's beeper. I don't think it's mine. Oh, that's probably the President's, where the President is. They have a thing in here that shows where he is at all times.

Randolph: In certain areas, yes, I would say probably yes.

Morris: What kinds of things?

Randolph: I don't know. Just certain things that he knew that I could handle with his own people that he worked with. But on the whole, people that called--oh, I don't know, it's hard to say. We just had a good rapport. I didn't have any specific section job, as such, that I handled that didn't go back to him.

Morris: But you could handle phone calls for him?

Randolph: Oh, yes.

Morris: Talk to people and--?

Randolph: That's right. I handled a lot of that for him.

Morris: And just speak for him, those kinds of things?

Randolph: Yes.

Morris: That's a good relationship to have and it can save a lot of time.

Randolph: But he also wanted to be on top of everything. I only--in the areas I knew I was all right, otherwise--but I never overstepped, because he likes to know everything that's going on. Anything that I did, I always made sure he knew about.

Morris: In Sacramento, what kind of a workload did that mean? Nine-to-five, five days a week?

Randolph: We worked more hours than that.

Morris: I figured you did.

Randolph: But not as many hours as here. Of course, there were always those times when the budget, certain things, came up, when you worked until twelve, one o'clock at night occasionally. There were always things that had to get out, and maybe you'd have to work until six-thirty or seven some nights. So you never knew. You were kind of on call. So when things came up, you'd--

Morris: That's a huge responsibility.

Randolph: That's right. You'd just stay as long as your responsibility.

Morris: It means you don't have as much time for your family and non-governmental friends.

Randolph: No, that's true. But he was always very thoughtful. He was a very thoughtful man. Still is very thoughtful.

Morris: Yes, and a very good-humored person to be around.

Randolph: Oh, very. That's right.

Morris: Were the people in the governor's office enough kindred souls so that, in a way, those provided social friendships, too?

Randolph: Oh yes, we made a lot of friends there. It was like a big family, and everybody loved him, loved the Governor. It was a good relationship in the office, I think, with everybody.

Morris: Family is the term that Molly [Sturges] Tuthill uses.

Randolph: It was; it was like a family.

Morris: She was somebody that worked with you when she came in the last year or so to [collect] the [Governor's] papers?

Randolph: Yes, right. A real nice gal. I liked her very much. But we were like a family. I really feel that way. And we all had a good relationship with each other, the gals, the men, all of them. We had a good relationship with each other. We really did.

Morris: Thank you. That gives me a good sense of how the governor's office functioned. I don't think they could get along without the support staff, the secretaries, and--

Randolph: I agree. That's right. And I think they were very smart to keep the people they did for the smooth running of the office.

Morris: Did you stay on into Jerry Brown's administration?

Randolph: I stayed and worked for Gray Davis in the same capacity that I was with Ed Meese for that next six months, and I left under very amicable circumstances. At that time, on June 2 of that next year [1975] I went to work for Judge Anthony Kennedy, who is the U.S. Circuit Judge of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Morris: Did Mr. Davis approach the administrative aspects of being executive secretary the same way Mr. Meese had?

Randolph: I think they all--it's hard to say. They had their own way; they changed many things too numerous to even go into.

Morris: They did pick things up and turn them around?

Randolph: Yes. It's just like, personnelwise, they didn't do like Reagan did. They didn't keep half the support staff on. They let many, many go; many, many.

Morris: Was the idea to cut down the size of the governor's office?

Randolph: No, I don't think so. They just rearranged it. I have to say, I personally don't feel that they had the trust in the people and in the work and why they were needed, as in the previous administration. I truly feel that way.

Morris: I'd like to stay and talk longer, but I have to move on, and I know--

Randolph: I know. It's been very interesting.

Morris: I know you're busy. You'll get a copy of the transcript.

TAPE GUIDE - FLORENCE RANDOLPH PROCUNIER

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University of California
Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Robert Walker

POLITICAL ADVISING AND ADVOCACY FOR RONALD REAGAN, 1965-1980

An Interview Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris, Sarah Sharp
1982-1983



President Ronald Reagan with Robert C. Walker
1983

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

"Political Advising and Advocacy for Ronald Reagan, 1965-1980," an oral history conducted with Robert C. Walker, demonstrates the benefit of interviewing staff members who operated in less visible, though clearly critical, positions within a governor's office. This interview complements several others in the Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era oral history project in discussing Walker's efforts on Reagan's behalf in both state and national politics, and how he and other staff members aided Reagan in his search for the presidency.

In this oral history, Walker recalls his own role in the Republican party as an innovative strategist, operating in San Diego; Harris County, Texas; other Southern states; and nationally. In the first interview session, Walker provides much new information about Reagan's participation in California Republican politics before 1966. Included here are anecdotes about Reagan's campaigning for Loyd Wright (the conservative challenger to Republican Senator Thomas Kuchel) in 1962, and about Reagan's co-chairing (along with M. Philip Davis) of the Goldwater-Miller campaign in California in 1964. During this same period, Walker worked for the Los Angeles County Republican Central Committee, and for the then newly-formed Republican Associates in San Diego. (To supplement his discussion of Republican Associates, the interviewee has allowed the editors to include a brochure describing the group's successes in the 1964 San Diego elections as an appendix to the interview.) Robert Walker also became staff assistant to Dr. Gaylord Parkinson, who was chairman of the Republican state central committee in California between 1963 and 1967. It is in this position that Walker authored the "Eleventh Commandment" which Republicans used to help Reagan get elected governor in 1966.

Nineteen sixty-eight clearly was a transition year for Walker's Republican loyalties. He describes his support for Richard Nixon for president early in the year. Indeed, he and Dr. Parkinson spent several months setting up Nixon's preliminary campaign. After suffering the disappointment of what Walker referred to as "broken promises," Walker and Parkinson left the Nixon staff. Walker was picked up by the Reagan organization to spend the next five months getting ready for the Republican national convention to be held in Miami Beach in late summer. His responsibility, though assigned too late in Walker's estimation, was to "organize the Southern states" for Reagan. He concludes that Reagan "damn near made it" in 1968, and would have had it not been for the strength of national party support for Nixon. One of the highlights of this interview is Walker's assessment of what happened in 1968--why Nixon was heir to this party support, what the roles were of national Republican leaders such as Ray Bliss and Strom Thurmond, what the Sunbelt states' enthusiasm was for Reagan, and how other Reagan staff members such as F. Clifton White and Thomas C. Reed proceeded with their work in Miami Beach.

Once back in California, Walker worked for Reagan as governor in several different roles: as head of the state Department of Navigation and Ocean Development between 1969 and 1971, in charge of San Diego and Imperial Counties during the 1970 Reagan campaign for re-election, and as an assistant to the administration on plans for welfare reform and legislative reapportionment. In his consideration of these positions, Walker concludes that his "main thrust really was national politics." "I was the only one in the office," Walker says, "that had that background and experience."

Especially towards the end of the Reagan administration in Sacramento, this thrust became a source of tension within the governor's office and Walker left. Between 1971 and 1974, Walker remembers, "as his political advisor I did go with him on all of his out of state trips. On those, when we would plan schedules (the destination dictated by political importance), we grew quite cognizant of his potential, beyond his tenure as governor, to become president. We would prepare those schedules with that idea in mind.

When Walker was trying to get Reagan to discuss the prospects for presidential campaigning in 1976, Reagan told him that he was "perhaps overly concerned." "Bob," the governor said, "if the good Lord wants me to be president of the United States, I'll be president of the United States." It is clear though that Walker and many others of Reagan's devoted staff have worked since 1968 through 1980 to give providence a boost.

Robert Walker currently serves as vice-president in charge of national affairs at the Adolph Coors Company in Washington, D.C. Both taping sessions for this interview, which were held on 30 August 1982 and 5 May 1983, were conducted in Walker's office in Washington near Pennsylvania Avenue. There was a clear view of the White House out of a side window, and the interviewee would gesture to that view to make his points about the success of efforts to elect Ronald Reagan president. During the initial session, Walker agreed to meet for a second session to focus more thoroughly on the 1968 presidential campaign. This session was held when Gabrielle Morris was in Washington interviewing several other participants in this series. Walker returned the interview transcripts quickly after each was sent to him for his review, adding several new written passages during the process. These passages have been incorporated into the entire manuscript and it is noted where they occur.

Sarah Sharp, Interviewer-Editor
Gabrielle Morris, Project Director

14 September 1984
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California

Regional Oral History Office
Room 486
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University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

Governmental History Documentation Project Interviewees

Your full name Robert C. Walker

Date of birth 3-2-26

Father's full name Arnold Albert Walker

Father's place of birth Smith Center Kansas

Mother's full name Hazel Elizabeth Hughes

Mother's place of birth Greene County, Tennessee

Where did you grow up? Greeneville, Tennessee & Riverside, California

Education (grammar school, high school, college, and the location of each school):

Crescent PolyFitzgerald Grammar Schools, Greeneville, TN
Lincoln Grammar - Riverside, CA
Central Chemistry Junior High - Riverside, CA
Polytechnic Highschool - Riverside, CA

I CAMPAIGNING FOR REPUBLICANS, 1960-1968

[Interview 1: August 30, 1982]##

First Endeavors; Party Squabbles

Sharp: I thought we'd go ahead and get right into the most important information, taking off from the questionnaire that you filled out. We might start just by talking about how you got interested in politics in the first place.

Walker: All right. In the 1950s I was in advertising, public relations work. I didn't see myself staying in that for the rest of my life and I cast about for some kind of career that might be a little more fulfilling. I'd always been interested in political affairs. I'd done a great deal of reading and kept up on current events and things like that. I considered myself a Republican, and a conservative one at that. I was living in Riverside [California] and working there.

I went into Los Angeles one day and simply applied for a job at the Republican central committee of Los Angeles County, to Bill [William E.] Roberts, who was the executive director at the time. He hired me as an area director for three congressional districts in Los Angeles County. At the time there were only twelve. So this was a fourth of all Los Angeles County. Stu [Stuart K.] Spencer, incidentally, was another area director at the time. He had three congressional districts.

This was in 1959. Al [Alphonzo E.] Bell was the county chairman who subsequently was a congressman from Los Angeles County. I succeeded Bill [Roberts], actually, as the executive director of the central committee of Los Angeles County in 1960 when he and Stu went out to form their own--

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 55.

Sharp: Spencer-Roberts.

Walker: --professional firm, and went through the [Republican] national convention of that year, that nominated Richard Nixon in Chicago. Then I resigned from that post-convention and became the staff director of the Nixon-Lodge [Henry Cabot Lodge] campaign in California. We were fortunate enough to carry California for Richard Nixon in 1960, if you recall, by I think a plurality of 35,000 votes, which delivered the electoral votes in his home state in 1960. After the election Congressman Bob Wilson asked me to come down to San Diego and start a businessmen's political organization that was copied somewhat after one that had been going in Los Angeles--Republican Associates.

I did. We started with about six guys down there and we built it up to fourteen hundred businessmen members in San Diego.* It became the group in San Diego that actually ran Republican party politics over the next five years. I was the executive director of that for five years. We went on to elect our own state [party] chairman from San Diego, Gaylord Parkinson.** I was his principal aide at the time. He was the first chairman of Republican Associates and was quite a dynamic guy.

Sharp: He's fascinating. He really is a very interesting person.

Walker: Yes. Bringing Reagan into the thing, I first became aware of him in 1962 when he campaigned for Loyd Wright, who was a primary [election] opponent of Senator Thomas Kuchel. He [Reagan] went around and made speeches for Loyd Wright and I became aware that he was making speeches generally around the country. I recall being fascinated by his delivery of material and the material itself that he was using.

I next encountered Ronald Reagan in 1964 when he was proposed as the co-chairman, and subsequently became the co-chairman for the [Barry] Goldwater [Sr.]-[William E.] Miller campaign in

*Mr. Walker later added the names of members of this group: Gaylord Parkinson, Frank Nicol, Gordon Luce, Cliff Wallace, Bill Herrick, and Dick Capen.

**Readers may be interested to see Parkinson's own interview, "California Republican Party Official, 1962-1967," in Issues and Innovations in the 1966 Republican Gubernatorial Campaign, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.

Walker: California--Citizens for Goldwater-Miller.

[When asked later about M. Philip Davis, who was co-chairman of this campaign along with Reagan, Mr. Walker inserted this response:]

Walker: I don't know anything about Davis's conduct after the meeting I mentioned. In that meeting he was the leader of the "crazies", those who wanted to go down in flames at all costs.

[transcript resumes]

There was a very acrimonious meeting that occurred post-convention in Los Angeles County. I believe it was late August before they got it underway. There were a lot of people fussing and fighting with each other for the leadership of the Goldwater campaign.* Ronald Reagan was in the room at this meeting where Dean Burch, who was the national [party] chairman, and all of the national leadership of the Goldwater campaign came out to Los Angeles and Reagan got up and tried to pour oil on troubled waters, without success.

It was so bad that while I was proposed to be Reagan's aide in this campaign for Goldwater-Miller statewide by the national leadership (Clif [F. Clifton] White had proposed me for that position), I declined it and went back to San Diego because I could see that the whole campaign, at least on a state level, was not going anywhere because of all the acrimony.

Reagan, I remember, in that meeting, true to form, stood up and said, "Folks, I'm the new boy on the block. I haven't been involved in a campaign like this in the past. But I can see that there's trouble here and there ought not to be trouble here."

He went on to try to pacify people and get them to cooperate in behalf of the Goldwater effort. They more or less ignored him because he was just a movie star that they knew of: someone who went around and made speeches here and there.

This was prior, of course, to his big speech in '64 for Barry Goldwater.

*When asked on the transcript about these disagreements, Mr. Walker inserted the following note:

Rule or ruin--purity over pragmatism. "The silent majority" came to power at last; "We few and no others must get in front of the parade."

Sharp: Yes. It intrigues me that you take him all the way back to '62, especially within the Republican party, because that's a link that is not often made--that he was really that active or even considered so much by--.

Walker: Phil Davis. You may have heard of that name. He and Phil Davis turned out to be the California co-chairmen for Goldwater-Miller. I don't know who turned out to be their staff help, if they had any.

I went back to San Diego. As I said, we pretty much ran the campaign for the candidates in that county at the time. We specifically took on the Goldwater-Miller campaign for San Diego County. Because we used some new techniques (new for the time) like computers to figure out how you prioritized the precincts you work and to recruit volunteers, and all manner of use of computers for the first time. We turned out to be the largest county in the United States in 1964 to go for Goldwater-Miller. We only carried it by a plurality of two thousand votes, but we were still the largest county to go for Goldwater in the whole country.

Sharp: Do you think that the new techniques that you were using really were a significant issue?

Walker: It had a great deal to do with it, yes.

Incidentally, Pete Wilson was my assistant with general help and organizing.

Sharp: Is that right! I had wondered where he was at the time.

Walker: I had hired him the previous year as my assistant. He was just out of Boalt Hall [University of California Berkeley law school] and wanted to get into active politics, and needed a job. We put together quite a countywide campaign that year.

Warm-Up for the 1966 Gubernatorial Campaign

Walker: At any rate, the next time I encountered Ronald Reagan was in the late spring, early summer I believe of '65, when the powers that be in Los Angeles had persuaded him to go around and about the state under the aegis of Friends of Reagan, to see if there was support that could be drummed up for him for governor.

Walker: Spencer-Roberts had been hired as the campaign entity. Through my previous association with them and their knowledge of what I had done in San Diego they asked me to take his campaign for San Diego and Imperial Counties for the primary, which I did. I resigned, as a matter of fact, from Republican Associates subsequently to do that, and had some other clients as well.* I went into the professional political business myself at the time.

They brought him down, as I say, in late spring or early summer--I believe it was June; it could have been July. I remember I met him and Bill Roberts out at the Hilton at Mission Bay one evening. He was taking a shower when I arrived, so he didn't know I'd arrived, I guess. He walked out in the room stark naked! [laughter] It was the first time I'd seen that much of Ronald Reagan!

We then went on down to a little event involving the Boy Scouts in Chula Vista. I forget why we did, but we did. We took him down there and then we had dinner at the U.S. Grant Hotel in San Diego. We were discussing, of course, the possibility of electing him governor.

Sharp: How real did all that seem, that he might become governor?

Walker: It seemed as though we could do it because we, I guess, at the time had convinced ourselves that in order to penetrate a good proportion of the electorate you needed someone who could attract attention on his own.

We were at a pretty low ebb, as you know, after the Goldwater debacle. To be able to bounce back as we did in '66--not just in California but all over the country, we did bounce back. A lot of it was reaction to the abysmal defeat. In California we felt a guy as articulate as Reagan (as white-hat a guy as Reagan, if you will) could excite enough attention so that you could penetrate the electorate with your message. We were feeling that his message at the time--his having made the big speech in '64 that had gotten almost more attention than all of Goldwater's speeches--that he could do this. Yes. And Pat Brown had more or less run his string out, we thought.

*Mr. Walker added later that among his other clients were the thirteen western states within the Republican National Committee and an exploratory campaign for George Romney for president.

Sharp: You personally had built up a series of successes in San Diego anyway. You must have been feeling pretty good about your own work.

Walker: Yes. In the elections of '62 and '64, which weren't the best for Republicans generally, we had been able to carry, I believe, 85 percent of all the offices on the ballot. Of course, San Diego at the time was more Republican, more conservative than it is today, registration-wise. But still we tried to use the most modern methods of political action.

Sharp: Dr. Parkinson spoke about that in quite the same way. I interviewed him a couple of years ago, primarily about his work as state chairman in that whole period with Reagan running for governor. He remarked that San Diego had so much potential before it began to be organized by Republican Associates and the other groups that it was just waiting for somebody to come and do something.

Walker: I'm told that since we went on to other things there hasn't been the organization in San Diego that there was during that period.

Sharp: Yes.

I have a note that you became secretary of the state Republican party. Is that right?

Walker: No. I don't remember being secretary. I was the guy that ran Parkinson's campaign for vice-chairman and stayed with him all during his chairmanship, and helped him not only in California but on a national level. He became chairman of the state chairmen at one point. I helped him get that. I was kind of his aide in the background that did a lot of these things.

A Successful Candidate's Appeal

Sharp: What led up then to your going to the Republican governors' conference with Mr. Reagan in late '66? I had a note that you did that. Along with you were Mrs. Reagan, of course, and Phil Battaglia, Lyn Nofziger, Dr. Parkinson, Tom [Thomas C.] Reed, Bill Friedman, Lee Holdt and Arthur van Court.

Walker: Yes. I'm trying to remember that. We had two little jets. The reason we had two was because they [Mr. and Mrs. Reagan] wouldn't fly together--they didn't think that was wise. Just getting him to fly in the first place was something which was accomplished during the campaign. He'd always ridden trains before in his travels around the country.

Walker: We had these two little jets and we were going to Colorado Springs for that conference. It may have been because I was the western field director for the Republican National Committee at the time. I had taken on the contract as a free-lance political consultant with the Republican National Committee to oversee the thirteen western states. I may have been going in that capacity, to hear the new Republican governor-elect in one of my states.

Sharp: I wondered, especially with Dr. Parkinson going, as well as members of the governor's office, like Phil Battaglia his executive secretary, how closely the Republican party in California was working with Mr. Reagan after the election? There is the theory that Reagan ignored the party and went on his own with Spencer-Roberts's help and Lyn Nofziger's as well.

Walker: That's not true. He may have been passive with regard to the party at times. But he was not any kind of independent entity. I wouldn't agree with that.

Sharp: Was there anything particularly notable about this first governors' conference that Mr. Reagan went to that you recall?

Walker: I think there was a great deal of enthusiasm generally because of the bounce-back of the Republicans in '66. But there was a particular amount of enthusiasm with regard to him because he'd been elected governor of the largest state in the country. This was a phenomenon at the time. The only thing previous that had happened was that George Murphy had been elected to the [U.S.] Senate in '64. But that wasn't considered the great breakthrough that this was. The fact that Reagan was the second former motion-picture actor to be elected to a high political office heightened the phenomenon aspect of things.

Sharp: People really wanted to talk to him?

Walker: Oh, yes. He was quite popular among all those attending that conference.

Sharp: Did he have a sense that he came back from the conference feeling somewhat differently than when he had gone? Did it make any sort of impression on him?

Walker: I don't know whether it did or not.

Sharp: It seems like you might have really gotten to know him in this '65 through late '66 period.

Walker: Yes, but I got to know him much better later on.

Sharp: Yes. You worked much more closely with him later on I would think.

Preliminary Work on Nixon's 1968 Presidential Campaign

Sharp: I wanted to skip to the Department of Navigation and Ocean Development which I have you in from '69 to '71.

Walker: You're skipping quite a bit if you do that.

Sharp: What's in between?

Walker: What you're skipping is an eight-month interlude following the fall of '66 where Richard Nixon persuaded Dr. Parkinson and me to come back and organize the preliminaries of his presidential campaign in '67. This was the period from January to August '67. There was some relationship in that with the new governor. That is, here's Richard Nixon, a Californian, living in New York getting ready to run for president, and he's hired a couple of guys who were prominent in helping Reagan get elected to do his presidential thing.

Sharp: How then did you work on that?

Walker: That's the period when I lived here. I told you that I'd lived in Washington for about six months after I stopped commuting. I did set up the Nixon for president headquarters and did much of the preliminary organizing in some of the primary states. I hired a staff.

We both became quite disillusioned with Richard Nixon in August of '67 and went back to California, to San Diego.

[Upon her review of the transcript, the editor asked Mr. Walker to describe how this disappointment came about.]

Walker: Parkinson and I had sat down with Nixon for five hours one evening in his New York apartment and he had agreed to conduct himself in a certain manner as candidate in relationship to us as campaign chairman and executive director, respectively. We had reviewed all of the errors of his operations in 1960 and 1962, and he promised us that they would not reoccur. He would be the candidate and reserve to himself only those matters that are properly the concern of a candidate, such as issue positions. We would run all of the support mechanisms of the campaign without his interference.

By August, Nixon had broken all of his promises to us. We concluded that the man did not have integrity and should not be president of the United States. So, we resigned as quietly as

Walker: possible and returned to San Diego. While we were not vindictive enough to want to harm him, he and John Mitchell and Maurice Stans floated a story with a national columnist to the effect that we had been fired because we were disloyal; that we had leaked information to the Reagan and Rockefeller people. Nixon suspected, rightly as it turned out, that both would run against him in 1968. Far from being disloyal, so long as we worked for Nixon we were intent to keep Reagan, Rockefeller, Romney, and any others from running at all in 1968. Any communications we had with any of their people was directed at that objective.

[transcript resumes]

There was an interlude there also when I was involved with Shirley Temple [Black] for Congress, briefly. That was a couple of months.

Shift to Reagan: The 1968 Republican National Convention

Walker: Tom Reed asked me again, as the consultant outside government altogether, to work with him on the Reagan for president effort in '68.

Sharp: I wondered if you might have been involved in that.

Walker: I was. It was one of the most interesting periods in my career, because I had set up Richard Nixon's preliminary campaign, become disillusioned with him, been re-hired by Reagan, and I spent five months getting ready for the Republican national convention in Miami Beach to oppose him [Nixon] and be for Ronald Reagan.

Sharp: You were moving all over the horizon.

Walker: I was moving between presidential candidates. I suppose you're not terribly interested in the details of that convention, or are you?

Sharp: Well, I am. I did interview Paul Haerle from San Francisco.

Walker: He was involved.

Sharp: Yes, he was, and he had some interesting observations about it. We interviewed Emily Pike, as part of a [California] Women Political Leaders series, and she had some interesting things also to say about

Sharp: that convention.* But what is your perspective on that convention and Mr. Reagan's running?

Walker: My perspective is that we damn near made it, if you will. We forced Richard Nixon to go, on the first ballot, all the way through Wisconsin to Wyoming, the last state in the alphabet, before he had his 667, one more than half the number of delegates, to nominate.

If we had stopped Richard Nixon on that first ballot almost everyone agrees, who knew anything about the vote counts and how the delegates were going to switch after the first ballot, that Reagan would have been nominated on the third ballot. This would have saved us Richard Nixon, saved us Watergate, probably saved us Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.

Sharp: That would have been different for sure. What stopped it, do you think?

Walker: We were just out-gunned. They had more power than we had. If you really want to know what stopped it, it was some of the people who are still around who stopped it. Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond are the ones that stopped it.

Sharp: Is that right! Now, why do you think that?

Walker: Because they were establishment Republicans at the time, in reaction to their being ostracized, if you will, by their abysmal defeat in '64. They wanted nothing more than to be respectable again and Richard Nixon gave them respectability within the Republican party. They were not radicals anymore, and they saw Reagan as coming on as the representative of the '64 era and a radical within the Republican party. That's why they wouldn't vote for him.

Sharp: That's intriguing. I'll have to think about that. He doesn't seem that way to me now because he's been in politics for so long, but did a lot of people share that feeling about Mr. Reagan, that he was this sort of new mover?

Walker: Apparently. I had the job of organizing, not just for the convention in Miami Beach, but they gave me--too late it turned out--the job of organizing the Southern states for Reagan for president in '68.

*See Emily Pike, Republican Party Campaign Manager, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1982, especially pp. 244-252.

Walker: (Clif White mismanaged on a national level.) That's why I know intimately the attitude of Strom Thurmond [from South Carolina] and all the other leaders in the South, such as Clark Reed in Mississippi [who was Republican state chairman and head of the delegation] at the time. The people in Florida were not helpful to the Reagan candidacy.*

Sharp: I had heard that.

Walker: Yes. I think that the previous [Republican] national convention of '64 and the subsequent defeat colored many, many conservatives' thinking, and they had suffered much ostracism as a result of that. They thought they were being labeled as radicals, at least by the rest of the Republican party, and they wanted desperately to get rid of that label. So they wanted to stay in a safe harbor, if you will, in '68.

Here was this brash, new, former motion-picture actor out of California coming in to try to take this away from Nixon, who had been laboring in the Republican vineyard ever since the '40s. It was something that they didn't want to see. At least not enough of them wanted to see it. Not enough of his natural allies--philosophical allies--wanted to see it, so that we were not quite able to pull it off.

Sharp: Who were the main supporters, did you feel, in California working with you either behind the scenes or more obviously in this first push for the presidency?

Walker: Financial types?

Sharp: Either financial or--

Walker: Tom Reed was the principal operator, and Holmes Tuttle and Henry Salvatori were principal finance types.

*Mr. Walker added later that "The delegates, many of whom promised to Reagan, and didn't; one was now-Senator Paula Hawkins."

Sharp: Some of the same people who were helping him financially [in his] run for governor?

Walker: Originally, yes.

Sharp: Why was Reed so interested in a Reagan presidency?

Walker: National ambitions.

Sharp: Did you have a lot of contact with Tuttle and Salvatori, or was that more Tom Reed's bailiwick?

Walker: No. I didn't have a great deal of contact with Holmes Tuttle and Henry Salvatori, but I did have a good deal, for instance, with Bill Clark, who was executive secretary at the time--had succeeded Battaglia.

Sharp: What did all this consist of?

Walker: Arrangements for Reagan's sojourn in Miami Beach.

Sharp: Are there any other notes you'd like to make about that convention? It's an interesting interlude in Mr. Reagan's political career, for sure.

[Mr. Walker wrote an answer for this question during his review of the transcript.]

Walker: Just that we came very close in '68 and that in '74 when Nixon was finally shown to be without integrity, [not] Ronald Reagan nor any of us ever went back to the Goldwaters, Thurmonds, Reeds, Towers, Hawkins, etc. of the South and said, "You should have listened to us."

II NOTES ON REAGAN'S GOVERNORSHIP

Director, Department of Navigation and Ocean Development, 1969-1971

Sharp: This department--Navigation and Ocean Development--this was all brand new as I understand, part of the Resources Agency.

Walker: Well, they had had a department called Harbors and Watercraft for a number of years, that had been the smallest department in government. I forget why they had made it a department under [Edmund G.] Brown [Sr.]. Maybe it was to give someone a job and some prestige. It should never have been a department to have just that limited a purview, harbors and watercraft. Essentially the department licensed small boats and subvened gas tax funds for the development of facilities for those small boats in harbors; marinas and launching ramps and that sort of thing.

We thought, you can't just abolish it. It doesn't fit anywhere else particularly. There was, coming on in California, a great environmental concern. So, we in the Reagan administration sought to address that concern. We sought to expand this department beyond the boaters' interests and to make it a total coastal interest. We wanted to do something about the environmental concerns that were quite obvious at this time. Sixty-nine was a very early time in environmentalism, but we recognized it.

This department had a name change--we got it through the legislature--and a purpose change to treat some of these coastal problems, although the legislature was reluctant to do it for Reagan--for this administration--and we didn't get any money particularly. We only got, as I recall, a tentative charge to do these new things.

As a matter of fact, we didn't have everyone in the administration on our side. I can recall at one time making a speech before the cabinet on this subject and saying that if we did not do some of the things that I was recommending that we do, that the Democrats in

Walker: the legislature would, or else there would be an initiative on the ballot that would do some of them. Those solutions would be far more extreme than what I was proposing, that would treat the problem but not be extreme.

I lost that battle in cabinet and you subsequently had the people, through the initiative process, enacting the California Coastal Commission [in 1972] which has been a subject of controversy ever since. That's what we were trying to do with the Department of Navigation and Ocean Development, developing it from the harbors and watercraft thing.

Sharp: Why did you get into this department at all?

Walker: A way to stay involved with Ronald Reagan.

Sharp: Did you have Norman [Ike] Livermore's support?

Walker: Yes, I did, as I recall.

Sharp: Was it a matter of him going to bat for you with the cabinet?

Walker: Well, Ike was not always your best batter. But I can recall two people who were instrumental in seeing that we did not address this problem. One was Earl Coke and one was the lieutenant governor, Ed Reinecke. They were opposed to it.

Sharp: Can you isolate out any particular reasons why? They just thought it wasn't necessary, or too expensive, or both?

Walker: Probably both, but I don't recall specifically what their opposition consisted of. I just know they were against it.

Sharp: I looked back in the '70-'71 annual budget for the state. It was referring to some of the departments' objectives, mentioning a beach erosion program (some \$125,000 for beach erosion work at Capitola Beach State Park in Santa Cruz). But the primary, some 80 percent of the department's budgeted monies, went for boat launching facilities development and other sorts of things like that.

Walker: That's true. I believe we would occasionally enter into joint ventures with the Corps of Engineers as far as funding goes.

Sharp: I wondered about that.

Walker: The Corps of Engineers had the principal responsibility for beach erosion, but we would on occasion supplement their projects money-wise to see that they were done.

Sharp: Did you deal at all with the oil drilling and the oil spill issue?

Walker: Not at all.

Sharp: I didn't know if you did or not.

I wondered what sort of contact you might have had with some of the environmental groups, like BCDC. The Bay Conservation and Development Commission was really getting going during this period.

Walker: Not a great deal.

Sharp: Did you hear from various private industries in this particular office, or not too much?

Walker: We heard a great deal from the boating people who felt they were being swallowed up in the bigger venture. They were quite difficult to deal with. They wanted their own department even though it wasn't justified in the whole scheme of things. When we tried to expand it and take on all of these new concerns, why, they were naturally upset. We were able to overcome that. Frankly, I haven't followed enough California state government to know what has happened since.

But that is why we organized that department, because we had this concern. Unfortunately the administration would not adopt a forward thrust on the question, and of course the Democrats were reluctant to do it as well. That was one of the reasons I moved into the governor's office, because I didn't see my activity getting very far in that field.

Sharp: I was going to ask you.

Walker: They [Ed Meese, Mike Deaver, and Tom Reed] had asked me to take a leave of absence anyhow to go back to San Diego and run San Diego and Imperial Counties again for the governor's re-election in '70, which I did. Then I came back and very shortly thereafter I went into the governor's office as his political advisor.

The Re-Election Campaign, 1970

Sharp: Let's get just a note on the re-election campaign.

Walker: All right.

Sharp: Some of the people that I've talked to about it, specifically Mr. Haerle and others as well, characterized that as a pretty easy campaign; that there weren't too many problems that had to be solved campaign-wise and that everybody worked rather well together. I wondered if you had some sort of contrasting view, or you would support that idea?

Walker: I wouldn't say it was an easy campaign. I would say that it was a campaign that could have been done much better than it was. I think when you reduce your plurality to half what it was the first election against a non-incumbent--. You had an incumbent you were running against in '66. In '70 you were running against Jess Unruh, who had a very poor image with the electorate.

Sharp: He did?

Walker: He was "Big Daddy." He was the epitome, image-wise at least, of the corrupt politician, against the glamorous sitting governor. To have cut your plurality in half, I thought, was a rather poor campaign, even though I was involved in it.*

The governor himself said, after the campaign was over, "I wish," he said, with an expletive deleted, "they had let me do more television." They kept him off television, to a large extent.

Sharp: Why was that?

Walker: I don't know. It was incomprehensible to me that they did the kind of advertising campaign that they did.

Sharp: What did the advertising consist of then?

Walker: Some canned spots, very poor ones. That was about it.

Sharp: Did you have significant issues in San Diego that you had to deal with in terms of getting enough votes for him? I'm not familiar with how San Diego did.

Walker: San Diego did very well, I think. I don't recall exactly, but it was more an organization type thing rather than an issue campaign. It's getting your troops organized, getting them committed to work the precincts, getting your special events handled properly. Your big media impact occurs in a campaign at the state level. Out in all the counties it's an organizational thing.

*Mr. Walker later responded to a question about this cutting in half of the plurality. He attributed it to not enough TV time, and "What there was, was poorly done."

Sharp: So you came back in '71 into the governor's office?

Walker: Right.

Sharp: That was specifically at Mr. Reagan's request, or other people seeing you, wanting you to return?

Walker: I think Mike [Michael K.] Deaver principally wanted me there. I informally, while I was still a director, had helped out in political things as requested by the governor's office. For instance, I had advised on the election campaign of Gordon Luce to be state [party] chairman. A lot of people within the party had thought that he could not be elected. We proved that he could be elected. I had more or less managed his campaign for state chairman, informally.

But instead of my doing things like that informally, ad hoc, they asked me to come into the governor's office and be the political aide, and I did.

Sharp: Who did you work directly for then when you first came into the governor's office in '71?

Walker: Ed Meese was the executive secretary, so I worked directly under him. But it was understood that I was working for the governor and I had access to the governor at all times. I went with him on most of his out of state trips.

I was the one, you see, who had national political experience in the whole Sacramento political Republican circle. So when we would plan his out of state speaking schedules I was the one that did the planning. I was the one then that went with him on those trips.

Sharp: I wonder if you had brought back to the governor's office in '71 any particular perspective on the first administration? I see you in a very interesting set of situations because you're working with him long before '66, then through the transition. Then you're out of the governor's office in this department and you come back in. What did you bring back with you in terms of how you thought about the administration?

Walker: I brought back the knowledge that I never again want to be a bureaucrat! [laughter]

Sharp: [laughter] It was far more exciting in the governor's office than doing that?

Walker: Oh, yes! Even outside government it's far more exciting than to be inside a department attempting to accomplish something with all the strictures that pertain with regard to legislation, budgets, and personnel. It's a very dreary job, frankly, and I did not enjoy it a great deal. [pause]

Reapportionment Plans, 1971-1973

Sharp: I thought we might talk about the reapportionment issue. As I wrote you, Ken Hall told me that you had been involved in it. I didn't know really to what extent it had been part of your domain once you came back to the governor's office.

Walker: It was my domain as far as the governor's office was concerned. I had to represent him to the legislature, both houses, and advise him on the stance that he should take vis-à-vis the legislature. It was an interesting issue because, I believe, it's the first time (you would know better than I) that the reapportionment issue was finally decided by the [California] Supreme Court as a result of the impasse of the legislature and the governor's office.*

Sharp: How did that impasse come about?

Walker: It came about because Reagan was unwilling to sign a bill that he felt was unfair to the Republican party, even though there were Republicans in both houses who were willing to work with the Democrats in their own personal behalf. They never did come up with a bill that was as fair as we thought it should be, or as fair as we thought it would be if a disinterested entity, such as, we thought, the [state] supreme court would be, could draw a plan. As it turned out the supreme court did not draw a good plan. We thought it would because it was not a politically interested party to the question.

The legislature is obviously in conflict of interest when it draws its own lines. The governor has a political interest in it because he represents his party statewide. But the supreme court is sitting there and has no particular interest, unless they are partisan. We think they did turn out to let their partisan feelings enter into it. Or at least their staffs did, their special master, or whoever their agents were, in drawing the plan.

*In January 1972, the California Supreme Court said that the reapportionment plan passed by the legislature, and which Governor Reagan vetoed, was unacceptable. The court gave the legislature until 31 December 1972 to draw up another plan. See California Journal, December 1972, p. 371.

Walker: That's what we were trying to do. We were trying to either get a fair plan from the legislature, which proved to be impossible, or we wanted to see that it did go to the supreme court in order to get fairness.

Sharp: What did your work specifically on the issue of reapportionment involve?

Walker: Analyzing the various plans that were thrown up by the legislature; negotiating on those plans with the legislators (the Republicans who brought them in); then advising the governor whether to accept them or not, whether to ask for modifications or not in return for his signature.

Sharp: Whom did you meet with in terms of the legislature?

Walker: The Republican leadership in both houses. John Harmer, for instance, was one in the senate. I don't recall meeting with [Robert] Monagan. Was Monagan still in the legislature at the time, in the lower house? [Monagan was minority floor leader the assembly in 1967 and '68, and again in 1971-72.]

Sharp: He was speaker in 1969 and 1970, I think. I forget now who was speaker after him.

Walker: I forget who we would have negotiated with in the assembly.

Sharp: At this time, now, Put Livermore was chairman, Gordon Luce was vice-chairman, and treasurer was Robert Beaver. Would you have had some sort of input from the Republican party?

Walker: Oh, yes. I remember Put Livermore being in my office a great deal on the reapportionment issue.

Sharp: It was a matter of your meeting with him, asking you to analyze what had been brought to you from the legislature, or the other way around?

Walker: It was a matter of communication, keeping everyone informed as to what the situation was on a day-to-day basis.

Sharp: Was there a full cabinet involvement, too?

Walker: No. The cabinet, per se, had relatively little interest in it. It was more simply between myself, Put Livermore, the leaders in the legislature, and the governor.

Sharp: Did you have your own ideas about--? Did you privately go home and make up a plan, or sit in your office and make up a plan of what you thought would be a fair sort of reapportionment?

Walker: No.

Sharp: I wonder if Mike Deaver had come into this at all? He had been one of the main advocates, I had understood, for the Cal Plan.

Walker: No. Mike Deaver had been an employee of Cal Plan under the aegis of Parkinson as state chairman, of which the Cal Plan was the major thrust. Mike had been more or less an organizer in one part of the state for that. Parkinson himself developed the Cal Plan concept.

Sharp: Was the congressional and the state legislative reapportionment somehow synchronized in terms of Republican efforts?

Walker: Yes, although I must say that we had the lead on it. Some of the Republican congressmen weren't particularly happy with our inability, if you will, to come to terms with the Democrats in Sacramento. They put a little pressure on us to do that. But it didn't mean a great deal.

Sharp: Are there other ideas that you have about reapportionment and how you worked on it that you think we should talk about?

Walker: Not particularly. I would just say that there is an inherent conflict of interest when the legislature draws its own district lines. The solution to that has to be, in the future, some disinterested entity, a commission of some kind that has nothing to gain by one district line or another, doing reapportionment.

Sharp: I wonder if that will ever happen?

Walker: That's rather idealistic.

The Administration's Achievements: Efforts at Welfare Reform and Tax Reduction

Sharp: Besides the reapportionment issue, what other sorts of activities did you have between '71 and '74 as this political person within the governor's staff?

Walker: The principal achievement that I identify with of the whole Reagan administration is welfare reform.

Sharp: Is that right!

Walker: There was a great deal of unrest about this problem of welfare and its ballooning costs in California at the time. I was given the job of focusing that unrest on Sacramento and on the legislature, in order to create the climate where the problem could be solved. I put together a statewide, grassroots organization that did focus it. The climax of that was when Bob Moretti and other Democratic leaders went into the governor's office holding their arms in the air and saying to the governor, "Stop those cards and letters!" [laughter]

Sharp: Stop the pressure of working on it?

Walker: Right.

Sharp: Was this part of one of the task forces then, or separate from that?

Walker: A separate task force of citizens to focus the public concern.

Sharp: I talked with Jerry Martin about this quite a bit.* There was the legislative message on welfare reform that set out the issues and what should be done about them.** I didn't see your name at all in any of this, which is typical. People often disappear from the records, at least as far as their main activities are concerned.

Walker: And then I have not always operated visibly--deliberately. This was probably one of the times, when I was seeing that the outside groups were put together but was not heading up any group personally.

Sharp: Could you give me a chronology of how you worked on welfare reform in either meeting with Mr. Moretti through this period, or working on the bills?

Walker: No. First of all, my memory doesn't serve chronologically, but there's a fellow who is running for Congress now and is going to be elected, down in one of the Riverside districts, who was a supervisor, Al McCandless, (now Congressman) who was the person that I designated as the chairman of our outside groups for welfare reform. He could throw a good deal of light on it from his perspective, if you ever run across him.

*See oral history interview with Jerry C. Martin, "Information and Policy Research for Governor Ronald Reagan, 1969-1975," and interviews with Robert Carleson and Earl Brian in this series.

**"Meeting the Challenge: A Responsible Program for Welfare and Medi-Cal Reform," delivered to the California legislature on 3 March 1971, later available in print.

Walker: I was the one in the governor's office that stimulated this activity. I did not, however, deal directly with Moretti or anyone in the legislature. My whole job was an outreach to the public; to generate cards, letters, phone calls to the legislators urging them to solve the problem on the governor's terms.

Sharp: Did this start as a re-election issue?

Walker: No. It had nothing to do with re-election. It was something that simply had to be done in order for the state to survive financially. It was done in the second term.

Again, I don't know how the welfare laws and regulations have survived since, but there were some significant concepts about welfare that were put into the public mind during that campaign, I think; requiring able-bodied people to work for their stipend.

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Sharp: Who would be the kinds of people that you would go and talk to then, as part of this outreach beyond the governor's office into the state?

Walker: People who represented whatever walk of life, either volunteer activity or occupation, that had some relevance to the welfare question. Minorities were a significant part of our outside group. We put together a statewide committee under Al McCandless that represented all kinds of people that are impacted, one way or another, by the welfare question. We would have meetings of that group and press conferences and all sorts of things. It was quite an effort, if I do say so. It was ultimately successful; that is, the governor didn't get everything in his original proposal, but he got 75, 80 percent of it.

Sharp: Would he come and talk as well?

Walker: Oh, yes. He identified with the outside groups.

Sharp: It sounds a lot like a political campaign.

Walker: Yes; it was in a large sense.

Sharp: How many times a week would you try to meet with people? Was that something that you would do two or three times a week?

Walker: Not on any regular schedule, whenever necessary.

The other activity that I was involved in in those years was Proposition 1.

Sharp: That was the next thing I was going to ask you about. Prop 1, of course, was the special election, fall of '73. Before that, of course, you were on a steering committee along with Frank Walton, Jim Jenkins, Mr. [John] Kehoe, Lawrence Robinson, and Herbert Jackson. The steering committee was for the task force on tax reduction. I wondered what the connection was between the steering committee and the actual work of the task force--how you were really connected.

Walker: The steering committee, as I recall, was sort of like the executive committee of a board of directors. They're the ones who deal with the key issues and come back to the board of directors and say this is what we recommend being done.

I think I was included on that group only for liaison information purposes. Again, my job in Prop 1 was quite similar to the job on welfare reform. If we were going to go for an initiative for this purpose, then I was the one who was to focus public opinion on it. I was the one that handled the campaign itself outside the government or saw that it was done, and the liaison with the citizen groups that were formed to advocate the adoption of Prop 1.*

There was a problem there that I would like to mention. We only lost it forty-six to fifty-four. The reason we lost it was because we put it out there by itself in a special election with nothing else happening in November of '73. I, in the cabinet meeting when this decision was made, had advocated that we not do that; that we instead put it over to June of '74 in the regular primary election. The reason I wanted to do that was because I felt that if we put it out there by itself, all those who were enemies of the proposition, shall we say, would be able to concentrate their efforts on that and that alone. They did, and that's why it was defeated.

If it had been combined with other issues in the context of a regular election where you had a lot of other propositions and all manner of candidates on the ballot, it would have not attracted as it did by itself and might very well have passed.

Sharp: Why didn't your view prevail?

*Mr Walker remarked later that he coordinated these efforts with Mike Deaver.

Walker: I don't know. I'm sure many felt that with '74 being the last year of the governor's tenure, that even though it might be passed in June of '74 it would not become operative until after he left office, and might not be implemented as well as if it were passed in November and implemented during his last year. They didn't want to leave it to the succeeding governor to implement. I believe that was the principal reason the proposition and my view were defeated.

Sharp: The legislature had turned down a constitutional amendment in June of '73.

Walker: I'd forgotten that.

Sharp: It's after that that there is the decision, at least that's sort of the chronology that I saw, made to go for the special election. Do you know really who all contributed to the decision-making of pushing for the special election? Was Mr. Reagan leading in front with others agreeing with him? Or were there other persons who were perhaps the most interested in seeing that it be a special election?

Walker: I don't recall who the principal movers and shakers were on it. I would have to guess that it was Verne Orr, Frank Walton. I believe it was a subject of frequent discussion before the entire cabinet, however.

Sharp: Mr. Orr would have been acting in his role as--

Walker: Finance director.

Sharp: You then would have worked on the actual campaign, after it was decided that it would be a special election.

Walker: Yes.

Sharp: How might you have worked on that?

Walker: Again, I saw that things were done on the outside without taking a leave of absence or without carrying on private activity on the government payroll. As the governor's political advisor I simply saw that the party activists [Putnam Livermore and Gordon Luce] and the people who were particularly interested as private citizens in this issue did their jobs.

III FINAL COMMENTS

The Presidential Thrust

Sharp: I have a couple of other questions.

Walker: The other thing that I want to be sure to mention--. You say, "How did you spend your time in these years '71 to '74?" The other thing was that as his political advisor I did go with him on all of his out of state trips. On those, when we would plan schedules [the destinations dictated by political importance], we were quite cognizant of his potential, beyond his tenure as governor, to become president. We would prepare those schedules with that idea in mind.

I was the one in the office, because I had had national political experience, who would talk to him from time to time about those prospects. Sometimes I would advocate that we go on a little longer trip than he was prepared to go on.

Sharp: How did that go over?

Walker: That didn't go over very well, with Nancy particularly. So we would scale them back to something a little more acceptable. She didn't like for him to be out of the state for any longer than absolutely necessary.

When we were on trips I would want him to meet as many key people as possible at these events, without over-taxing his energies. We would do that sort of thing. There is a great deal, as Richard Nixon used to believe, in the idea that when you go around and campaign for people you do obligate them to support you for something in the future. So that would be the principal purpose of our doing it.

Walker: In '72 I was his principal aide at the convention when he was temporary chairman of the Republican national convention in Miami Beach.

[Asked on the transcript to describe how he assisted Mr. Reagan at the 1972 Republican national convention, Mr. Walker replied as follows.]

Walker: [I worked on] all arrangements, events to attend, issues to handle as temporary chairman, itinerary, transportation, a yacht party hosted for hundreds of guests.

[transcript resumes]

What I wanted to say was, once upon a time he said [something] to me on an airplane about the future and about the presidency, and about any possibilities in '76. He was telling me that I was perhaps overly concerned; that I should not be concerned so much about the future, about planning, and about making sure you meet all the right people or enough of them, and that sort of thing. He said, "Bob, if the Lord wants me to be president of the United States, I'll be president of the United States, and you don't need to worry."

Sharp: Well--

Walker: With that I didn't say any more.

Sharp: Did you feel better?

Walker: He was sincere. This was not flippant on his part at all.

Sharp: It strikes me that there was this tension (and maybe this is just politics) between being governor and figuring out what you're going to do next, working sort of on both things at the same time. How did Mr. Reagan deal with that?

Walker: I don't think he dealt with it. As the remark about the good Lord indicated, he did not lie awake at night scheming--as some others might have--about how to become president. He relies on providence in many respects. That is one of the characteristics of Ronald Reagan.

Sharp: Besides providence, he does happen to have, and has had for a long time, this remarkably devoted group of people around him.

Walker: Surely.

Sharp: You're one of them. But there are others who were with him in the very beginning and who are still with him now, perhaps even in a more obvious position than you. So providence, plus very hard workers.

Walker: I subsequently thought of a rejoinder to his remark about the Lord. It even got published somewhere later. It was that, yes, that is true, but sometimes the good Lord needs a little help. [laughter]

Sharp: Right. [laughter] Did you work fairly extensively on the presidential push from '72 on, after '74 as well?

Walker: I did a good deal of planning while I was still in the governor's office. We had developed a considerable number of files on states and so forth. But there did develop some tension--if that's a good word--between those who were principally concerned with Ronald Reagan as governor and me.

I was involved in the welfare reform and Prop 1 and that sort of thing, but my main thrust really was national politics. I was the only one in the office that had that background and experience. There did develop some tension between the others and me, so that a decision was made very late in the administration, like November of '74, that they would more or less continue to be allied with him and I would not be.

So I went to Coors, where I've been ever since. I did help as I could, as a private citizen, in '76 and '80. But I've not been associated formally since.

Sharp: I don't have, really, any other questions, but I'm really struck by the members of Mr. Reagan's staff who've been with him for so long, who have this feeling that he should be president. I wonder if you could describe that feeling; if you ever sit and analyze that feeling, or your reasons why you did all the work that you did for so long, assisting him with your own political knowledge to attain the presidency. Why? Why would you do all that work?

Walker: Two reasons. We believed, and most of us still believe, that Ronald Reagan is a man of unimpeachable integrity; that he's not infallible, but given the fallibility of human beings, he's better than most--far superior to most. Given all of the information on a critical question, he will almost always make the right decision. The only time that he appears to deviate from that is when he does not get all of the information, or gets a skewed version of an issue from someone who is not serving him well.

Walker: That in itself is a sufficient reason to elect a man as a leader, whether for governor or president. But the other major reason is that he is a superb politician in that he can communicate with the electorate better than anyone we had ever encountered in our political activities. His appearance, his speech delivery, his speech writing (which he always did himself prior to the presidency, and still edits a great deal), his knowledge of the issues which he would have to have in order to write those speeches--all these are characteristics of a successful politician. Together with his integrity, we were convinced that he should be governor in the first place, president in the second place.

Sharp: Did you find yourself disagreeing with him very often?

Walker: Not very often. I'm a conservative but not necessarily an ideologue. When sitting in cabinet meetings or elsewhere and hearing the same information that was imparted to him and listening to his decision based on that information I would, nine times out of ten, have taken the same decision myself.

Sharp: If you'd like to talk some now about the '68 Republican national convention we can do that now. Or, if you need to get on to the rest of your work for the day--

Walker: If that becomes something that you would particularly like to have you can let me know, and the next time I'm in California I'd be glad to do it.

Sharp: Okay.

The "Eleventh Commandment" and Other Political Methods

Walker: There's just one other remark I might make that is significant, I think, to this whole period of the '60s and part of the '70s, I guess.

In 1964 you're familiar, of course, with the climate and the debacle suffered by the Republicans. In our ability to bounce back in '66 there was a factor, including Reagan, that was important. We had the problem of party unity because we had the liberals and the conservatives still fussing and fighting with each other--George Christopher in the gubernatorial primary representing the liberals. So, how do you dampen this down? How do you make the lamb and the lion lie down together?

Walker: Sitting at my desk playing around with this idea one day in San Diego in the summer (I believe it was August) of '65, I came up with this thought. I said to myself when I wrote it down, "Surely this has been said before." [telephone interrupts interview]

And so, this crazy little idea that I had, that I wrote down, was the "Eleventh Commandment:" Thou shalt not speak ill of any Republican. It must have been September because I remember that the Republican state central committee convention was coming up in San Francisco. Parkinson was the chairman.

I gave this little idea to Parkinson. I said, "You know, we've got to pull this thing together if we can on behalf of '66 victories. Why don't you, as state chairman, enunciate this thing that I'm calling the Eleventh Commandment?" I had a devil of a time persuading him to do it, but he finally did.

Reagan and Christopher were in sharp contention at that convention, between adherents. That is, the liberals were for Christopher, the conservatives were for Reagan, and never the twain shall meet.

Reagan immediately picked up on the Eleventh Commandment and adopted it as his own theme for the campaign, which I had advised Stu [Spencer] and Bill [Roberts] also to do. George Christopher pooh-poohed the idea. I forget the statement that he made but it was to the effect that, "That's perfectly silly! I'm not going to be quiet. If I see something I want to criticize about Ronald Reagan, I'll criticize him."

Reagan adopted it. You know the subsequent history. It was adopted nationally by Ray Bliss as the policy of the Republican party. Again, because we let Parkinson enunciate it and Reagan used it as his own, I never sought any publicity having originated it myself. But I did. I thought you might want to know that.

Sharp: Dr. Parkinson and I talked about that and I know that it was an important part of that campaign. But I never did figure out who came up with it.

I did think of one last thing and that's your appraisal of Bill Roberts and Stu Spencer. They seem somewhat remarkable, in the kinds of techniques that they developed and used together for Mr. Reagan, for that '66 campaign. Yet, there's your doing all of this political work. I wondered if some of your methods dovetailed somehow?

Walker: Methods?

Sharp: Political methods of focusing on issues and getting people to support the issues. You've been telling me how in these different years you were really essentially working on very important issues, like welfare reform, and the Prop 1 campaign, and so on. Both Spencer and Roberts worked on political issues as well, more directly in terms of political campaigns for Mr. Reagan and others. I wondered if the time was right to come up with these new sorts of campaign techniques? You seemed to be coming up with them at the same time. I wondered if you had a sense of how much cross-over there was in how the three of you approached political campaigning?

Walker: My only association with Spencer-Roberts was to work with them in the Republican central committee of Los Angeles County in '59 and '60, and then again in the [Reagan] gubernatorial campaign from the summer of '65 to the summer of '66.

In that period I guess I learned a great deal from them. They were senior to me, in terms of political activity. Going back to the Young Republican days, they had been active in politics and had developed a lot of techniques that I had to learn. I didn't get into politics until I was thirty-three.

I developed some innovation, I think, when I went to San Diego, having to do with how you computerize a campaign or use computers to facilitate a lot of previous activities that had been done by hand, so to speak.

Then, I guess, on a national level I began to operate before they did. For instance, I was the one that introduced Lyn [Franklyn C.] Nofziger to Stu Spencer. I had known him as a politics writer for the San Diego Union in Washington, and had gotten acquainted with him coming back here with Parkinson and Parkinson's national Republican activities. So, when the Reagan campaign needed a press secretary, in early '66, I introduced Lyn to Stu here, in Washington. They subsequently went together. [telephone interruption]

Sharp: We're still on Mr. Nofziger.

Walker: Well, Lyn and I had been friends. So I introduced him to Stu. Stu hired him and Lyn turned out to be a principal, of course, in the whole Reagan operation.

Yes. I think the sixties was a period of innovation in not just the Republican party in California, but in the opposition as far as tactics are concerned. You had people marching in the

Walker: streets in the sixties, advocating causes and attempting to bring about change that way. We were moderates compared to much of that. But we did develop some new ideas.

There has been a great deal more innovation since what we carried on in the sixties. For instance, this idea that you can run a campaign almost entirely by direct mail is something that we started with computers. We put out computer letters, or at least computer-addressed letters, in '64. But now you can key people on an issue by their relevance to that issue, through occupation or through ethnicity, or whatever--.

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Reagan: A Man of Varied Talents

Walker: The [Nixon] Committee to Re-elect the President sent a stretch job out to Sacramento to fly Reagan (only seven of us went, but this is how they squandered money in that campaign) one morning, early, and six of us, including security, to Miami Beach to do a rally for Nixon, where Nixon wasn't present but where a lot of celebrities were. This was some kind of big rally [held in October 1972]. Then we were to fly back to Los Angeles that same night, which we did.

The governor, of course, always on the trip out is writing his speech. So you don't talk to him on any trip out. But on the way back it's relax time, you know. Not only were the seven of us on that plane, because we had a lot of room, but we had others that wanted just to get back to the West Coast. For instance, Red Skelton.

This was a five-hour flight, from Miami to Los Angeles. The governor and Red Skelton sat across from each other and all of us gathered around, listening. They traded stories back and forth for five solid hours. The governor had just as funny stories as Red Skelton did. This was a marathon story-telling session for a guy who isn't known for being comedian, but could make you laugh with his stories just as uproariously as Red Skelton did. I've thought many times if we just had that on film it would be a treasure.

Sharp: He really does have an inexhaustible--photographic memory?

Walker: No. He says not. Just that the brain is a muscle and you store up these things. You can recall them if you use it enough.

Walker: I don't know how he does it. But I'm told that he got a lot of this material over the years from his mother-in-law. Nancy's mother, apparently, is an inexhaustible source of funny stories.

Sharp: What kind of stories were they? Could you remember any at all?

Walker: Just jokes. Just funny stories. Jokes of various kinds, and many of them a bit off-color.

Sharp: Does he have time for that story-telling now? How does that fit in with his--?

Walker: What do you think that big national picture was that appeared last week with Tip [Thomas P.] O'Neill and [Daniel] Rostenkowski--the Democratic leaders--all of them just breaking up on the front pages of all the papers. I'll bet you a dollar Reagan had just told a funny story! [laughter]

Sharp: Well, he's quite enigmatic, I think, Mr. Reagan. Other people have said that. There are these layers of personality--the story-telling, the so-called photographic memory and being extremely sharp on details, remembering things well, and making good substantiation for his statements and so on. And you have this philosophy that is in legislation and all sorts of programs. Characteristics that people give him. That he uses his glasses quite a bit, either on an arm or a chair or throws them down on a desk, or whatever.

I guess there is this question of, what's he really like? What sort of person is he, really? I don't think anybody's answered that too successfully, yet. Do you have any clues about what kind of person he really is?

Walker: Only that he's much more than he appears to be. People consistently underestimate him and he will consistently surprise you with his depth. He is taken by many people who don't know him well to be superficial. He's not superficial.

Sharp: I think it would be good really to document him, himself, and his own thoughts and feelings and attitudes. Thank you very much.

Walker: I've enjoyed it.

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IV RETRACING THE REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY IN 1968

[Interview 2: May 5, 1983]##

Staffing and Support for a Conservative Candidate

Morris: We were discussing Skip [Norman] Watts. He was an aide of Tom [Thomas C.] Reed's?

Walker: Yes. Like a number of people that Tom brought into the operation, he was sort of a "go-fer". Some people don't know a great deal about politics, or have any background in it, but very quickly learn a lot because they're given assignments by people who do know. [People who] know how to extend themselves into situations through other people.

Morris: So it's a matter of giving the neophyte good instructions?

Walker: Yes. And placing them in a position to be your eyes and ears, or do things for you that you couldn't do yourself, because you can't spread yourself that thinly.

Morris: It sounds like it involves a fair amount of trust.

Walker: Yes, and loyalty. Tom had a number of people like that, who were loyal to him. He paid them well, and that's how he was able to be as prominent a figure as he was, I think. He had money himself, which he was willing to spend, and he knew how to raise money. He employed people--he employed me, for a time, before I went with the administration in Sacramento. This was in 1968.

I had been involved in setting up the Richard Nixon operation in '67, which I may have covered somewhat with Sarah Sharp.

Then I had also been, in your neck of the woods, briefly involved with Shirley Temple Black, when she tried to run for Congress. That was in the fall--August, September, first part of October--of '67.

Morris: Because Mr. Reed was interested in--?

Walker: No, he had nothing to do with those campaigns.

After I had left both of those things in '67 I went back to San Diego, which was my base, where my family was, and where I had an office.

I was more or less a free-lance operator. I had an office and a secretary in San Diego and kept all my business there. But then I moved around the country, did these various things, and Tom at that point hired me. He said (looking towards '68), "One thing we need is an advance manual. We don't have an advance manual."

Morris: Really? I can't believe that.

Walker: He said, "We don't really have a good advance manual that's suitable for national operations for the governor. Would you write one?"

So I took that as a project and did it. I took the old Nixon manual from 1960, and I took the [Barry] Goldwater [Sr.] manual from 1964, and I took all my experience that I had had working for the Republican National Committee. I took the best parts of all of those and wrote a new advance manual, and turned it over to Tom.

Morris: Does an advance manual have to be rewritten for every election?

Walker: Not necessarily. But you do have to rewrite it for each candidate or for each major figure that's going to be using it. He has enough individual requirements that are different from another kind of man that you have to take into consideration. Like Richard Nixon is a different personality, altogether, than Ronald Reagan, or Goldwater. So you tailor your advance manual to the man that you're working for.

Morris: In terms of how they like a schedule set up?

Walker: What they're willing to do, what they can do, what their particular talents are.

Morris: In consultation with the person whose candidacy you're--?

Walker: Yes, oh, yes, you have to know your man. We knew enough about Ronald Reagan from '66 to be able to put such a manual together.

Morris: Did you sit down and talk with Mr. Reagan at that point?

Walker: I don't think I did. I felt that I knew enough about his idiosyncrasies, if you will.

Morris: Had you traveled with him at all in '66?

Walker: Oh, yes.

Morris: How did you go about transferring what he had developed in the way of a campaign style in California to a national base?

Walker: Well, I'm not sure I recall the detail of that. As I say, some of it is custom to your candidate. But a lot of it is common sense; a lot of it is what has worked before, for other candidates.

At that time (this is the fall of '67), we weren't sure just what we were going to get into in '68, but we were going to be prepared, or at least Tom was. If you recall the history, the political history in the Republican party of that year, and particularly Reagan's history, you know that it was strange. It was the kind of campaign that you have to, if you're involved in it, simply take on faith.

Morris: Because it wasn't clear whether or not he was going to be a candidate?

Walker: Yes. He wasn't clear himself. He didn't want to put himself in an embarrassing position. He had a kind of instinctive feeling that having been elected governor of California two years before, that in '68 it was premature for him to be stepping out on the national stage, so to speak. Yet there was this great clamor for him.

Morris: Where was the clamor coming from?

Walker: Oh, I think mostly from what are called now--the states in the South and the West--what do we call those states now?

Morris: The Sunbelt.

Walker: The Sunbelt states were primarily where it was coming from and they looked upon Reagan, having been elected governor of California, as the successor, and if you will, a great improvement upon the candidacy of Senator Goldwater in '64.

Morris: How had the people in the South and West gotten to know him as a political figure?

Walker: Well, it started with his great speech in '64 on behalf of Goldwater. Then, of course, the tremendous national publicity he got while he was running for governor of California.

This was, if you recall, something of a phenomenon, because it was only in the mid-'60s, I believe, that California became the most populous state. It surpassed New York in population, and began to get national publicity. And so anything, of course, having to do with the governorship was national news. It was particularly national news if you were going to elect a motion-picture actor as governor. The only precedent for that had been George Murphy being elected to the [U.S.] Senate in '64.

Morris: Was this something that you made a special effort about in your advance manual? Was the feeling in the group you were working with that this was something that should be built on, downplayed, or--? You know, how did you deal with the actor background?

Walker: I don't believe we took that into account very much, because we felt, I believe, that his having been elected governor of the largest state and his performance in office the first year and a half or so had been sufficiently without incident, or without negative incident. We didn't have to apologize in any way for his background; that we did not have to play it down; that the "motion-picture actor" had become passé as an issue.

Morris: Within a year?

Walker: Yes.

Morris: Mr. Reed was from Connecticut, am I right?

Walker: Originally, yes.

Morris: Originally. How had he gotten interested in a candidate who looked like his strength was in the South and the Southwest?

Walker: Well, he was a resident of Marin County.

Morris: That's one point that's been unclear. I haven't had a chance to talk to Mr. Reed yet and I know he now has a base in Marin County.

Walker: He did at that time. He lived at Ross, and had his office at San Rafael, where he still does. I can't tell you how they chose him, but he was the northern California co-chairman of the original campaign [in 1966], along with Phil [Philip M.] Battaglia in southern California. I think he was chosen (in fact, I'm sure he was chosen) as Phil was, by Spencer-Roberts. But how they found him I don't know. I've never asked them how Tom was uncovered.

They were interested in getting two vigorous young people that had not had any political background to head up this campaign. They didn't want any old political warhorse of any kind to put the face on the Reagan campaign.

Morris: Really? That's interesting since a lot of the support in California was coming from well-established businessmen. That's one of the real curious things.

Walker: Well, it was coming, in southern California, in the Los Angeles area, from Holmes Tuttle and Henry Salvatori and those kinds who, yes, were businessmen and were supporting Reagan, and were the ones who talked him into doing it. But in northern California it was an entirely different story.

Walker: The establishment was, the business establishment was, very much with George Christopher for governor. The Leonard Firestones of the world in southern California were for George Christopher! You know, you had a great dichotomy at that time between the liberal Republicans and the conservative Republicans, which came out of the '64 campaign where you had Nelson Rockefeller and Senator Goldwater dividing up the party. We just barely won the state for Goldwater, as you know, and took all of the delegates to the convention in '64.

Morris: And a fair amount of bad feeling that ensued.

Walker: Oh, absolutely. That's the reason the Eleventh Commandment was so vital. To come along in '66 and to say in effect, "We've got to cut out this nonsense, you're going to have to quit attacking each other in such a brutal way, if you're ever going to win anything."

So we had Reagan adopt that as sort of his credo, and George Christopher pooh-poohed it. From then on Christopher went downhill. Because it was the sense of the party that we would have to knock off this stuff.

Morris: What about the party and how many of the party people in southern California were involved in the Christopher primary?

Walker: Well, as I say, you'd have to go down and list all the people who were leaders in the liberal wing of the Republican party, and they were all for George Christopher.

That's why, you know, when we started out in '65 with Reagan moving him around the state, we called it "Friends of Reagan." It was an exploratory thing, just to see how many people would come to his side in the party and see if it was feasible at all. He didn't know if it was feasible to run for governor until we'd gone through that.

The reason that's important is, and going back to '68, that was the problem with the presidential thing in '68. He didn't know, he could not be convinced, because Richard Nixon had this jump on him, whether there was that much grassroots sentiment out there that would make it practical at all for him to go into the convention and fight Nixon for it. He was always reluctant to come out and say, "Yes, I'm running." Right up to Miami Beach. We were always out there, Tom Reed and some of the rest of us who were wanting it to happen.

Morris: Did you do any polling on Richard Nixon to get a sense that maybe he was not as strong a candidate as he might be?

Walker: I wasn't involved in any polling. Tom may have done some, Clif White and his operation may have done some, but I wasn't privy to it, and I don't recall it being done, although it might have been.

Morris: At what point was Mr. White brought in?

Walker: I think he was brought in in the spring of '68, maybe March of '68. I don't believe he was aboard any earlier than that.

Morris: Now, he's a non-California figure.

Walker: Yes, he was from New York. The reason he was brought in was because he'd been prominent in the Goldwater effort in '64 nationally. He had headed up the national Draft Goldwater Committee.

Morris: A campaign professional?

Walker: Yes.

Morris: Who was the one who brought him in?

Walker: I think Tom Reed was involved in that. But, also, some of the "kitchen cabinet" types felt that he would add something to the effort. That's the Salvatori-Holmes Tuttle group.

Morris: In some of the books on the Reagan administration in California, Mr. White is called a "delegate hunter." What does that mean?

Walker: That means that he got a good deal of the credit in '64 for the nomination of Goldwater at the Cow Palace. Then thereafter, his reputation rested upon that effort and everything he did in politics, including '68. I happen to think that he was never as effective as he was in '64.

To give him credit, he did do a rather magnificent job of overcoming the opposition to nominating a "rock-ribbed" conservative. A grassroots sentiment grew up spontaneously in behalf of Goldwater. White was able to marshal that grassroots sentiment and translate it into delegates at the Cow Palace and to vote those delegates so that the Rockefellers and the Scrantons didn't prevail.

For the first time, you know! They had dominated Republican conventions forever; that element of the Republican party had.

Morris: Since Mr. Eisenhower's days?

Walker: Well, yes, they were the element--going all the way back to [Alfred M.] Landon and [Wendell L.] Willkie and [Thomas E.] Dewey, that was the element that ran the Republican party. And for the first time, along came this fellow from Arizona [Goldwater], who was not a part of that establishment.

Clif White is the one that was given the credit for putting that operation together. That's the reason there was so much blood on the floor, to so speak, in San Francisco, in the Cow Palace.

Morris: That he was ruthless?

Walker: No, it was just political conflict. Nelson Rockefeller got up and gave his speech and people booed him, you know. This was not done in--

Morris: Polite politics.

Walker: --circumspect Republican conventions. You didn't have anything like that.

Morris: So, your first task was to put together this advance manual.

Walker: Yes. That was just a project. From then on we had an advance crew that Tom employed that would go out and set up events for Reagan to speak at, where it was appropriate for him to speak.

Morris: Who all was in the crew besides yourself?

Walker: Well, we got started on this by mentioning Skip [Norman] Watts. Skip was very much involved in that, and you know, frankly, I don't remember very many of the people who were involved in it.

Morris: Were there any of the other people that had come out of what Win [Winfred] Adams was doing in the California Republican party? For a couple of years before '66 he had been putting people in the field.

Walker: No, I don't think so. Most of them were people that Tom picked up around the country. There was a fellow from Ohio, I remember, that was involved in the advance, but I don't remember his name.

The next job I had was to go down and spend some time in Houston where Tom had an uncle. I needed to have an income. So Tom said, "Go down there. The Harris County Republican party needs some reorganization. Work with those people and in the meantime keep your ear to the ground with regard to Reagan in the state of Texas, which will be terribly important in '68 if we decide to do something."

So I did that for a couple of months. I reorganized the Harris County Republican party.

Morris: This was the period in which most of those Southern states didn't have much of a functioning Republican party. That's the legend, is that the reality?

Walker: Well, not in Harris County. It's a very conservative county and they had had a Republican party for some time but it had just fallen into disrepair. They needed some help.

Morris: Was the chairman of the county party somebody who put some money up for it?

Walker: We got a new chairman, Dudley Sharp. He was a former secretary of the air force. We brought him in as chairman and did some other organizational type work. I was only there a couple of months.

Cultivating the Delegates; Richard Nixon's Strength

Walker: Then, they sent me to Miami. I was five months in Miami Beach before the convention.

Morris: This is '68 now.

Walker: Right. So I lived down there, away from my family. I'd go home every two or three weeks to San Diego (just for a few days), but I actually was based there.

I was liaison between the Reagan operation and the [Republican] National Committee, when they opened their offices, getting ready for the convention. It was my job to know everything about the convention. Then, I believe, it was as late as May or June before Tom Reed and Clif White turned over the Southern states to me, and told me that I was to get as many delegates for Reagan out of the Southern states as I could get, operating out of Miami Beach, in addition to getting ready for the convention.

It was really too late. We got more delegates out of the South, though, than they got out of the rest of the whole country. But Nixon had it wrapped up pretty well by the time we got started.

Morris: Was your sense in those five months in Miami Beach that he was pretty much in charge of the Republican National Committee?

Walker: Who?

Morris: Mr. Nixon.

Walker: No. Ray Bliss, who was the chairman at the time, of the national committee, was probably as fair and honest a chairman as we've had in my experience. Despite great pressure from Nixon and his people he remained evenhanded throughout, as between Nixon, Rockefeller, and Reagan, who were the three contenders. And we got a fair shake out of all of that.

Morris: What are the kinds of things that are being decided in that preliminary period?

Walker: They're deciding which states get which hotels. That can be important because of prestige or because of adjacency to the convention center. They're deciding all sorts of perks: which candidate gets how many tickets for his people. Transportation is allotted to states. All sorts of things. How many floor passes shall be given for staff people from candidates' organizations.

Morris: What effect do those kinds of arrangements have on a candidate's likelihood of either being nominated or not being nominated?

Walker: They're important. The more people you can get floor passes for, the more can work on the floor. That turns out to be important sometimes.

But we better get on to some more of the detail of '68. When we got into the summer and things began to heat up, Reagan became considerably more enthusiastic about the possibility of being nominated. We were able to get him out of Sacramento more frequently for speeches. By the time he came to the convention in Miami Beach, a great deal of his reluctance had been overcome and he felt that lightning might strike and he would have to be ready.

You'll remember that he did announce in Miami Beach, and he was correct, as a matter of fact, that it could have happened. There were only a few people that stood between him and the nomination in '68. But just allow yourself to surmise what we would have been saved if he had been nominated in '68: [laughter] Watergate, Jimmy Carter, probably, and any number of ills, politically, that we've suffered since.

The problem was that Richard Nixon had such a march on us, because of our inability to go forward under full colors. He had gotten to the key people who could have made it happen, such as Senator Strom Thurmond. Senator Thurmond had committed to Richard Nixon.

I personally went into South Carolina and got Jim Edwards (who was just up here as secretary of energy, you know, and has gone back now). He was a dentist. I was the one that uncovered Jim Edwards and got him to mount an insurgent effort within the South Carolina delegation.

Even though we did that and a lot of other things, Strom Thurmond would not go back on his "sacred word," as he said, to Richard Nixon. Even though he was more philosophically in line with Reagan than he was with Nixon.

Morris: Did he have his own count of what was likely to happen in terms of votes and things like that? Was that a factor?

Walker: Well, of course you want to be on the winning side and they thought they were on the winning side, and it turned out they were.

But what I have always said is that if we had stopped Richard Nixon the first ballot, we would have beaten him on the third ballot. We had those votes counted, the way they would switch on the second and the third. We had delegates telling us that, "I have to vote for Nixon on the first ballot, but I will switch to Reagan on the second ballot because my commitment will be satisfied." So, all we had to do was stop him from getting the nomination on the first ballot.

In order to get his 668 votes, which was one more than half, he had to go all the way to Wisconsin, through Wisconsin, which is the next to the last state, Wyoming being the last. So we held him to that. It would have just taken one state to deny him that nomination on the first ballot, and that could have been South Carolina, it could have been Florida*, it could have been Mississippi. We had all these states under the gun, and we even had Mississippi off of--

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Walker: the floor--with the governor pleading with them, when the people running the convention started calling the first ballot. So they had, of course, to go back in order to answer the call. The Governor didn't even get to finish his pitch.

They called the first ballot, roll call, prior to the time that they were scheduled to, just because they knew that we--you see, at that point the Nixon people did have a great deal of influence, although it wasn't due to Ray Bliss. They had people like Gerald Ford in charge, as permanent chairman of the convention, and Gerald Ford was a Nixon man.

Morris: So your sense is that the meeting was called to order before it was scheduled to be?

Walker: The roll call was begun before it was scheduled to be, before we knew they were going to call it. They did that because they thought we were making inroads with Mississippi. And we were. But as it turned out, we were just shy of a few votes from stopping it.

*Later interviewees recalled that women delegates from Florida were crucial but finally did not cast their ballots for Mr. Reagan because of delegation chairman William Murphin. Asked on the interview transcript if he could clarify this point, Mr. Walker replied that the women were "emotionally for R.R. but dominated by Murphin [who] played a double game with us; led us to believe he was not committed to Nixon and might swing Florida to us."

Morris: And all those Southern states were voting as a whole?

Walker: Well, there was a strange psychological phenomenon working in the South, [and that] was the reason we weren't able to break as many delegates away as we hoped. That had to do with '64. You see, they had been solid for Goldwater in '64; solid conservative. Anti-Rockefeller, anti-liberal, all that.

But in '68 here comes the great moderate, Richard Nixon. He was neither a Goldwater conservative nor a Rockefeller liberal. He was trying to go right down the middle of the road, and these Southerners had been so embarrassed by being so pro-Goldwater and Goldwater's being defeated so abjectly in '64 were trying to regain respectability, and they didn't want to go with another hard-right conservative, namely Reagan.

So they regained their respectability by staying with Nixon. There were many like that. That was the main psychological factor that kept Reagan from getting the party nomination in '68.

Morris: Did the Southern delegates and party people that you were down there working with, did they tell you they were embarrassed?

Walker: They would not. Their pride wouldn't let them tell you that, but you knew it, from all the other things they would say.

Morris: Isn't that strange? I'm interested in how Mr. Nixon was viewed by your people, in terms of his conservatism. When he was first elected, he came into office on an anti-communism, get tough on subversives kind of thing.

Walker: I'll grant you that his reputation and his whole national prominence had been based on his being a conservative, starting in the late '40s with the Alger Hiss thing and so forth.

But from 1960 on, many of us from California who had been rather closely associated with him had come to believe that Nixon was not the conservative that we thought he was in the '50s. That if he had been a conservative then (I guess in terms of the times then, he was) he had changed.

In the campaign of 1960 he was quite different, and in '62 when he ran for governor. When he came to run in '68 he was entirely different.

But that wasn't as overriding as [the fact that] I at least, and some others, I think, came to believe that there was some truth in what many Democrats had always felt about him, and that was that he was not as full of integrity as he might have been.

Morris: In governmental issues, as opposed to political issues?

Walker: No, in all issues. He would tell you something, and then both as to issues and as to just plain facts, he would turn out to do the opposite sometimes.

Morris: In some of those campaigns there were what were called "dirty tricks" and Murray Chotiner was often reported to be involved in those. Had you had some direct contact with Mr. Chotiner that supported that?

Walker: I knew Chotiner. And I knew his reputation. I thought that many of his (Chotiner's) tactics were just plain hardball, political hardball.

Morris: Rather than unethical?

Walker: I really haven't thought that much about the difference between hardball and ethics. But I would guess that it was at least borderline on the part of Chotiner. I know through firsthand experience, though, that Richard Nixon's promises could not be depended upon.

Morris: Through some of your campaign work earlier?

Walker: Yes. But I was not working for Ronald Reagan for that reason. I had worked for both men. I had worked in the original Reagan campaign, then I had worked for Nixon, then I'd gone back to Reagan.

I was not working for Reagan because I held any great grudge against Nixon, although my regard for him had disappeared. I was working for Reagan because Reagan was so darned good. He was the antithesis of what I had experienced in working with Nixon. Reagan would tell the truth to a fault. I used to tell him that he was too good for this world, sometimes. [laughter] I would urge him to do all sorts of things in the period when I was on staff and we'd be going around the country, that he wouldn't want to do. Like speak to one more county chairman, have one more meeting, put himself out a little bit, exert himself and pick up some "due bills" from people, that he might be able to use later on.

He would say, "Don't worry about it, Bob. If the good Lord wants me to be president of the United States someday, I'll be president of the United States." You know, he is a fatalist, and he just has a faith.

He believed that literally. He believes in God. Looking after all of us.

Morris: Along with the sparrows, He's looking after His Democrats and Republicans.

Morris: Is part of the job of advancing and doing the political chores to keep track of these "due bills"?

Walker: Yes. You make sure that people who want to talk with him, get to.

There are two things: if you have people who are prominent in the party, prominent in some way, where they have influence in their states or their cities or counties, that those people get to chat with your candidate, or at least meet him. You also make sure that your candidate is presented to the general public in a favorable way.

Well, as an example, there are some people that write advance manuals, I'm told, that say, well, "Let's schedule this man, bang, bang, bang." And so he goes from event to event, and he's off the dais right after the applause stops and out the back door, so he can go on to another event.

I would not do that, because it's important that people who hear a speech and are enthused about what they've heard, and about the man, get to come up and spend a little time and shake hands with him. He's not perceived then as being someone less than human, ducking out of back doors, just an image that they saw making a speech. Instead, he's perceived as being a man, as being human, and willing to stay around and shake hands and chit-chat a little bit.

Morris: Answer the same question seven thousand times in the course of a tour?

Walker: You don't whisk him away. Many candidates, particularly Richard Nixon, didn't like that sort of thing, because he didn't like people that well, really. Reagan never really objected to it; he rather enjoyed it.

Morris: Did he ever say whether these kinds of campaign exploration trips were different or harder from the tours he used to make for General Electric?

Walker: No, we never talked very much about the General Electric tours.

Morris: Because he was on the road a lot for them and doing a lot of the same kind of talks at community groups.

Walker: Those were a lot more casual, probably a lot more fun than his political ones, because back then he wouldn't even get in an airplane, you know. He rode the train around the country on those General Electric tours. He'd have time on the train, you know, to read, and to write his speeches, and to make revisions. Of course, he continued to do that when we would fly out somewhere. Always on the trip out he'd be writing his speech, making changes and so forth.

Morris: Would you give him a draft to work from?

Walker: No, not necessarily. Well, sometimes. Sometimes we would. But many times he would just revise, he kept revising the original speech, referring to what was current.

Morris: What was going on, and what community he was going into?

Walker: More as to what the political situation was in the country then, as opposed to last month.

Morris: Is part of what you do to brief him on what's going on and the political impact of it?

Walker: Yes.

Morris: When did you get him into an airplane?

Walker: He began to have to fly during the primary in California, because you just couldn't cover California by car, although he tried. When he first started [campaigning] they would drive him down from Pacific Palisades all the way to San Diego in a Lincoln. No flying then. And later, the flying was kept to a minimum; only when time was of the essence.

Morris: It's a common anxiety. It's interesting to hear of somebody who has dealt with it and now, I guess, flies comfortably?

Walker: Yes, I'm sure he's overcome all of that now.

Morris: Yes, well, I hope we'll have a chance to ask him about that in due time.

Walker: It hung over though, all the way through, at least all the way through the '66 campaign because, as governor-elect, he flew out of Los Angeles right after the campaign, to Colorado Springs for a Republican governors' conference. We had to get two little Lear jets, one for Nancy and one for Ron, because they were so scared to leave their children alone. If something had happened to one plane, they'd both be gone.

Morris: Mrs. Reagan also was not comfortable with flying at that point?

Walker: I don't know how she felt, but the fact that he didn't, because she's with him almost all the time, would have practically prohibited her from flying.

Morris: Would she go along on some of these presidential-exploratory speaking trips?

Walker: Yes, she did. Not on all of them, but some of them.

Morris: One of the comments that comes up again and again, is that Reagan felt uncomfortable, while he was governor, with the Eastern establishment. He felt that he had difficulty with the Republican leadership in the Eastern states, and that they looked down on him. Can you shed some light on that?

Walker: I don't think he felt uncomfortable. They felt that he was some sort of Western interloper, I'm sure. But Ronald Reagan doesn't feel uncomfortable with anybody.

Morris: Well, that's one's impression. That's why the fact that I've come across this comment in two or three different books--

Walker: It's the other way around. They felt uncomfortable with him, and that may have put some strain on relationships. But he himself gets along with anyone and everyone, by virtue of his personality.

For instance, he was thrown together at national or Republican governors' conferences throughout his eight years, with Nelson Rockefeller. They struck up a great friendship.

Morris: Did they? Even though they were both interested in the presidency?

Walker: Yes. They were at opposite poles philosophically. But because they were thrown together and by virtue of both their personalities, they got along very well as two human beings. There was never any personal problem there. I must say, however, this occurred after '68, after Rockefeller had made his run at the presidency against Richard Nixon. It was a three-way thing, you know, at Miami Beach. This was during the last six years of the Governor's administration that that [friendship] occurred.

Morris: Well, in working on the preliminaries for Miami Beach, how much of a strength did you run into for Rockefeller? Was it easier to break loose Rockefeller people than--?

Walker: No, because the people Nixon was going for were closer to us on the philosophical spectrum. We didn't work the Rockefeller liberals at all, which were a minority. We worked those conservatives that were going to go with Richard Nixon. We were selling the idea that Nixon could not win. Because he had lost in '60, because he had lost the California governorship in '62, and Reagan had won it in '66.

"Now, this guy is a loser. What do you want to go with a loser for? Do we want to lose again? We lost in '64. Why do we have to lose in '68?"

But because Nixon was playing the great moderate role, and because the Southern delegates were trying to get back to respectability, their pride having been so damaged in 1964, we were unable to crack the "Solid South".

Morris: Were the Nixon people also calling in chits from the years that he had been vice president for Mr. Eisenhower?

Walker: They were calling in chits, but that was too long ago. They were calling in their chits from '66. He had gone around in the off-year congressional elections and had done a lot of campaigning.

Thereby hangs an interesting story with regard to Ray Bliss. You recall that when Nixon was elected president, one of the first things he did was fire Ray Bliss, his national chairman. The reason he fired him was that back in the summer of '66, when Bliss was national chairman and Nixon was just a lawyer in New York and wanted to create these chits in '66, he called up Ray Bliss one day. He said, "Ray, I want to go around and campaign for your Republican candidates in '66. Would you provide an airplane for me, so I could do that through the national committee?"

Bliss said, "Mr. Vice President, I can't give you an airplane. If I gave you an airplane to campaign for candidates I'd have to give one, in order to be fair, to Nelson Rockefeller and to Ronald Reagan and Gerald Ford and everyone else who wants to go around and campaign for Republican candidates. The national committee just can't afford to do that."

It made Nixon very angry and he fired Bliss as soon as he got [the presidency]--even though Bliss is the one who put the party back together and made it the vital force that was necessary in order for Nixon or anyone to be elected in 1968. Nixon was vindictive. And he fired him.

Morris: Was Ray Bliss interested in there being a number of candidates? Did he see that as healthy for the party?

Walker: Well, I imagine he did. He wasn't interested in seeing a lot of blood on the floor, but healthy competition.

Morris: Yes. I remember as a kid listening to the radio, and the ballots would go on and on and on and on, far into the night. It was great sport to watch the pull and haul between the candidates. In recent years it seems as if, from outside it looks as if, they're all tied up going in.

Walker: Yes. That's the problem. Because of the advent of the primaries, I think, there hasn't been a second or third ballot nomination since, since what, Wendell Willkie? I think he was nominated on the second or third ballot, maybe.

The primaries, you see, pretty much decide who's got the strength, and they've worked it out so that all nominations are first ballot.

Walker: But back then, when you were a kid and I was a kid, they didn't have all that many primaries, maybe Wisconsin, and New Hampshire; but now they've got thirty or so. It was more a brokered convention. The delegates got appointed by their state conventions, or by their city bosses, or some way. They went to the convention city and they bargained with each other for the nomination. That's the reason it would go on and on and why there was more drama in the conventions than there is now.

Morris: Right. It was probably tougher on the political people. They had to do it all out in front there at the convention, rather than back in their states.

In looking through some of the materials in the Reagan collection of the Hoover Institution, it looks like at one point in '67, that the Republican National Committee was kind of coordinating his appearances, or that at one point Mr. Reagan said, "If you guys want me to appear, you set up the schedules." Is that true?

Walker: In '67? That may have been the case. Because we didn't really get underway with him for president until the spring of '68.

Morris: Even though you had been doing the advance manual?

Walker: Well, I'd been doing the advance manual in November, December of '67. Then I'd gone to Harris County. But I didn't really go to Miami Beach until February or March [1968].

Morris: And by this time Tom Reed had left the governor's office?

Walker: Yes.

Morris: In order to work on the long-range possibility of Reagan being president?

Walker: Yes, on the '68 effort.

Morris: Well, then after '68, how much of what you put together stayed in place for future options?

Walker: Not much. Nixon was president. We turned our efforts toward Reagan getting re-elected in '70, after '68. I went to Sacramento and went with the administration in November '68. Then I took a leave of absence and went back to San Diego and ran that county, and Imperial [County] and so forth in '70 for a few months, for the re-elect, and then went back to Sacramento.

An Aside on 1972

Walker: But then, you see, the next thing was '72, and Nixon was re-elected. We helped. We organized California for Nixon in '72. The governor was the temporary chairman of the convention in Miami Beach, that renominated Richard Nixon in 1972, you see.

Morris: That's a handsome photograph! It's a double photograph: there's an image of Mr. Reagan in the background and then that really nice picture of him in the white suit.

Walker: It's a rear-screen projection of him, simultaneous with his coming to the platform and taking the ovation.

Morris: Oh, I see!

Walker: That's a big rear-screen projection.

Morris: It was projected behind him on the platform.

Walker: The White House photographer was primed to get the precise shot when that rear-screen projection was shown, and while he was taking the ovation of the convention. There are only about three or four of those photographs in existence.

Morris: That photograph? I thought that that might be. The people in the Reagan archives at the Hoover would be enchanted to have a copy of it.

Walker: That's Bob Dole, the back of Bob Dole's head, and the woman beside him is Ivy Baker Priest. Remember her?

Morris: Oh, yes! From California, sure. California state treasurer. Was she involved in any of this political strategizing you fellows were doing?

Walker: No, not at all. But she was a dignitary of some sort at the convention. I forgot her title.

V COMMITMENT TO REAGAN AS A STATE AND NATIONAL LEADER

Morris: Had you worked with Rus Walton in some campaigns or anything before he came into the governor's office?

Walker: Not really. Rus ran UROC, you know, United Republicans of California, and I had gotten acquainted with him in that capacity. But because he was involved in that organizational work in California, he hadn't been directly involved in the campaign, to my knowledge.

Morris: Wasn't one reason for organizations like UROC and the California Republican Assembly so that Republicans could take positions in primaries and that the party officially could--?

Walker: Yes, that's right. They were endorsing groups.

Morris: Were they part of the strategy of building support?

Walker: Oh, sure. You'd want to get as many endorsements as you could get. What's the liberal group that was organized in California about that time?

Morris: California Republican League?

Walker: League! They were organized for that purpose too. Now of course, they would have been for George Christopher, whereas the assembly and UROC were for Reagan, pre-primary.

Morris: Yes. Mr. Walton's arrival in the office seemed to signify a change of either how they operated, or an interest in getting some more philosophical input into things that were going on?

Walker: I don't really remember how Rus happened to come into the office, who brought him in, or why. He was a conservative influence, he was a good writer. I think he was involved in the speechwriting.

Morris: Rus's title was program development and Jerry Martin's title was research. Whether those were the same things under two different names is unclear. We're looking for some illumination.

Walker: I really can't throw much light on that.

Morris: Is there anything significant in the number of people who have worked with Mr. Reagan in California who were of strong religious beliefs and had at one time been involved as lay preachers or otherwise involved in church work? There are several people who are mentioned.

Walker: I think the significance of it might simply lie in the fact that Reagan himself has been perceived, by them, as a person with whom they would want to associate their efforts. Because he's a straight arrow, because he's so honest and good himself. A person of strong religious convictions would naturally want to be associated with someone like that. That's why they gravitated to him. He did not go out and choose them. That is not Ronald Reagan's m.o. [modus operandi], ever, to go choose people, but instead, they gravitate to him.

Morris: And get involved in the kinds of activities that bring them to his attention?

Walker: They would come to his attention only by getting there themselves. He would never go out and get them, or notice them and say, "Hey, come and follow me." [laughs] That's not the way he operates. This is an idiosyncracy. He never hires nor fires. He delegates and acquiesces.

[Because of a problem with changing batteries in the tape recorder at this point, the following passage has been reconstructed from the interviewer's notes.]##

Morris: Was this how Mr. Reagan operated during those days of the 1968 convention in Miami?

Walker: Actually, he got really interested once we got into the convention itself and very much involved in what was going on.

##

Morris: So would Mr. Reagan make suggestions about who he should talk to?

Walker: No. No, he relied upon staff to tell him who the key people were with whom he should speak. So we had a regular itinerary worked up, and he was kept busy throughout the convention period, going from one delegation to another, or one individual to another.

There was one point at which it was deemed very important that we try to make some inroads in the Ohio delegation. The Ohio delegation was headed by Governor James Rhodes. So there was a conference between Rhodes and Reagan. There are some who say that if Rhodes had been willing to commit the Ohio delegation to Reagan in 1968, that Rhodes would have been our vice president, our vice-presidential nominee.

Morris: What was going on in Ohio that he was not willing to make a commitment?

Walker: Well, I think the problem was the philosophy. The Ohio delegates were divided between Richard Nixon's centrist philosophy at the time and Rockefeller's liberal philosophy. There weren't many conservatives in that delegation. But it was a near thing. A lot of people do not realize how close Reagan came to getting the nomination in '68.

Morris: Well, and the care with which the preliminaries were thought through in only a short period of time.

When you came around to 1980, were a lot of those same people still around? Or, had the ball game changed completely?

Walker: Oh no, many of the same people were around, such as Lyn [Franklyn C.] Nofziger, Ed Meese, and Mike [Michael K.] Deaver. They were all involved back then and still are.

Morris: Were they part of the 1968 process that you've been telling me about?

Walker: Lyn Nofziger was. Meese and Deaver were on staff, but I don't recall their being heavily involved. They were present, but they were not heavily involved in the '68 convention effort. They were more prominent in '72 when we were in Miami Beach again for the renomination of Richard Nixon. The people who were prominent in '68 were Tom Reed, Clif White, and their people.

Morris: Were there a few people around the country who were already committed to Ronald Reagan? As a person?

Walker: Oh, yes. People such as Joe Coors, who stuck with Ronald Reagan through thick and thin, from really, '66 on, when he first became aware of him. Stayed with him through the '68 thing and is still one of his principal supporters, never having wavered at all.

Morris: How did they come in contact? You know, Colorado and California are not next door neighbors.

Walker: Well, California has been a--

Morris: A large beer-drinking state?

Walker: --large market for Coors, for many years, and Joe has been acquainted with many prominent Republicans in California for a long time. He would go out there to various fundraising events. He had met Reagan early on and was very taken with him, very impressed.

Morris: That's an interesting thought.

What about the fact that Colorado also has a lot of sort of yeasty (no pun intended) [laughs] political activism? Around Boulder there seems to be a lot of--

Walker: Well, you know, it's interesting you mention that because Joe Coors was a regent of the University of Colorado, in the late '60s when there was so much difficulty on campus there. Very similar to the difficulty at Berkeley. [laughs] Joe Coors was quite prominent in some of the struggles with the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society], for instance, on campus, when they were causing so much difficulty.

Morris: So, before Mr. Reagan became governor?

Walker: No, I think this was after he was governor. I believe Joe was elected a regent in '68 or '70, along in there, after Reagan was governor.

Morris: So they could commiserate with what you do with university campuses. [laughter]

Walker: Yes. [laughs] They were both having university troubles at about the same time.

Morris: Oh my, yes. That was a tough period.

Were there other people like Mr. Coors around the country?

Walker: Yes. I used him as an example, but there were many key people of that nature that became Reagan admirers and who remained so throughout the years.

Morris: Then they were a base that you could build on when the political situation changed.

Walker: That's right.

Morris: Thank you very much.

Walker: I enjoyed it.


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
APPENDIX:

HOW REPUBLICANS WON ELECTIONS IN '64



IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY

THE HOME OF THE



PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS		
Vote for One Party		
LYNDON B. JOHNSON for President	Democratic	
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, for Vice President		
SARKEY M. GOLDWATER, for President	Republican	
WILLIAM E. MILLER, for Vice President		
• for President		
• for Vice President		

CONGRESSIONAL		
United States Senator	Vote for One	
PIERRE SALINGER, Democratic United States Senator		
GEORGE MURPHY, Republican Business Executive		

HOW REPUBLICANS WON ELECTIONS IN '64
IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY • IN THE 16TH LARG-
EST COUNTY IN THE U.S.! • IN A COUNTY
LARGER THAN 15 INDIVIDUAL STATES!* • IN
THE LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREA IN THE
U.S. TO GO FOR GOLDWATER! • IN A COUNTY
WITH A DEMOCRATIC REGISTRATION!

IN THE FACE OF A
GIGANTIC DEMOCRATIC LANDSLIDE

What Made the Difference? What campaign elements were present in San Diego County but lacking elsewhere?

Throughout the United States there were the regular Republican organizations:

State Committees, County Committees, Federated Women's Clubs, Young Republicans, and other volunteer organizations...all of them working hard for their candidates.

Throughout the United States there were Citizens for Goldwater-Miller Committees and local candidates' organizations all working hard for their candidates.

All these groups were present and working hard in San Diego County, too...but here we had something more! We had the difference!

We had professional management.

We had a professional organization!

We had Republican Associates...

And What Is Republican Associates? Republican Associates is a private group of business and professional men and women who support a continuous program of Republican political action through the payment of membership dues. Dues are \$2, \$5, \$10, \$25, or \$50 per month. Two-thirds of all members are in the \$2 category. RA has 1,300 members in San Diego County. A business office with a full-time professional staff is maintained in downtown San Diego. Republican Associates is governed by a Board of Trustees and an Executive Committee elected from the general membership.

Republican Associates has never engaged in fund-raising events feeling this to be the prerogative of the County Central Committee. In adopting its programs, RA never supersedes a sphere of action which properly belongs to another Republican group and where that group is sure to succeed. Rather, it searches for areas wherein help is needed and proceeds to supply it.

Republican Associates never endorses one Republican candidate over another in the pre-primary period where there is no Republican incumbent. Of course, if a Republican candidate is unopposed he is supported against the Democrat incumbent throughout the primary and general election periods.

Republican Associates never engages in power struggles within the Republican Party. Being a professional service organization, nothing is gained and much could be lost by taking part in factional disputes.




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10 C E E E O O O O D E L C L T T C E F E T C C

Here's What RA Did—RA organized and conducted a CANDIDATES ADVISORY COUNCIL. This vehicle brought together the most experienced Republicans in the County as consultants to the candidates and their campaign managers. There were 18 members of the advisory group; 19 members of the candidate group; 4 presidents of countywide volunteer organizations; and 10 representatives of the Republican precinct organization.

This large council met weekly throughout the campaign without benefit of publicity. Its purposes were these:

- A. To communicate facts and ideas among those most closely involved in campaigns.
- B. To coordinate campaigns and prevent overlapping and inefficiencies.
- C. To solve current campaign problems by utilizing the reservoir of experience available.
- D. To initiate and approve all countywide campaign projects.

No minutes were taken of these meetings and all discussion was confidential for purposes of security. Meeting agendas were concerned entirely with campaign business as outlined above and left no room for controversial or divisive subject matter to arise. The meetings of the C.A.C. were conducted by Robert Walker, Executive Director of Republican Associates.



RA Employed 5 Full-time Men to serve as precinct organizers or (as they were called), COORDINATORS. These five men came to work in early August, 1964 and were given intensive training to equip them to organize the largest, most effective precinct organization ever seen in San Diego County. One man was assigned to each of the five State Assembly Districts contained within the County. Each man had the following duties:


- A. To survey his district as to current status of precinct organization.
- B. To become acquainted with all volunteer leadership and secure their cooperation.
- C. To recruit additional volunteers to bring the regular precinct organization to full strength.
- D. To mount a registration drive and bring it to a climax by close of registration on September 10.
- E. To set up Republican Precinct Headquarters geographically situated to serve the needs of the district. To furnish and staff those headquarters.
- F. To execute various special projects between September 10 and November 3 all of which will be described in other sections of this report.

Throughout August, September, and October the 5 coordinators met with Mr. Walker three times weekly to report on their districts and to receive instructions. They also attended every meeting of the C.A.C. to give reports on the progress of precinct organization.

3,000 Volunteers Recruited. RA originated the dynamic "San Diego County Plan" to recruit volunteer workers for campaigns and for precinct activity. Business and professional leaders contacted inactive Republicans in their own organizations and asked them to "sign up" for specific jobs. Over 1,000 did so in 1964! Most of these workers were absorbed into the regular precinct organization as precinct captains, blockworkers, or poll watchers. Others were assigned to assist in the campaigns of various candidates.

For Election Day only, 2,000 more volunteers were recruited by mail to form the highly effective "Victory Squad."

On November 3, 1964, the Republican Party of San Diego County had 5,000 volunteer workers in the field. This was a combination of regular precinct workers, additions to that group through the San Diego County Plan, plus Victory Squad volunteers.



9469 GROSSMONT BL
LA MESA

CALIF GRO011

62

WILLIAM S CURRAN
9841 EL GRANITO AV
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

RAY F DA METZ
9785 SHADOW RD
GROSSMONT
CALIF GRO011

CLAUDIE M DAVIS
9840 GRC SALIA AV
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

MARIE S DICKENS
9955 GRC SALIA AV
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

JEANNE G DICKENS
9955 GRC SALIA AV
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

KENNETH C DOWNING
10030 PANDORA DR
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

ELVIA P DU PECK
10077 SIERRA VISTA AV
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

GEORGE E ELLIS
10432 FUNARTE DR
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

CAARD A EAST
9951 GRC SALIA AV
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

MARILYN E ELLERY
9631 SIERRA VISTA AV
LA MESA
CALIF GRO011

Statistical Analyses. RA produced the first comprehensive statistical analysis of the 1964 Primary Election in San Diego County ever done on a computer. It showed vote results for both parties and all candidates in each of the county's 2,140 precincts. Registration figures and ratios of Republican and Democrat registration were shown plus percentages of votes to registration and to turnout. Copies of the analysis were printed and distributed to all Republican candidates and managers.

This analysis of the Primary enabled candidates to identify areas of strength, areas of weakness, and marginal areas. It told them where to concentrate their efforts in the General Election.

A similar analysis of the General Election has been prepared. It will be of value to candidates running in 1966 and 1968.

3,500,000 Address Labels. RA produced over 3½ million gummed address labels for San Diego voters in the Primary and General Election of 1964. Assembly, Congressional, Senatorial, and Presidential candidates' organizations were furnished these labels with which to do one or more mailings to voters. The labels were produced utilizing computer and other data processing equipment. Volunteers were thus freed from the tedious tasks of typing or hand-addressing envelopes. Their energies were then directed into more meaningful work for the candidates or the precinct organization.

Assisted the Republican Central Committee. In early August, 1964, the Central Committee was without an Executive Director due to a resignation. It appeared improbable that anyone could be secured in the middle of a campaign who would be sufficiently qualified to handle the job. In response to this situation RA released its Assistant Executive Director, Peter B. Wilson, to assume the Central Committee duties for the balance of 1964. Everyone having knowledge of his performance agrees that he did an excellent job in a period of great activity.

Also, in August, it appeared unlikely that a speaker of major stature could be secured in time for the regular \$100.00-a-plate fund-raising event. RA had a long standing commitment from Senator Thruston B. Morton (R), Ky., to speak to our own membership. To assist the financial well-being of the Central Committee and of all Republican candidates, Republican Associates relinquished Senator Morton to speak instead at the \$100 dinner which was held September 18, 1964. This event turned out to be the most successful fund-raising affair ever held in San Diego.

RA Produced Scientific Precinct Quotas. Using computers, RA determined the exact number of votes each Republican candidate needed in each of 2,140 precincts to win and to carry San Diego County. These quotas were then communicated to each precinct captain. While doing his door-to-door polling, the precinct captain knew how many votes were needed according to registration and the past voting habits of his precinct. If polling did not give him the necessary result, he knew how many undecided voters he must persuade to vote for Republican candidates.

RA Produced Over 800,000 Pieces of Printing. 350,000 24-page Goldwater brochures • 350,000 candidate slate cards • 100,000 door knob hangers • 7,500 poll-watchers' guides.

NOTE: The Goldwater-Miller campaign or the Central Committee paid the costs of printing the above materials.


100,000 LBJ Biographies Purchased and Distributed. RA collected \$2,000.00 in small contributions and acted as agent in purchasing 100,000 LBJ biographies at the volume price of .02 apiece. The contributors then distributed them throughout the county.

Designed and Wrote Goldwater Mailings. Acting as consultants to the Goldwater campaign, RA designed the mailing and wrote the letters which were sent to 350,000 Republican and Democratic households in San Diego County.

Directed 4 Door-to-Door Canvasses. From August to November, RA directed the regular Republican Precinct Organization in canvasses which accomplished the following tasks:


1. Registration of additional Republicans.
2. Distribution of absentee ballot application forms.
3. Recruitment of additional workers.
4. Distribution of literature for all Republican candidates.
5. Solicitation of small contributions.
6. Polling of over 200,000 voters to determine areas of strength or weakness.
7. Distribution of a "slate card" showing photographs of all Republican candidates together with copy selling their candidacies.
8. Turn out of a maximum vote on Election Day.

Instructions for these canvasses were prepared by RA and together with all materials were distributed throughout the county by the five coordinators.



RA Planned a Countywide Phone Blitz. Working with a sub-committee of the Candidates' Advisory Council, RA developed the plans for a countywide telephone operation. Every Republican household in San Diego County received a call prior to November 3. The call urged Republicans to vote and to vote for Goldwater, Murphy, the Congressional, and the Assembly candidates.

The execution of the plan was carried out by Peter B. Wilson, Executive Director of the Central Committee.



RA Planned and Executed the Republican Victory Squad! The two most important elements of the election day Victory Squad operation were the volunteers and the Victory Squad Kits or walking lists of Republican voters. The 2,000 special volunteers were carefully channeled to those areas of the county where help was needed most. This meant that areas of weakness had to be identified well before election day so assignments could be made. A Victory Squader was assigned by mail or by phone to one of 60 county headquarters locations. We knew the exact hour each person would report and so informed the headquarters chairman.

Upon arrival, the volunteer was given verbal instructions and a precinct kit, prepared by RA, which included written instructions, a list of registered Republicans in street order (prepared by computer listing), a road map, a precinct map, a list of his election board officials, the address of the polling place, and enough door knob hangers for his precinct. He was told to work until 8:00 P.M. and to report back to headquarters.

Each headquarters chairman was furnished a listing of his precincts in priority order according to quotas and worker coverage. His kits were in the same order and he assigned workers according to that priority.

A central command post was set up at RA downtown headquarters. The 60 Victory Squad chairmen could thereby call for additional workers or report a surplus of workers. However only a minimum of shifting was necessary due to careful pre-election assigning.

County Precinct Chairman Dick Smith ran the command post and the five coordinators were in direct charge of all election day operations in their respective Assembly Districts.

All This Plus. The endless telephone calls and meetings wherein advice was requested and given... wherein quarrels were down-graded to mere differences of viewpoint...and wherein the crescendo of candidate enthusiasm was brought to a grand climax by November 3!

WHAT DID WE ACHIEVE IN 1964?



Barry Goldwater



George Murphy



Jimmy Utt



Bob Wilson



Clair Burgener



Dick Donovan



Dick Barnes



Hale Ashcraft

For all this effort San Diego achieved the national distinction of being the ONLY bright spot for the Republican Party among major population centers! It was worth it!



THESE REPUBLICANS WON IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY...

BARRY GOLDWATER for President

GEORGE MURPHY for U.S. Senate

JIMMY UTT for Congress

BOB WILSON for Congress

CLAIR BURGENER for Assembly

DICK DONOVAN for Assembly

DICK BARNES for Assembly

HALE ASHCRAFT for Assembly



Of 10 possible offices, Republicans won 8. The other two were held by incumbent Democrats in heavily gerrymandered districts.



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Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Rus Walton

TURNING POLITICAL IDEAS INTO GOVERNMENT PROGRAM

An Interview Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris
in 1983



Rus Walton and friend,
New Hampshire, 1983



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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Although he served in California state government only a few years (1967-1970), Rus Walton is one of the more interesting members of Ronald Reagan's gubernatorial administration. In this interview, he thoughtfully and incisively discusses the development of public programs implementing Reagan's philosophy of government and the evolution of the conservative political movement before and beyond Reagan's candidacy.

In an administration that was noted for recruiting people without prior political or governmental experience and with undivided loyalty, Walton was one of the few Reagan appointees who had long-standing ties to such traditional Republican leaders of the 1950s as William Knowland and Joe Shell. Before he became deputy director of the Department of Motor Vehicles in the opening days of the Reagan administration, Walton had been Shell's campaign manager in the 1962 gubernatorial primary, and the two men had founded United Republicans of California (UROC) after Shell's defeat by Richard Nixon. For Walton, "Joe Shell would have been one of the best governors the state of California ever had. He was majority leader in the assembly, a man of great integrity."

In describing his own professional political life, Walton covers the rapid rise of UROC into a 20,000-member grassroots organization, his work with the 1964 Goldwater campaign, and the John Birch Society's takeover of UROC in 1965. The purpose in starting UROC was to "get the Republican party where we thought it should go...We said the people own the party. They [party officials] said that the money guys own the party." Along the way, he met Ronald Reagan while Reagan was assisting in Loyd Wright's 1962 Senate primary campaign; and, in 1964, Walton was influential in the Goldwater campaign's decision to put Reagan's now-famous speech on national television.

Two years later when Reagan became governor, Walton recalls, "I felt very strongly about highway safety. I felt that I could contribute something if I went up there and tried to do something about highway safety in the state of California." And so he did, first in the department and later as assistant to Business and Transportation Agency Secretary Gordon Luce. Walton was also soon asked to draft reports and speeches for the governor. Among them was the original concept of the Creative Society, a phrase that was to be used in many later publications of Governor Reagan's administration.

Then, "Tom Reed kept asking me for things which clearly could have been used either for the elections in 1968, to help in the assembly and state senate, and also to position the governor for a national campaign." Walton's view of Reagan's try for the presidential nomination is succinct: "I think what came into play were not necessarily his ambitions, but other people's

ambitions . . . this guy ran to be the governor of the largest state in the country. It needed a job done. He said he would do the job. He should have kept his word."

After the 1968 convention, Reagan's executive secretary, William Clark, asked Walton to head a new unit in the governor's office called program development. "It was a beautiful job," says Walton. "I'd say, now here is a problem, and we ought to build to solve it." This project implementation function of the office, however, appears never to have been clearly differentiated from its public relations functions. Some interviewees for the project have referred to the program development unit as another kind of press office. In other cases, several people seem to have pursued Walton's program ideas independently.

For example, in response to the persistent visibility of campus disturbances, Walton twice presented proposals to "narrow the communications gap between college students and the Reagan Administration" and "divert some of the creative genius and deep desire for participation on the part of many of our college students toward a constructive effort in a creative society."* The 1970 version, an important part of his proposal for a Commission on the Seventies, included student interns and had a group of distinguished advisors and a budget. During the same period, Alex Sherriffs, Reagan's education advisor, was occasionally bringing groups of student government leaders, from campuses not affected with protests, to meet with the governor. John Kehoe also worked on the student question. And during the 1970 re-election campaign, Norman "Skip" Watts, himself then in his 20s, put together panels of students to work for the governor.

Apparently these different approaches made by members of the governor's administration to reconciling activist youth with the government establishment did not interact, and Walton's Commission on the Seventies was never activated. The role of program development was further diffused when Walton transferred from the governor's office to the 1970 campaign staff as director of advertising, public relations, and program development. Although he did not return to the governor's office, a program development unit continued to be part of this office. Interviews with John Tooker and Don Livingston in this series describe this unit's later activity in developing the rationale and climate for passage of the governor's legislative proposals.

For several years, Walton wrote a well-received syndicated political column, which reflected his belief that "the conservative philosophy is a very positive, strong forward-moving philosophy that encompasses many facets, including not just the political, but the moral and spiritual." Later he

*Governor's Action Program, November 18, 1968.

became head of the Plymouth Rock Foundation in Marlborough, New Hampshire, where the project made contact with him.

The interview was recorded on a rainy morning in May 1983, in a conference room of the Ramada Inn in nearby Keene, New Hampshire. Hotel staff occasionally looked in, a bit puzzled, but otherwise left us undisturbed. A principled, strong-minded, attractive person, Walton seemed to enjoy the opportunity to discuss his experiences in California government and politics, as did the interviewer. The project time schedule did not permit discussion of his present work, although he commented, "I am a Christian and I believe that Christians should be active in government," and, off tape, that the northern mountains of New England were a safe place to be.

Walton reviewed the transcript of the interview promptly, providing useful editorial tidying and adding missing details. He also supplied the photograph that illustrates the manuscript and selected reports and campaign materials from his work in California. These are listed in Appendix A and are deposited in the Reagan Papers at the Hoover Institution.

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer-Editor

October 4, 1984
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please print or write clearly)

Your full name RUSSELL S. (Rus) WALTON

Date of birth Nov. 28, 1921 Place of birth Trenton NJ

Father's full name Louis Kirk Walton

Birthplace Lambertville, NJ

Occupation Wholesale petroleum dealer, ESSO

Mother's full name Edna Sparey Walton

Birthplace Troy NY

Occupation Graduate Nurse, missionary to China (Baptist medical)

Where did you grow up ? Bridgeton and Asbury Park, NJ

Present community Marlborough NH

Education The Kings College, Belmar, NJ; Temple Univ., Phila. PA -- inter-
rupted by six years in US Army Air Corps (pilot). Did not return to collec-

Occupation(s) Former newspaper editor and publisher, radio & TV commentator and
syndicated columnist, author (best-selling ONE NATION UNDER GOD & others)
executive director, Plymouth Rock Foundation

Special interests or activities

I FIRST CONTACT WITH MICHAEL DEAVER AND RONALD REAGAN

[Date of Interview: May 10, 1983]##

Santa Clara County Republican Activities

Morris: We like to start by asking you a little about your personal background and how you got involved with the Reagan people in California. You were a Californian by choice?

Walton: Yes.

Morris: --early training and--?

Walton: Well, I'm originally from New Jersey, but I was sort of a war dropout in California after the war was over [1945]. Like a lot of Air Corps people, I ended up in California. And became active in politics in Santa Clara County. As a matter of fact, Vern Cristina--who was the chairman of the county committee--I was co-chairman--we hired Mike Deaver when he was playing piano in a bar in San Jose.

Morris: [laughs] I don't believe that.

Walton: Yes. As central committee executive secretary. Back in, I think, the late '50s. I'm not sure.

Morris: Before the Cal Plan had been developed?

This symbol indicates the start of a new tape or tape segment.
For Tape Guide, see p. 57.

Walton: Oh, yes. I think that Mike met Parky, Dr. Gaylord Parkinson, when he [Deaver] was secretary of the Santa Clara County Republican Central Committee. Then that developed into--when was that, '64, I guess. He went with Parky, and Don Yule came in there, or someone else came in. I'm hazy on that. But I do remember that Mike, who had trained for the priesthood and then had taken a trip around the world, was playing the piano in a bar when we interviewed and hired him.

Morris: Was he looking for something in politics?

Walton: I think so. Yes, I think he had an interest in it. He definitely applied for the job.

Morris: It was unusual at that point for a county central committee to have a staff director.

Walton: Not necessarily. Santa Clara was the third or fourth county then. L.A., San Francisco, San Diego, Santa Clara--well, Alameda. It was a large county.

Morris: Was Bob Kirkwood still around?

Walton: Yes. He was fading. Bruce Allen (Judge Allen). Spencer Williams, who is now a judge in San Francisco and was secretary of--what?--human resources.

Morris: Health and welfare.

Walton: Yes. He was an attorney in town, and so forth, ran for AG [attorney general].

Morris: In 1970, and also in 1966.

Walton: Yes, later. But I guess the entry point is I met Reagan in '62. I'd sort of bumped into him with glancing blows before that. But I met him in '62 when he was--I don't know whether he had a position or not, but he was active in the Loyd Wright for Senate campaign. Do you remember?

Morris: I do remember Loyd. A couple of other people have mentioned the Loyd Wright campaign. But they couldn't really pin it down.

Joe Shell's Primary Campaign for Governor

Walton: I think it was '62, because I was very close to Joe Shell and managed the last two and a half or three months of Joe's primary campaign against Nixon.* So that way, there was some common interest with the Wright campaign. That's where I got to know Reagan a little better than I had.

Morris: Do you recall that Reagan might have been co-chairman or something like that?

Walton: It was southern California something. Or maybe it was state.

Morris: It was up in that caliber?

Walton: Definitely.

Morris: Was he making speeches, or was he part of the strategy?

Walton: Both. See, I was with the National Association of Manufacturers for ten years as the head of what's called public affairs for the West, the thirteen western states, and GE [General Electric Company] was a big member of NAM. So we sort of tracked Reagan's career, although I can't pretend that I had ever met him personally.

Morris: Is that how he got involved in the Loyd Wright campaign, from the GE connection?

Walton: Now, this I don't know, but I suspect that it had something to do with his interest in politics down in the L.A.-Hollywood area.

Morris: From the Screen Actors' Guild?

Walton: Yes. And his friends, [Henry] Salvatori, and guys like that, that he began to meet. Now, he knew them before the kitchen cabinet was formed, as you know, I'm sure.

Morris: People we've talked to are very vague about that. [laughs]

Walton: I think I can pull those threads a little bit for you as we go along. So anyhow, we had a pretty rough campaign with Nixon. I still feel that Joe Shell would have been one of the best governors the State of California had ever had.

*A sample speech from this campaign is in Mr. Walton's papers in the Hoover Institution.

Morris: He had been very strong in the legislature.

Walton: He was majority leader in the assembly, a man of great integrity, which is a sadly lacking virtue in politics. After he was defeated--and we got thirty-seven per cent of the vote, which wasn't bad against a former vice president who was a scallywag, [laughter] Joe asked me if I wouldn't like to sort of string along with him, and I said, "You bet." Because the NAM was quite upset that I had not supported Nixon. I left my job with the NAM as a result of it.

Morris: They didn't like you being that active in politics, or--?

Walton: Both. I'm sure, although they never spelled it out, but I'm sure that if I had been that active for Richard Nixon, there would have been nothing said. But I was quite active for Joe Shell. So I had no choice in my opinion but to leave them in March, or whatever it was, and go full-time as Joe's campaign manager.

So after the primary campaign, when Joe refused to jump over the net and shake hands with Nixon--do you remember that?

Morris: Yes.

Walton: Were you around when he said, "No, sir, I'm not going to abandon all the people that--"

Morris: Yes.

II THE RAPID RISE OF UNITED REPUBLICANS OF CALIFORNIA

Founding of UROC, 1962

Walton: We stayed together, and in the fall of '62, we formed United Republicans of California, UROC. Which is a bird large enough to carry away an elephant. [laughter] Did you know that? That's what a roc is.

Morris: Yes, from Sinbad the Sailor.

Walton: Yes.

Morris: I thought you were referring to your organization.

Walton: UROC?

Morris: Yes.

Walton: Yes, that's why we called it UROC, United Republicans, but it also was a delight to remind people that a roc was large enough to carry away an elephant.

Morris: And that was your goal from the founding, to take the Republican party where it ought to go?

Walton: To get the Republican party where we thought it should go. It grew as you know. It became the largest Republican volunteer group in California. We learned a lot from CDC [Council of Democratic Clubs, also called California Democratic Council]. We were structured--

Morris: How about the California Republican Assembly? Were they useful?

Walton: No. Well, we learned a lot about what not to do from the CRA, which was run from the top down and which was the old smoke-filled room operation. Where the power brokers ran the CRA, UROC was run at the grass roots. Every unit in UROC that had ten members had something like five votes at the state convention. It was really democracy in action.

Morris: Gee! And how many units were you able to set up?

Walton: I forget now, but it was well over five hundred. We had units wherever there were people gathered in a living room. I think we had close to twenty thousand members by the primary in 1964. And were very active in the Goldwater campaign. I think that Stu Spencer and Bill Roberts would say that UROC was one of the primary factors in Goldwater's squeaking through the California primary in '64.

Morris: They were working for Rockefeller in the campaign.

Walton: Right. Which, of course, as you jump ahead in time, was one of the reasons so many people were upset when they were named to the Reagan campaign.

Morris: So you were looking for a candidate like Goldwater?

Walton: No.

Morris: Or you were looking to build your own--?

Walton: Trying to rebuild a Republican party in the state of California, and to get it away from Los Angeles and southern California. Not Orange County--because that was one of our power centers--but away from the power centers in southern California, and also in Alameda, to some degree.

Morris: That was Bill Knowland at that point.

Walton: Bill was with us, but it was the old [Earl] Warren-Kuchel, especially [Thomas] Kuchel. He was [laughs] often represented as the bogey man.

Morris: Really? Why was that?

Walton: People felt he was kind of liberal. I don't remember now why. But Kuchel was not one of the conservatives' favorites. No way.

Power Struggle Between the Old Guard and the Grassroots

Morris: Was the organizing principle that Warren and Kuchel had not been constructive leaders?

Walton: Warren especially, of course. Knight, UROC was upset with Goodie [Goodwin] Knight in some way, because he was sort of a chameleon. And I don't mean to present the picture that it was a negative energy that was involved here, because UROC was very positive. It was a grassroots movement. It was a combination of the Wallace type populists, which is a very dangerous commodity to play with, I think--

Morris: The Henry Wallace?

Walton: No. George Wallace. This is why I was really upset at some of my friends in Washington that are going this new populist route. That can explode in the face.

Morris: But what's the difference between populist and grassroots?

Walton: At that level, perhaps, very little, if any. But as it rises to the cutting edge in politics, there's a tremendous difference between representative government, which is a republic form of government, and populism, which is almost mobocracy, where you bend to the wind and the whims of the people in a populist situation. Where there are the checks and balances and controls of sanity and deliberation, and the balances of the three-branch system, which you have in a representative [government], you don't get that in populism. The legislature becomes everything in a populist [system].

Morris: As opposed to the executive being delegated--

Walton: Well, yes, which is the other extreme, which is the imperial presidency, which is very dangerous. The two extremes are dangerous. And of course, you've got the third extreme, which is the imperial judiciary. But in populism, it's mobocracy. It scares me. Populism, frankly, gave them Hitler. It did, when you think about it. Of course, he played and used it. But once it was generated, he harnessed it to install and empower his Third Reich.

But anyhow, it was a combination of factors that gave a rapid rise to the United Republicans of California. They took positions on issues. That was another thing. Now, the birth of the CDC, with Alan Cranston and so forth, was springboarded in a sense because they stood for issues. They weren't afraid to take a position on issues. And neither was UROC. The party people were

saying, "Now, don't be so brittle on issues, because you'll split the thing up. We've got to compromise," and this and that, and so forth.

But the people in UROC said, "This is our position on the issue. This is where we stand. And if you don't like it, too bad."

You see, the central committee--

Morris: Was this before Parkinson we're talking about now?

Walton: Before and during and after Parky. Now, we got along very well with Parky.

Morris: How about with Cap Weinberger, who'd been chairman in 1962-64?

Walton: Cap and I had a bitter knock-down, drag-'em-out fight on the floor of the state central committee meeting in the ballroom of the Sir Francis Drake Hotel.

Morris: What was the issue?

Walton: Well, I'm trying to remember. It centered on the issue that the central committee was supposed to stay neutral in a primary, and that they were not neutral, that they were spending money and using staff to promote a candidate [Nixon] during the 1962 primary. We got into a real--.

Morris: The central committee?

Walton: Yes. --battle on the floor. I was very upset when he came up to Sacramento in the Reagan administration as director of Finance. But to make it very short, Cap Weinberger and I became the closest of friends. I have a tremendous amount of respect for him. Now, I'm not talking about in the job he's doing now [Secretary of Defense]. I don't know. But at that time, in Sacramento, he was the best thing that happened to the Reagan administration.

Morris: After Gordon Paul Smith left.

Walton: Right. Between Smith and [Verne] Orr. He did a tremendous job as director of Finance. I got to know him and like him. I really like him. So anyhow, he wasn't any help with UROC. [chuckles]

Morris: UROC didn't see Weinberger doing the right things with the party as chairman?

Walton: Cap was part of the power structure, and UROC was not the power structure. So there was a natural hostility and rivalry for control of the party. We said the people own the party. They said that the money guys own the party. The guys that put up the money will call the shots.

It's a fact of life.

Morris: Well, if that's a fact of life, what's the purpose, then, of raising twenty thousand members, if it's the people with the money who have the power?

Walton: Because you can lick them every time if you organize your precincts.

Morris: Regardless of who has the money?

Walton: Sure. If I come to you and I say, "Look, old buddy,"--you're my next-door neighbor--"don't listen to that jazz. Here are the facts. Now, you know me. We cut the lawns together. We go down to the market together. This is the guy you ought to vote for," the weight factor will be in my favor, regardless of how much they're going to spend for television. If you have confidence in our friendship. And usually good neighbors do. Plus organization, getting out the vote. Which goes all the way from locating it, registering it, delivering it at the polls. Now, you can still do that. [President Jimmy] Carter proved that. Sure, he did. You bet 'ya. So that was the purpose.

Morris: Okay. Was any of the conflict that you were trying to recruit members into UROC and, when Weinberger and Parkinson were chairmen of the Republican State Central Committee--

Walton: Parky never gave us any trouble.

Morris: They were also involved in trying to increase registration.

Walton: Sure. But neutral in the primary. And then, as they should, for the candidate in the general. And I don't mean to pick on Cap, except Cap personified the old, old guard on Montgomery Street and Spring Street and in the Towers in San Diego, that had been running the party and buying the candidates and putting them up, and the workers were given a candidate and [told], "Here, go out and work for him." So anyhow-- .

Citizens for Goldwater, June-November, 1964

Walton: As a result of the explosive emergence of UROC--I guess you could say that--and the victory in June of '64, I was asked to be the director of advertising and public relations for Citizens for Goldwater in Washington. I did. I took Stan Harper and John Grossman, who is a tremendous artist, and a couple of other people back with me.

Morris: Had they worked for--?

Walton: In UROC. Very active. John Grossman, who with his wife, Andrea, is now Mrs. Grossman's Paper Company, [is] a tremendous painter. Have you seen his work?

Morris: No.

Walton: It used to hang in the governor's council chambers. I think the Governor gave one of the Grossmans to the emperor of Japan, and so on and so forth. If you go the ranch, one of the paintings of Marin County is a Grossman. But John had designed a folder for UROC, for the Goldwater campaign. It was absolutely the best thing going in the whole campaign, bar none.

Morris: This is the small piece you give to individuals in shopping centers?

Walton: Give to people, yes. It was beautiful. So when I was asked by Clif White to go back to Washington, I asked John and Andrea if they'd come back, and they did. He did the Goldwater graphics, Citizens for Goldwater graphics, which made everything else look shoddy. [See sample next page.] They really did. Because they had class. They weren't typical political shove-it-out stuff, and they had integrity. They weren't flamboyant. They were sincere and direct. Anyhow, he came back and did that.


Morris: Where had you gotten the money to have that kind of staff for UROC?

Walton: The annual dues were--boy, what were they? I think the annual dues were ten dollars a year, of which something like two or three dollars went to the state. And the other--.

Morris: To the state organization?

Walton: To the state office in Los Altos. And the rest was used at the local level for precinct material. You see, everything was down at the base of the triangle. And then people could contribute to the state office if they wished. But that was not dues. We raised money in various ways. Sales of things and rallies. I know I

This sample of Mr. Grossman's work is reduced from the 8 1/2 x 11 1964 campaign folder. Printed in red, white, blue, and gray, the leaflet unfolds ingeniously to an 11 x 17 head and shoulders view of Mr. Goldwater, suitable for use as a poster or window card. Original in supporting documents in the Hoover Institution.



practically lived in a Cessna, flying around the state, making speeches at rallies and stuff. And they made money that way. And we had a couple of strong supporters, Hub [Hubbard] Russell, from--what is the name of that little town? Outside of Bakersfield. Maricopa.

Well, Hub and his brother, poor unfortunate guys, they had a potato farm in Long Beach, and one day the guy came in and said, "There's something wrong out here," and they went out, and they were in the middle of an oil field.

Morris: That's too bad.

Walton: Then they sold that to Richfield, I guess. That was part of that big Kettle Hills thing, I think, or whatever that's called down near Huntington Beach. They moved up to this valley outside of Bakersfield, and one day the foreman come in and said, "Boss, there's something on the pond out here, and the cattle won't drink it." [laughter] And they were in the middle of another oil field.

Morris: We should all be so lucky.

Walton: Oh, yes. But it never--he didn't change at all. He wore grubbies and [had] an old Buick. But he loved Joe Shell.

Morris: These were still Joe Shell friends.

Walton: Yes. So he helped get UROC started financially. And Muriel and Bruce Reagan put in some money, and so forth.*

Media Decisions: Reagan's Speech and "Choice"

Walton: So one day, back in Washington, Stan Harper and Dana Reed and I had commandeered Dennison Kitchel's, I think it was a Cadillac or a Chrysler limousine. Because it had a phone in it, and we were on our way to Madison Square Garden [in New York City] for a big rally up there for Goldwater. The phone rang, and it was our secretary saying that a Ronald Reagan was trying to get me. So we pulled

* Bruce Reagan had been a Los Angeles assemblyman from 1949 through 1961 and had run for state controller in 1962. No relation to Ronald Reagan.

over to one of these rest areas with a public telephone and called the number. It was Reagan. He was in Vallejo, California, at a big motel on Highway 80.

He was making a big speech that night. You know, he really worked for Goldwater. And he said, "Rus, some of the guys here"--specifically [Holmes] Tuttle and [Justin] Dart and Salvatori--"think that I should take my speech and dress it up and go on national television." "A Time for Choosing." Remember that?

Morris: Yes.

Walton: I said, "I think that's great." I'd seen him, and he's a great talker. I don't know that he's a great communicator, but he's a great talker.

Morris: [laughs]

Walton: There is a difference. He was a better communicator as governor than he is as president. I think. We can get into that later.

"And I'm having trouble," [Reagan said] "because Kitchel and Dean Burch don't want me to do it. What do you think?"

I said, "Boy, I think it's a great idea. I think you ought to do it, and let me see what I can do to help." So we agreed that I would do what I could to promote the idea. And he did, and I did, and he went on. And as you recall, his speech--

Morris: In October.

Walton: Yes. Very close to the [election]. And I knew full well, and I think he did, that it wasn't going to make any difference as far as the outcome of the election. I mean, if you were at all realistic, you knew that Goldwater was--you don't change presidents three times in two years. You don't. We had a real argument with the Senator about doing it after [John] Kennedy was assassinated.

He [Goldwater] said, "I agree with you, but I owe these people"--meaning guys like the ones in UROC and so forth--"and I can't let them down. Maybe it's a suicide mission, but I'm going to do it. I've got to do it. And at least we can use it to state the case." We knew going in that [Lyndon] Johnson was going to win, unless some unexpected development, which came along, could shift the tides.

But anyhow, it was worth it for Reagan to make the speech, I felt. It gave a tone to the campaign close--actually left the campaign open-ended in that the battle on the issues could continue.

Morris: And the party has to have a candidate. The Republicans couldn't just say, "We're not going to run anybody" that year.

Walton: Well, [Nelson] Rockefeller would have been glad to run. [laughs] Do you remember the Cow Palace [1954 Republican convention in San Francisco]?

Morris: Yes.

Walton: [William] Scranton-- [laughs] So anyhow, he made the speech.

Morris: On the speech thing, we've had a couple of different versions of that. One is that it had been put together and financed by a local group somewhere in southern California?

Walton: Yes, that's Tuttle and Dart and-- .

Morris: Republican Associates?

Walton: No.

Morris: Did they exist yet?

Walton: I don't know what vehicle they used, but I know where the money came from. Because I know who paid for the time. (Those who subsequently were the kitchen cabinet.)

Morris: At first it was shown at a party meeting, and then it was shown at different party meetings, and eventually it got on national television because different local groups bought the time--?

Walton: In some cases.

Morris: --because the network wouldn't make it available?

Walton: Yes, they built their own network. But although the speech had been given before, in substance, and might have been either taped or filmed, as I understand it the speech which was used nationally, through this built-up, jerryrig network, was delivered in an auditorium at USC, or somewhere. I could be wrong on USC. And it was filmed purposefully and cut to meet time requirements on television. He honed it and added and brought it up to date. But what you saw is what he gave that night.

Morris: Who cut the film?

Walton: I don't know whether Bill Carruthers did or not. But they had a film editor that worked with him.

Morris: And it's this film that Mr. Reagan called you about from Vallejo and said what do you think?

Walton: "They want me to go nationally. What do you think?" And I said, "You bet."

Morris: But it was already in the can, as they say.

Walton: No, he went ahead and did it, and they filmed it.

Morris: Oh, and then that film [of his appearance at USC] had been cut for national television.*

Walton: Yes. Specifically for that reason. Yes. That's the information I have. That was my impression.

Morris: Okay. But he thought enough of your judgment to call, track you down?

Walton: Maybe. I don't know. [laughs] I think maybe it was more my position than my judgment. As director of advertising and PR, I probably had something to say about it.

Morris: Did Mr. Goldwater get in on this?

Walton: He was all for it. I think he is the overriding voice with Kitchel and Burch. Anyhow, I really wasn't privy to that. I was having my own problems with "Choice" at the time. All I know is that--

Morris: Problems with choice?

Walton: You've not heard of the infamous "Choice," the film? Bare-bosomed women in the windows of San Francisco.

Morris: Are there two films in this campaign that we're talking about, the '64 campaign?

Walton: Yes. This was a citizens' campaign. It was a half-hour film for television called "Choice." It started out, "Now there are two Americas." Raymond Massey was the narrator. And it showed Lyndon Johnson in his black Lincoln careening over the fields of Texas throwing beer cans out the window. Don't you remember that?

* The pretaped speech was televised on October 27, 1964.

Morris: No.

Walton: We picked that up from the news, so we portrayed it. Then the drugs and the riots and all that jazz, things that were going on in America. It was a morality play, in a sense. Raymond Massey narrated it. The thrust of it was, there are two Americas, and you have to choose. The bad guy was Lyndon, and the good guy was Goldwater. At the end, John Wayne comes on and says, "Choose, America, choose."

The Senator saw it and said no!

Morris: Okay. I think those two films have gotten confused in the historical memory.

Walton: I think so, too, because when you talk about local groups buying time, and so forth, that's what they did with "Choice." The Senator--

Morris: Yes. It was meant for Republican groups rather than for general audiences?

Walton: No, we were going to put it on national television. I took a print up to the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel in Philadelphia to show the Senator, and because some of the riot scenes had some black faces, he said no. I disagreed with him, but I respected his decision. He said, "I do not want to do anything that will play on racism or cause any problems in the social milieu here." He said, "Let's not use it."

I said, "Senator, give me some time to go back and see if we can--" We didn't select-- As a matter of fact, and you can check this in Hollywood, we went out of our way to make sure that, as much as possible, we had riots without black people in them. But anyhow, the black people were rioting. You know.

But he said, "I'll give you ten days to redo it." Then he called and said, "No, let's not use it."

By that time, the prints were out, and the troops said, "Nuts to you, Senator," and they bought their own time. They went around to parties and to cocktail shows. In San Francisco, they showed it in a window down on O'Farrell or somewhere, where the Goldwater headquarters was, and it blocked traffic. Big headlines in the Chronicle, and so forth. Drew Pearson picked it up, and all this jazz.

But that's way beside the point. Ronald Reagan had nothing to do with that.

1965 UROC Convention: Reagan Keynote Speech, Shell Endorsement Hopes

Morris: Okay. But you and he stayed in touch after that, or you got to know him better after that?

Walton: Yes. I saw him several times when the noises started about his being a candidate. We went out to Pacific Palisades. Then we had our great big state convention, and I mean they were big, in '65, at the convention center in Sacramento. We asked him to be the keynote speaker. He came and gave--

Morris: This is the UROC state convention?

Walton: Yes. He came and gave a great speech. Which didn't hurt him at all. I got to know him a little better through that. And so on and so forth.

Morris: Was he speaking at that point as a potential candidate or as a test-the-waters or--?

Walton: How do you distinguish? I would say yes, he was--,

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Walton: To tell you the truth, my favorite candidate was, and is, in that sense, Joe Shell. I think Joe Shell would have been a great governor. I had an agency, a PR--

Morris: In addition to running UROC?

Walton: Yes. UROC became an account, so that we could lighten the financial burden on the members. They said, "Yes, you can handle other things." Because I had a staff, you know, and I had to-- So we had an account called Pilots for the American Republic. PAR.

Morris: Pilots?

Walton: Pilots, flyboys. It came out of Pilots for Goldwater. They asked us to handle their account, and we did. We went over to Phoenix and we met with Goldwater. The Senator said, as we were going out to the house, he took me over and he says, "Hey, Rus, can you get Joe to step aside and not run against Reagan?"

I said, "Well, I don't know. You'll have to talk to Joe."

Morris: Joe was still feeling like--?

Walton: Sure. He should have been, too. He worked hard. He'd given all these years to the party. He'd worked hard for Goldwater.

So I said, "Well, it's not my position. Joe will do the right thing, I'm sure. But I'll do what Joe does." So although I thought that Reagan was a great public figure, in that sense of communicating, speaking--

Morris: A visible one.

Walton: Yes. --and personality.

You see, this is the problem with politics today, which has been engendered, or at least aggravated, by television, that the charisma and the personality and the visage become more important than the substance. [taps table for emphasis] Now, that's no slam at Reagan. That's a general observation.

There was nothing wrong at that time with Joe Shell's image. Clean, all-American football player, handsome.

Morris: Except he was also well known as having good friends who were very powerful in the oil business.

Walton: Yes.

Morris: And that--

Walton: And also the kitchen cabinet.

Morris: Yes.

Walton: It split Dart, Tuttle, and Salvatori and--

Morris: Some of those guys had been Nixon backers, too.

Walton: Sure had. We had some bitter go-rounds in '62. But anyhow, you asked me if I saw Reagan as a candidate for governor. I sensed what was coming, but I was wedded emotionally and philosophically to Joe Shell. It was not hard to remember that it was only six years before that that Reagan had been out pounding the ground for Helen Gahagan Douglas and other people, and so on and so forth. Maybe I'm off on the six years. Sixty, wasn't it?

Morris: I think there was a hiatus there. The first time he's visible as a Republican is '62. But Helen Gahagan Douglas was--.

Walton: He was for Eisenhower in '56. No, I guess he wasn't.

Morris: Helen Gahagan Douglas was 1950, when Nixon ran against her for the U.S. Senate.

Walton: Yes, you're right. As I say, time is--.

Morris: It telescopes from this point of view.

Walton: And that's not necessarily a curve at Reagan. But I'm not so locked into party loyalty that I will say no, so-and-so has served us well for ten years, despite the fact this man is more qualified.* I will say, "Let's go with the qualified man."

But Joe Shell was the qualified man, in addition to having served the party and raised money for candidates and built the thing [Republican representation]** in Sacramento. With Parky, and so forth, they brought that thing from whatever the assembly was, up to the point where they just about had control of the state assembly. You just don't kick a guy out and say, "Nice going, but we've got Prince Charming. We're going to go with him."

Morris: There was also George Christopher, who had decided to go statewide.

Walton: [laughs sarcastically] Yes. What I was going to say is not for print. Old George.

Morris: You didn't feel that he was the candidate for the Republicans at that point?

Walton: No way.

Anyhow, Reagan became a candidate. Now, you see, I had some problems in UROC. And this conversation is about the Governor, not about Rus Walton, but I think I have to inject here that in late

*Asked to clarify this passage, Mr. Walton replied on the transcript: What I was trying to say was that the abilities and integrity of the individual must come before party loyalty, which too often offers hacks and hangers-on.

**To the editor's bracketed phrase, Mr. Walton added: Yes, especially in the state assembly (he was minority leader). They held the fort and mounted a strong loyal opposition.

'65, I went back to Washington, and we had a national program called ACTT, America's Christmas Trains and Trucks, which gathered food and medicine and school supplies and clothes, and so forth, for the people of South Vietnam. It started out in Washington. Hubert Humphrey clamped the seal on the freight-car door, and it (the train) went across the country, and all these other trucks and trains met it as it came to San Francisco. They gathered I don't know how many millions of pounds of medicine and clothes and stuff for the folks in South Vietnam. So I sort of lost touch, if not administrative control, which is too strong a word, of UROC. Some of my friends in the Birch Society sort of gained the ascendancy.

John Birch Society Gains Ascendancy of UROC

Walton: Now, my problem with the Birch Society was not necessarily on issues or position. Many of the issues they held and hold, I agree with. I just felt that it was improper for them to try and take over an organization that had been built by other people. I'm not talking about myself. I'm talking about those ten dollars, and all the work that all these twenty-thousand people had done.

So we had a real go-round. In one interview with either Harry Farrell in San Jose [with the Mercury-News] or somebody, Jack McDowell [then with the San Francisco Call-Bulletin], maybe, I sort of told off the Birch Society. In essence, I said, "Keep your paws off of UROC. You're welcome to join, but when you join, you join UROC. UROC doesn't join you." So we had a very bitter showdown. I guess you could say they fired me.

As a result of that, I--this was just before they endorsed Reagan for governor in the primary of '66-- as a result of that, [Philip] Battaglia, and I guess Stu Spencer, and some of the others were really mad at me. Because they felt that washing our linen might have affected Reagan's chances. So I was Peck's Bad Boy. They didn't want me around at all.

Morris: There was a big flap, wasn't there, about whether or not Reagan would accept the Birch Society-- ?

Walton: The UROC endorsement. I don't know about the Birch Society, but there was some talk as to whether or not Reagan would come to Bakersfield and accept the UROC endorsement. But he did. He did. I guess in a sense I was the head of the boil, you know. So I had my own fish to fry in '66. I handled sixteen or seventeen congressional campaigns, and some legislative campaigns in Illinois, and had nothing at all to do with the Reagan campaign.

Morris: To do with the California campaigns.

Walton: No, all around the country.

Morris: Right. But not with the California Reagan campaign. You were working out of California.

Walton: Rus Walton and Associates. Pam Rymer, who has now made federal judge, worked for me.

Morris: What were the points of conflict between the Birch Society and UROC?

Walton: Just the administrative control. Plus--

Morris: Ideologically, maybe, or politically.

Walton: I don't think there were really any ideological conflicts. If there were, they were not pointed enough for me to remember them now. There were two things that I felt were improper. The first was that they tried to be like a hermit crab, you know, crawl in the shell and take UROC over. And the second was that I think that sometimes a soft answer turneth away wrath, and that some of the extreme statements and positions which we may hold to very firmly and dearly should be soft-pedaled in public with the press. There's no use creating antagonisms. The difference between strategy and compromise: strategy, you may change your course, but you don't change your principles. Compromise, you change your principles.

I said, "Fine, I'm not suggesting that we abandon Taiwan," for example. That's an example. I don't think that was at issue. What I'm saying is that when we're having press conferences, let's remember that we're the United Republicans of California, and the issues should be California issues, sales tax, or whatever it was, energy conservation. That was it. It wasn't ideological. It was strategy.

Morris: And their strategy was more effective in that case?

Walton: Stand up and talk it out. [laughter] I could have stayed and fought, and I think I could have won. I'm sure I could have won, but won what? We labored so hard to build a very effective organization which now is a shell. It really is.

Morris: Nor does the Birch Society have the strength as an organization that it did at that time.

Walton: Unh-unh. No way. I think the--I am a Christian, and I believe that Christians should be active in government, but the religious right in a sense has replaced the Birch Society.

Morris: In a sense? As a very--

Walton: Vocal, militant, obvious factor, sometimes given to extreme statements. Not that I necessarily disagree with some of their positions, but I just think that they are not going about it the right way.

Morris: They antagonize not only the press but--?

Walton: Yes. They pull Norman Lear's string, and he jumps, you know, and everything. It's ridiculous.

Morris: Which creates a counterpoise.

Walton: Yes. Neither of which is constructive, and neither of which is attending to the problems that are bringing a crisis to this nation. But anyhow, the Governor won, won well.

III EARLY DAYS OF THE REAGAN GUBERNATORIAL ADMINISTRATION

Transition; Highway Safety

Morris: Let's see, you didn't come back and join his administration in Sacramento for a year or so, did you?

Walton: In January of '67, wasn't it?

Morris: Okay. I didn't find you on the first--

Walton: No. You mean the transition team and all that stuff?

Morris: I didn't find you on the early staff rosters.

Walton: January, at the very latest, February, I should have been shown as deputy director of Motor Vehicles.

Morris: Okay.

Walton: I was there for a while, and moved over to assistant to the secretary of Transportation, under Gordon Luce.

Morris: Why Motor Vehicles and Transportation?

Walton: If you answer the first, you answer the second. Some of my friends who were up there said why don't you come up. It was quite clear-- I mean, Phil Battaglia really didn't want me around. I think--oh, what was the name of the other guy?

Morris: Deaver?

Walton: No, Mike and I are pretty good friends. Let's see-- [looks over roster] This is not the original team. This is '68.

Well, you see, right here, and I'm sure you've already covered it, but the first team that went up there was the team. That was a great team.

Morris: The transition team?

Walton: Yes. As they faded away, things began to change. What was the guy's name? He went with Disney. He was very close to Battaglia, and they got swept up in that homosexual thing. It's not really that important.

[additional question, asked on transcript]

Morris: Am I right that "the first team" refers to Phil Battaglia, Bill Clark, Lyn Nofziger, Tom Reed, maybe Win Adams and Paul Haerle? Within a few months, that group began to shift and by 1969 there were Ed Meese, Mike Deaver, Ed Thomas, Jim Jenkins, Paul Beck, Ken Hall, and Jerry Martin in the top administrative spots. How did they differ, in your experience, in philosophy and management style from the earlier group? How about interaction with Governor Reagan?

Walton: I would include Ned Hutchinson and Gordon Luce in the first team, too. Jerry Martin was not influential until '71. He worked for me in program development as a researcher.

The "first" team were (a) hard-nosed conservatives from Goldwater days (except for Battaglia who was a "Spencer-Roberts find"), who were (b) battle-wise, sharp citizen pols--i.e., no intention of making Sacramento their home trough.

The "second" team were strictly pragmatists and hangers-on. With the possible exception of Deaver, they knew little about the California GOP and its factions, had little regard for the conservative philosophy. Beck, for example, had been one of the L.A. Times reporters who had bombed Reagan during the campaign. Meese knew nothing about politics; was reported to have asked, "Reagan, who's he?" (Even stronger rumors have it he was opposed to Ronald Reagan while he [Meese] was lobbyist in the DA's office in Alameda County.)

[transcript resumes]

But anyhow, I felt very strongly about highway safety. I felt that at least I could contribute something if I went up there and tried to do something about highway safety in the State of California. So they made me deputy director of Motor Vehicles. I worked with Verne Orr. We put on the first teenage safety drive. Kids started out in Sacramento and drove to Fresno, stayed

overnight in Fresno, I think it was, and went down to the ballroom at the Biltmore. We gave prizes and all that stuff. We put on quite a highway safety campaign. Right from the steps of the state capitol. Instituted some reforms, both in roadway and vehicle. The reflectorized plates, I like to say are mine. We really had to fight that one.

Morris: To get that through the legislature?

Walton: Safety plates. Yes. It didn't have to go through the legislature. It had to go through the bureaucracy. And then Gordon Luce, whom I like very much, asked me if I wouldn't like to come over and handle highway safety and also do some writing for him. I went over and handled some PR work for Gordon.

Morris: I sometimes get the feeling that [departments in the] Business and Transportation [Agency] get lost in the shuffle in state government.

Walton: They do. At least they did then. Except that the personality and position of Gordon Luce kept it from getting lost then. We got along very well.

State of the State and Other Speeches

Walton: One of my so-called chief sponsors, I guess you could say, was Lyn Nofziger. Lyn and I went way back, long before Reagan. When he was with--whatever the name of that outfit is that owns the San Diego papers and had the Sacramento Union for a while. What's the name of it?

Morris: It's run by a woman. Helen Copley.

Walton: Copley, yes. He was still with Copley. He was sort of pushing me. I don't know how it happened, I really don't, but anyhow, they asked me to try my hand at the state of the union message, or the state of the state. [see Appendix]

Morris: That January message.

Walton: For January of '68. And I did. I went back to Los Altos and wrote it on my living room coffee table. The Governor accepted it, and things sort of developed from that.

Morris: How did you go about putting together a state of the state [message]?

Walton: They had a lot of stuff that various agencies and departments had sent in, things that they wanted to do.

Morris: I see. The governor's office sends out a call for stuff from the agencies?

Walton: Yes. The structure is, as you may recall, they have a cabinet, and then a council. Through the cabinet, as I recall it, they asked each member--the council was composed of the department heads. So they asked DMV and all these other outfits, "What are your goals for the coming year? What legislation do you need to facilitate those goals? What finances?" and so forth. So you take that and put it in order of priority, and also public appeal, and you hone it down into a draft, try to establish a theme, go over it with the Governor, go over it--well, first, you go over it with the lieutenants. Then you get it to a point where you go over it with him. And come up with a final draft. That's the way it was done then.

You come home with a big book, you know, and throw out a lot of it.

Morris: Had you and Lyn Nofziger had some conversations about what you thought ought to go, what you and he together, thought ought to go in the speech?

Walton: No. They left me alone. Which was smart. Not because of me and the way I work, but because, if nothing else, it gave them a fresh [approach]. I wasn't in their meetings and wasn't concerned about their foibles and the pressures.

Morris: Did Nofziger make a habit of doing that, working with people in the various agencies?

Walton: No. I think it was just our friendship. He knew that I'd written a lot of speeches, and he knew that I had handled Joe, and so forth.

Changes of Command

Walton: I stayed with Gordon Luce, and then--. Oh, the guy that, the fellow, all this time, after Battaglia left, and I was not involved in that in the sense that I was on the scene. We sat over on N Street, is it?, in Transportation, and saw it happen. One of my

friends was very close to the situation and knew what was coming and kept me filled in, and so on.

Morris: Was it as much the fact that a homosexual situation was developing, or there were problems with how Mr. Battaglia was handling the executive secretary function?

Walton: From where I sat, I would say that the homosexual situation enabled them to accelerate the application of their dissatisfaction with the way he was doing his job. It was something that they could then use to accelerate the situation. Now, that doesn't mean that--

Morris: To speed his departure.

Walton: That's right. To speed his departure.

Morris: Okay. Now, who are "they"?

Walton: Oh, I think it would have been Tom Reed, Gordon Luce, Paul Haerle--

Morris: Tom Reed didn't stay very long himself. He was on the Governor's staff, and then he left to--

Walton: He was an honest man.

Morris: He left to do the political--

Walton: Yes.

Morris: He then went on to do the '68 campaign thing, didn't he? Isn't that the way it worked?

Walton: Well, yes, except that he also had a great antipathy toward bureaucracy and red tape.

Lyn was, of course; Paul I mentioned; I think Meese was involved, but Meese is sort of a don't-rock-the-boat in my opinion, and I'm sure he wasn't really at the forefront. This is still again '68. But anyhow--

And then I think that Tom was so active in the campaign because he knew Holmes Tuttle, for one, and maybe Justin. I worked for Justin years ago at Rexall [Drug Co.].

Morris: You've had a busy career.

Walton: That was a long time ago. Anyhow, with that, Bill Clark came in. And Bill Clark was probably, even more than Cap, the best thing that happened to Ronald Reagan in Sacramento. It was too bad he left. Tremendous difference of operation between Bill and Ed Meese. Both have their strong points but, comparatively speaking, Bill was ideal. He really was a great guy.

Morris: What kinds of changes did he institute in how the governor's office functioned?

Walton: He opened it up. Sort of like opening the windows. He listened to the secretaries. And by that, I mean agency secretaries. And to the Governor's staff people, like [Alex] Sherriffs, and Win Adams and so forth. They had confidence in him. They knew that he'd be fair. They knew that if he agreed, he'd go to bat for them, that he was not afraid of Reagan. That he wouldn't toady.

The difference between--and I hope Ed will forgive me if he ever listens to this--but the difference between Bill Clark and Ed Meese is that if Governor Reagan were riding a horse down a trail, Bill Clark would be riding a horse alongside of him. Ed Meese would be a dog running after the horse. Well, that's a--. My old boss in NAM used to call them running dogs. Now, that's not quite fair to Ed. Because Ed has a little more backbone than that.

But Ed himself has always admitted that his job in Sacramento was to keep Reagan removed from the hassle, from the turmoil, from the controversy. That didn't bother Bill Clark. He felt that a man shouldn't be in the spot unless he could take some of the heat. So he would go to Reagan and say, "Here is the problem. Here are the two sides. Now, this is what we're going to have to do." At least, that was my impression.

And he was calm, gentle, in the sense that--a gentleman. Bill Clark is a gentleman. Now maybe he's changed, but boy, when I knew him, he was a real gentleman. He just--the tensions seemed to melt away. Some of those tensions, of course, were the Battaglia situation.

IV 1968 PRESIDENTIAL EXPEDITION

Origins of the Creative Papers

Morris: What about Reagan and the 1968 presidential campaign?

Walton: They came to me, I forget when, Bill Clark and Lyn Nofziger-- Anyhow, they asked me to do a series of creative papers, that they felt that the time had come-- See, all that time, I had been writing speeches for him.

Morris: This is before you came into the governor's office?

Walton: Yes. I didn't come into the governor's office until after Miami. I had written speeches for him. As a matter of fact, that's what I was doing. I was no longer even bothered with highway safety. I was just writing speeches.

Morris: But still sitting in the Department of Transportation building?

Walton: Yes, over with Gordon Luce.

Morris: And the San Diego mafia.

Walton: Yes. Well, they were involved, but not as-- [laughs] Yes, sure. I remember the speech after Martin Luther King was assassinated, and the Governor had to go back to Washington. Oh, boy!

But anyhow, they came and said, "We feel that the time has come--" Oh, I know now. It's coming back. Tom Reed needed something to document the first year of the Reagan administration. So he asked me to come up with a four-page review, report, whatever. And I did. And that sort of, as I recall it now, evolved into what we call the Creative Papers.*

*Probably "The California Commitment (an agenda for the Creative Society--some goals, dimensions and priorities both long-range and short-term)." Copy in the Hoover Institution.

So we wrote the Creative Papers. I think there were three. There was human resources, law and order, and education. The plan was to do--we should have done one on conservation or natural resources. I forget, we had a series of six or eight that we were going to do.

Morris: Did you and Tom Reed block out what the subject areas should be or how you could--?

Walton: I don't recall that we did. We might have.

Morris: Was there a strategy involved, or was that just a convenient way to get a handle on all the things that state government is involved in and that--?

Walton: It seems to me--and I'm not only hazy, I just don't remember--but it seems to me that the reason that we started with human resources was that we felt we had to--now it's coming back to me--we had to put that part of the Reagan image to the fore, to strengthen that. Now, the reason for that was, as you may recall, the Governor went around the state and met with minority groups. I attended, sat in the back, like a little mouse, on a lot of those, and listened to the people and their complaints and their requests and their suggestions. I think that that was what gave us the genesis for the human resources Creative Paper.

Morris: Who set up the meetings with the minority groups? Was that Bob Keyes?

Walton: Bob did. I'd forgotten all about Bob. And there was another fellow down in San Diego. I think Bob was the guy that was primarily responsible for setting them up. It seems to me there was a fellow in L.A. that helped him also, and I can't remember. Was he a Mexican American?

Morris: There was a Delgado on the list.

Walton: Yes. Armand Delgado. They worked together. They set them up all up and down the state.

Morris: Were they prodding Governor Reagan to get out and talk to the minority communities?

Walton: You mean Bob and the others?

Morris: Yes.

Walton: I think prodding may be too strong a word, but I think that since that was their assigned constituency, and maybe also their natural constituency, that they were certainly pushing for it. And it was a good thing to do. You have to cater. It's unfortunate. It's good when the catering has substance, but--you know, politics is the art of [laughs]--magic, I guess.

Morris: The possible is the usual definition.

Walton: But the problem there is that the possible is usually fraud, and certainly not always to the best interest of the people. It's to the best interest of the politician, but not the public.

But anyhow, out of those meetings came the first paper, the second paper.

Morris: In terms of building a response to what you were hearing in these meetings with constituencies?

Walton: And also--both. Building a response, "this is what we will do," as well as, "this is what we have done so far." This is the dream. This is how far we've gone. This is where we'd like to go. So Bill asked me if I would take on the chore and what help I needed, and so I assembled sort of a little team, and we worked on the Creative Papers.

Miami Convention

Morris: When did you realize that this was part of, or that there was a potential, or that there were some people who wanted to have a go at the presidential nomination?

Walton: I can't narrow it down. I'm not naive, in the sense that I'd been in politics for quite a while by then. And I sort of sensed it. Tom kept asking for things which clearly could have been used either for the elections in '68, to help in the assembly and state senate, and also at the same time to position the Governor for a national campaign.

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[Morris: To help in legislative election campaigns?]

Walton: [In order] to administer, to execute, you not only have to get along with the legislature, you have to have public support. Because public support can bring pressure on the legislature. I was thinking of it in that context.

Morris: As a tool for governing.

Walton: Sure. For governing the state, which is the job he ran for and was elected to. So that was a natural part of the program. But I think probably late May or June I realized that the idea of running for the presidency was not just a rumor. I certainly knew it in late June or July.

Morris: How did Mr. Reagan feel about that?

Walton: About the presidency?

Morris: Yes.

Walton: I think he was reluctant at first. I can't pretend that I really know personally his inner thoughts. I think he was had. I think that what came into play were not necessarily his ambitions but other people's ambitions. Maybe some of it was anti-Nixon. I don't know. What I'm trying to say is, I don't think he pushed and shoved his way to get there in '68. I think he was dragged rather than he led.

Morris: I would think if you're in the business of party organization and campaign management, that the Olympics would be to work on getting somebody elected president and to succeed.

Walton: If that's all that the art of governing and politicking is, and probably you're right, it's one of the major causes for the problems this country has.

This guy--and it's not just Reagan--but this guy ran to be the governor of the largest state in the country. It needed a job done. He said he would do the job. He should have kept his word. At least for the first four years. And then if he were re-elected, you know, who's going to run for a third term? Only Pat Brown. That type of thing. Then he could have legitimately said, "Now I will go on, based on my record in California, to seek the presidency." I can't fault him for doing something unique. Most politicians are just like that. Jim Thompson in Illinois, you know, you get elected governor, and now he's starting to think about the White House. [laughter] [Nelson] Rockefeller, and so forth. But that doesn't make it right. And that was the source of my serious objection to it in '68.

I was crestfallen. I thought for sure this man would stay and straighten, or at least work to straighten out, the state. I knew that Joe Shell would have. I really knew. Because Joe and I had talked about it. I didn't kick and scream and yell about it. But I made my position clear.

I'll never forget, I took my older son to Miami with me. We got there late at night, and I met Lyn in a crowded stairway going from the staff floor up to the penthouse, or whatever, with little buttons for admission and all that jazz. The first thing he said to me, "I want you to go down to your room and start writing an acceptance speech."

Morris: Really?

Walton: Yes.

Morris: He was that optimistic?

Walton: I think they were just giving me something to do. [laughs] I don't know. I said, "You got to be kidding."

He said, "No, sir." He said, "You get down there and start drafting the acceptance speech." Well, I tell you, I didn't put one word on a piece of paper. I sat there and thought, "What if something happens?" Because this guy does have the luck of the Irish. You've seen it time and time again. I thought, "Oh, boy, if he gets that nomination, I'm dead." But he didn't.

Morris: If you objected to the idea so much, pardon my asking, why did you go to Miami? Were you sent?

Walton: I didn't ask to go. I had no--have you ever been to Miami in August?

Morris: I wondered why the convention was there that year.

Walton: I've been there. [laughs] I had no desire to go. But I went.

Morris: Did every--no, everybody didn't go. Bill Clark stayed home and minded the store.

Walton: Yes.

Morris: But everybody with some campaign experience in the administration went to Miami to advance?

Walton: I guess. I don't know. A convention is a lousy deal, really, especially if you're working it. I had no desire to go. So I just went and sat in a room. I felt embarrassed for Bill Knowland.

Morris: For Bill Knowland?

Walton: Yes, he was pushed into it, too, I felt. He was there.

Morris: Was he in the "let's see if we can swing this around to Reagan"?

Walton: Yes. I think--and this is strictly, although I was pretty close to Bill Knowland, this has got to be chalked up to hearsay. I think that he was still a little upset with Nixon. Because of the 1952 situation, where--

Morris: Knowland was hoping that he might get the vice presidential nomination?

Walton: And Warren and Nixon pulled a fasty.

Morris: Oh, Warren and Nixon pulled a fasty? That's a new version. Would you please explain that?

Walton: Nixon got the vice presidency and Knowland didn't.

Morris: The accepted mythology is that Knowland hoped that Nixon and Warren might not succeed and that Knowland might get the presidential nomination in '52.

Walton: I hadn't heard that.

Morris: And that he was a loyal and true friend of Warren's throughout.

Walton: Of course, Warren sort of doublecrossed him.

All of a sudden Knowland was flapping in the-- Knowland was lined up to be the vice-presidential candidate. If Eisenhower got it, then to make peace with the Taft people, and so forth, and also to be strong in California, Knowland was lined up to be the vice-presidential candidate, to balance [his] knowledge, experience, legislative experience, statesmanship, and so forth, with Eisenhower, who was a public figure, popular, had foreign relations experience. It would have been a team. But all of a sudden in some way, with Nixon and Warren, Knowland was out and Nixon was in. Bill never forgot it. Now, I know that, because I used to have lunch with Helen and Bill over there in Piedmont, and we'd go over these things. This was in '64 when he was heading up the Goldwater deal.

But anyhow, I feel that he was used at Miami.

Morris: By the Reagan people.

Walton: Yes.

Morris: And in 1952 at the Chicago convention.

Walton: Yes. Warren, for the promise of being appointed chief justice, agreed with this other deal. And as a result of the trade, so to speak, Nixon was made vice president, and Knowland was out.

Morris: I see. It's a three-cornered--

Walton: Yes. And Knowland felt that he'd been had.

Morris: That would be difficult to then have to live with all your fellow national California Republicans.

Walton: Sure.

Morris: And therefore he was willing to go along with the idea of let's see if we can dump Nixon's delegate-counting and put in another candidate?

Walton: Yes, I think so. I think they gave him a false count. I think Clif was off on his count, accidentally or maybe purposefully. Those who took a hard-nosed count knew Reagan never really had a chance. Nixon had it locked up.

Morris: Clif White is referred to a great deal in this tale of Mr. Reagan. Had he had California experience and contacts?

Walton: Minimal, in the '64 primary.

Morris: Who brought him into the California scene?

Walton: I would guess that it would have been Tom and maybe Stu, or it could have been the kitchen cabinet. Now, the reason that Clif was brought in was that he really ran the 1964 convention at the Cow Palace. As you probably know, there's a flopover of about seventy-five per cent on the delegates from one convention to the other. About seventy-five per cent of the people who were in the '64 would be in the '68. He had kept his files. He had his men out in the field. He really knew the delegates. And it was not a bad idea to bring Clif in. He's a good floor manager, and so on. Or general behind the floor manager. But it was a futile exercise, in my opinion.

Morris: Mr. Nixon had some pretty capable people who had been doing political fieldwork for him for a long time.

Walton: Sure. I just feel the Governor was fortunate to come out of it with just some bruises and not scars.

Morris: Were there any plusses from it?

Walton: Not in my opinion. There could have been a plus, I felt, and I urged him to go that way, and they turned me down. My urging was that before his name was placed in nomination, he should on a point of personal privilege go to the podium and thank his supporters and say, "I was elected the Governor of California. I told the people of the state I would serve them, and that is what I'm going to do. I am flattered by your support, but I urge you to get behind Richard Nixon." This is what Goldwater did in '60, remember? So it wasn't a new thing. It wasn't some gambit. He would have come out of there-- As it turned out, he's president anyhow, so maybe I was wrong. [laughs]

Morris: Was he willing to make that kind of a statement?

Walton: I don't know that that ever got to him. As it was, he had to make it later anyhow as a defeated-- It's a lot easier to make it before you're defeated. Then you're a hero. Afterwards you're a loser.

V RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, 1968-1970

Building a Program Development Section

Morris: But the upshot of it was that after that effort, then you did move over into the governor's office.

Walton: When I came back, Bill Clark asked me if I would-- He said, "Why don't we start a new section called program development?" As a matter of fact, we had talked about it before I went to Miami. In vague terms. And when we came back, he called me and said, "We'd like to start this new section. Would you be--?" See, at that point, I was an assistant to the Governor.

Morris: You were?

Walton: That happened before Miami sometime. I don't know. I guess I could look at the certificates back in my files. Bill said, "Would you like to be secretary, and what'll we call it?" We discussed it, and I said, "You bet." So I assembled a staff. They did some remodeling in the governor's complex, and I moved over.

Morris: Physical remodeling?

Walton: Yes. Tore out some walls; I don't recall what had been there. But it was across the hall at first. When you come in from Business and Transportation, that side entrance on N Street, and you go toward the main intersection. Just before you get to the intersection, there was part of the Governor's complex. There was a door to your left. We had that whole area in there. I was there for a while, and then they moved me over into the governor's office. The section stayed there, and I moved over.

Morris: What was your function before Miami?

Walton: Speechwriter primarily, Creative Papers, ideas, so forth. Anything I could make.

Morris: Was that a unit with Lyn Nofziger as chief, or you were just sort of floating--?

Walton: No, I reported to Bill Clark.

Morris: Did you talk with the Governor at that point about what he saw the program development unit doing?

Walton: I guess I did. I seem to recall that we talked about it vaguely, in a sense; we didn't try to structure it or anything. Just the basic area of operation. Most of it was with Bill Clark. Talked to Lyn a little bit.

Morris: And what did they have in mind, Lyn and Bill?

Walton: We used to call it a think tank, or R & D. When I tried to explain it to people, they'd ask "What's program development?" I said, "If you were coming from a corporation, if I said it's a research and development section, you might understand it. Or you might call it a think tank." That's what it was. It was a beautiful job. I like Ed Meese, but it was beautiful under Bill Clark, and it was just as good under Ed Meese.

I could do almost anything I wanted. I'd say, "Now, really, here is a problem, and we ought to build to solve it." "Okay, what do you want to do?" Our problem was not at the top, but with people out in the departments; bureaucrats didn't want their boats rocked.

Morris: The civil service folk?

Walton: And some of the appointees.

Morris: Some of the appointees at the top. How did you go about defining the problem, as it were?

Walton: I think there were two levels. The first was that you go out and talk to either the [agency] secretaries or the department directors. And/or read their memos. Now, for each--

Morris: Their incoming memos?

Walton: Yes. To us. Or to Bill Clark or to Ed Meese. As we did with the state of the state message, we would call for their legislative program for the year. That was done early, like in June for January almost. And you go over those and pick out the ones that

had the A priority for importance and also for PR value. And you'd hone them and sit down and say, "Now, do you mean this? Do you mean that? Can we do this? What legislation would be required to do that? Is there really a big budget involved?" And so forth. "What will come out of the end of the pipeline? If we do it, will it be worthwhile?" And so forth.

Then you sit down with guys like--Pete Wilson was there then, [Robert] Lagomarsino [in the legislature], and Vern Sturgeon and George Steffes [legislative aides in the governor's office]. We used to work closely with them. George and I were, I guess, the two Bobbsey twins that took a hard position. [chuckles]

We'd say, "Here's what we have in mind for the program." Because, with malice aforethought, we used the state of the state message to lock in the governor's office.

Morris: To set up some parameters.

Walton: We made policy decisions through that speech. And they'd say, "We're not going to do this." "Oh, no? Well, here's your speech, and this is what it says right there. Now you've got to do it." And they, "Oh, boy." [laughter]

Morris: That's not nice to do.

Walton: That's one way to get around red tape. And I'm sure they're doing it in Washington today. Every administration does that. So then we'd come up with (a) the state of the state speech, and (b) the program for the ensuing year. Then when we moved in, we'd go after it. And Tom Ellick would be assigned drugs, for example, which was his first love anyhow. He really loved to fight the drug scene, and he did a great job at it.

Morris: Had you brought him into your team because of that?

Walton: Tom--I was asked by--was it Bill? It might have been Lyn. One or the other told me about Tom Ellick, who was doing something, I forget what, and asked me if-- "You don't have to take him, but will you try him out?" I said sure. He worked out very well.

Jeff Davis was in Finance. He was sort of an assistant to one of the section heads in Finance, bright young guy. I think he got to know, again I forget whether it was Bill or somebody, and they suggested him, and I said, "We'll give him a go," and he was a real goer. He was a real asset. Especially in the field of education. And also finances, because he had had the finance department background.

Stan Harper I brought in. Stan and I go way back together. My secretary, Karen Yamada, I brought with me from DMV. She was with me all the way from the first day I was there till the day I left.

Morris: Did she get to play with some of this think tank idea?

Walton: No. But she was my man Friday. She protected me and took care of the office details. She was great. I had a small replica of Rodin's Creation. Have you ever seen that? It's the hand of God, with Adam and Eve coming up out of the dust and the dirt. They're both naked, and they're entwined, two out of one. I think it's a beautiful piece, and I used to have it on a credenza. I'd have it so that you can see the complete sculpture, get the full story. I'd come back and Karen had changed it so all you could see was the hand.

Morris: She didn't like the-- Oh my.

Walton: Anyhow, I'm trying to think. Jeff Hart came out while we were doing the Creative Papers, and Lyn asked me to take him on, and I did. Jeff labored and labored. I think we used maybe two paragraphs of his stuff. It wasn't because it [wasn't] good, but because it was too erudite.

Morris: So part of it is pulling out the ideas and defining the problem, and part of it is how you state it, how you put it together.

Walton: How you present it. Sure. Like anything else, you take the raw material, and it's how you put it together. I had known Jerry Martin--you asked about Jerry--from the Oakland Trib. He'd been active in the YRs, I think, and so forth. Anyhow, I knew him, and I knew that he wanted to get out of the newspaper business. And we had a need for a sharp research director, so to speak, who not only knew where to find it, but knew what to find. So Jerry came up and was research director in the department.

Morris: How does that differ from what the rest of you were doing?

Walton: Research is digging up the raw material, and the rest of us were taking the salt and the coal and the water and making plastic. Jerry would provide the salt and the coal and the water, and then have some input on the plastic. But he was just part of program development.

Morris: In other words, looking for the statistics that would back up the point of view that you were shaping for the Governor?

Walton: Yes. Not just statistics. It could be rhetoric. It could be what somebody has done in another state. It could be a tear-jerking case of a teenager on drugs, or a family lost their home, or whatever. Which we could then use to complete the whole and present it.

Morris: How did this--?

Walton: Rita Lavelle was his assistant. Did you know that?

Morris: No. Amazing complex of people, and how they've continued together. How did what your think tank operation was doing relate to some of these task force studies that abounded?

Walton: You mean like the businessman's deal on efficiency?

Morris: Yes, there was the businessman's task force on efficiency and the economy that sent teams out into every department.

Walton: I remember that. Ned Hutchinson, my dear friend who passed away. I got saddled with that task force for a little bit, and praise the Lord, Ned took it off my shoulder. I was supposed to take some of that and--

Morris: The implementation?

Walton: Yes, or at least the glamorization. I didn't have to wrestle with that too long. We used some of it in the Creative Papers. And in speeches, you know.

Morris: A year or so later, 1969 and 70, some overlap, six or eight people would be pulled out, one from each agency, to go to work on finance and welfare. The people that we've talked to put it very similarly. They say, we really had to go in there and take a look and see what the problem was and then figure out how to take it apart and make it do what we want it to.

Walton: I remember that vaguely. We had a fellow who was assigned to us from whatever the licensing and standards, whatever that was called.

Morris: [Department of] Professional and Vocational Standards.

Walton: Yes. A fellow named Noel Black, who is now a vice president with Amway, worked with us on loan. Noel would sort of keep tabs on some of the findings from some of those teams. We used some of their material, as I understand it, but as I recall it now, theirs was more of an operational rather than innovative, in the sense of the architecture of the Creative Society type stuff, where we had

our own Camelot-type thing we were building. Where we could, we'd use some of their bricks, but most of it--

Morris: And you saw it in terms of Camelot?

Walton: We never used that term, but it was a vision of what could be.

Morris: The Democrats had pre-empted that term.

Walton: I don't care. Right now I'm sort of nonpartisan. I wasn't then, I'll admit. But it was a holy city type thing.

Commission on the Seventies

Walton: See, we formed--which nobody gave attention the way they should have, and I blame myself--but we formed a thing called the Commission on the Seventies. I got the Governor's permission to do it. I got the Governor to get Si [Sidney] Ramo to be the chairman. We had a fellow named Wildavsky on it from Berkeley, Aaron Wildavsky.

We had some of the best brains in the state of California on that commission. It could have spawned a California version of Herman Kahn's Hudson Institute. Our job was to sit down and say what's going to happen in the '70s. What's good, what's bad? How can we accentuate the good and hold down the bad? And not just for the Reagan administration, but for years to come.

We didn't get the support that we should have had on that. They balked when we wanted this, and they stammered when we asked for that. I'm not an infighter. If you're going to fight about it, forget it. Life's too short. There are too many important things to do. I should have been an infighter and said, "This is what you're going to leave the state of California."

Because frankly, the eight years of the Reagan administration, and I say this with all due affection for the Governor and some of the people, the eight years of the Reagan administration were an interlude. By and large, they were an interlude. Nothing much changed. When you go back and analyze the finances, the debt, the taxes, what changed really, basically? And they could have made a difference. They really could have made a difference.

Morris: By actions that were possible to be taken, or by this theoretical vision that you're talking about?

Walton: Implementing, if you want to call it the vision. I realize I'm idealistic, but that's the good part of idealism, because there's the nub of the idealism which can be real. And it's not there now. They haven't changed much in California.

Morris: That's not the common view. The common view--

Walton: What's the common view? Bob Carleson did about the only real job in California, in welfare reform. The taxes went up, the spending went up, everything. I can't sit here and recite it now, because I've got a different life now. I'm involved in other things. But the things that we were really campaigning on, how many of them came to be? Are the race relations better? What's better? Is education better? Is the state-- You know, you and I are probably at odds about UC, but I don't see UC any better on any of its campuses than it was then. Maybe bigger, but I don't think it's any better. I think we have spawned, and not just UC, but by and large California as an educational system has spawned dropouts and illiterates. What's better? Maybe the environment a little bit. But a lot of that's federal. Maybe it's my newspaper background. I tend to be a little cynical.

But I feel that the Commission of the Seventies, with the beef and the power that was behind it, and the astuteness of going to Jesse--

Morris: Unruh?

Walton: Yes. And even what's-his-name. The guy from San Francisco.

Morris: Willie Brown.

Walton: Yes. And so forth, and saying, "Look, we'll continue with our partisan war dances, but we have a job to do. Let's do it." All together they could have made it again a great state. And it's been an interlude. It was an interlude. I don't know what happened under Jerry Brown. You see, they goofed off on Jerry Brown, too. Jerry Brown should never have been governor of California. I'm not saying that because I don't like him or I don't agree with him.

VI 1970 CAMPAIGNS; DISAFFECTION AT THE GRASSROOTS

Walton: Politically, practically speaking, Jerry Brown should not have been elected secretary of state, from which he became governor.

Morris: The political machinery didn't work out into the other constitutional offices?

Walton: They didn't pay any attention to the secretary of state's race.

Morris: Well, it had been a family sinecure for thirty years.

Walton: But Frank [Jordan] died.

Morris: Yes, but then his son had been in office for--

Walton: But the point is that they had a pretty good candidate who was a black man [James Flournoy] in 1970, and they also probably--I think they could have won the seat if they had put some power behind him.

Morris: Okay. Let's talk a little bit about the 1970 campaign. It did not work as a--I thought there was a lot about the team for 1970.

Walton: "The Team '70," sure.

Morris: Was that your idea?

Walton: We coined that, yes. I don't know whether it was my idea. We coined that phrase. Yes. The team was there, but not all the players--

##

Walton: Jim Flournoy needed money. It was a tremendous opportunity for the Governor to have brought him into office with him. It would have been a great thing. But they didn't.

Morris: Why not?

Walton: I think--it's just a surmise on my part--I think they were more concerned with the top of the ticket and with the future than they were with the bottom of the ticket. And that if Jim Flournoy made it, great. I don't remember who was the treasurer. Was it Ivy?

Morris: Ivy Baker Priest.

Walton: Of course, she had her own power. She was a great lady.

Morris: Her credentials were solid Republican, but she had been more active on the national level than on the state level.

Walton: Yes, but she had the women behind her, and when you've got the women in either party in California behind you, you're going to win an election. You see, this is one thing that they did that hurt the Republican party in the state of California. The women, mostly, but also CRA, UROC--what was the other one?

Morris: The Republican Federation?

Walton: No. There was another group besides the CRA [California Republican League] that they considered liberal. Anyhow, they had rebuilt the Republican party after the fiasco of '58, the right-to-work [ballot proposition], the Knight-Knowland fight, and so forth, to the point where it was gaining some ascendency, it had recaptured the state assembly--you know, the Cal Plan with Parky, and so forth. That was part of Reagan's victory in 1966.

Morris: It was the result of that earlier building.

Walton: Sure. Twelve lousy hard years of work. But they let that whole thing disintegrate. And in 1970--this shocked me--in 1970, we were charging, that is the local committees paid for the Reagan campaign material. [see next page]

Morris: Really?

Walton: I said, "You gotta be kidding." They had twenty-five bumper stickers, and it is going to cost them X dollars. I said, "You give that stuff to them. Where's all the money going?"

That's the way to kill a party. I think part of that might have flopped over on Flournoy, I'm not sure.

Governor Reagan

10.

Reagan & Reinecke


11.

Bumper Strips. Solid blue, white lettering $14\frac{1}{2}'' \times 3''$. Also available in solid red, white lettering.


Reagan

12.


"Mini" Bumper Strip. Solid blue, white lettering $8\frac{1}{4}'' \times 3''$. 3¢



13.




14.



15.



16.



17.

Issue brochures. Graphic, factual presentation of Governor Reagan's record in office on five major issues. Blue and black, $16''$ long $\times 8\frac{1}{2}''$ high opened (folded to $4'' \times 3\frac{1}{2}''$). $1\frac{1}{2}$ c

Governor Reagan

18.

Governor Reagan lawn card and poster. Solid blue, white lettering. Also available in solid red, white lettering, $24'' \times 20\frac{1}{4}''$.

Laminated on soft board.
Laminated on hard board.

17c
36c

Governor Reagan

19.

Governor Reagan rally poster. Black and white photo, blue lettering, coated soft board, $14'' \times 20\frac{1}{4}''$.

13c



20. $(2\frac{1}{4}')$,
21. $(1\frac{1}{4}')$



22. $(2\frac{1}{4}')$,
23. $(1\frac{1}{4}')$



24. $(2\frac{1}{4}')$,
25. $(1\frac{1}{4}')$



26. $(2\frac{1}{4}')$,
27. $(1\frac{1}{4}')$

Campaign Buttons. Solid blue, white lettering. Both sizes also available in solid red, white lettering. $2\frac{1}{4}''$ diameter. $9c$
 $1\frac{1}{4}''$ diameter. $4\frac{1}{2}c$

Morris: I think it was Win Adams, who had also been part of that Cal Plan operation, who said the trouble was that they brought so many of us into administration, that we were not out there doing the party work that we had been doing.

Walton: I think that's a valid observation. But I think it goes deeper than that, that the Reagan machine, as apart from Reagan himself, who was not really a political--what should I say?--mechanic--.

Morris: In the way that Nixon was?

Walton: Right. Or Johnson. Or--

Morris: Carter?

Walton: In a sense. But not quite. Carter wasn't the real political animal that Johnson or Nixon were. But the Reagan machine was a Reagan machine, and then maybe a Republican machine.

Morris: That's true of Nixon, too, isn't it? And Johnson.

Walton: Yes. I think probably in part it is. Which was one of the bad things about Nixon, too. And which was one of the reasons for Joe Shell's popularity, because Joe was a Republican. He took time to shake hands with the little old ladies and go to their teas. And not just when he was running for election. But anyhow, the party was hurt, I think, from '66 to '74.

Morris: How serious was the Unruh challenge? You didn't feel it was a strong campaign?

Walton: We should have won by a greater margin than that. Part of it was the defection at the grassroots. Not defection in the sense that they didn't like what the Governor was doing in Sacramento, but they were either having their noses rubbed in it or being ignored or being charged for that bumper sticker. So they [grassroots workers] concentrated on local candidates.

Morris: Ed Reinecke was the lieutenant-governor candidate. Aside from his later difficulties, it's unusual in California, isn't it, to have the lieutenant governor, one of the other constitutional officers, come back from Congress to run for state office?

Walton: First he was appointed when Bob Finch left. And then he ran.

Morris: Again, to appoint somebody from Congress.

Walton: I thought it was a shrewd move. Probably because Ed's a personal friend. I thought it was a good move. Here's a guy that comes in that knows the Washington scene. I don't know what percentage of the funds in the state are controlled by Washington. Here's a guy who knew his way around Washington. I thought it was a good move. I thought Ed was a pretty good lieutenant governor.

Morris: I'm not saying it's a bad move. I'm just saying it's unusual.

Walton: Perhaps, yes.

Morris: Was it your suggestion?

Walton: Oh, no. I don't know whose suggestion it was. I was just delighted. We were old friends from UROC days and Joe Shell days. He was a businessman, as you know.

Morris: You do know that he's currently chairman of the California Republican party, don't you?

Walton: No. Isn't that great! He's made it back.

Morris: Yes, he's rehabilitated.

Walton: Oh, that's great. That was a lousy, rotten deal he got. I think [John] Mitchell put it to him. I really do. I didn't know. Wait till Ila knows that. She'll be delighted. He was [former Congressman Edgar] Heistand's protege, Reinecke. Ila, my wife, was Heistand's field secretary. So we were all close to Ed. Which reminds me, let me go out and see if she's there.

[interruption]

Morris: You were transferred from the governor's office staff to the campaign staff?

Walton: Yes.

Morris: Then stayed in touch with who in the governor's office?

Walton: I guess Ed Meese and Mike Deaver.

Morris: He's not on the organizational chart.*


Walton: Who isn't?

Morris: Mike Deaver.

*See next page.

R. R.

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SAC - Office of the Lieutenant, State Capitol, Sacramento, Calif. 95811, 916-445-2811
LA 1250 No. Western Ave., Los Angeles, Calif.-Jan 29, 213-467-7111
SP 100 Montgomery St., Suite 625, San Francisco, Calif. 91104, 415-363-7520

Walton: No, he stayed in the governor's office as assistant to Ed Meese. But it was a total and complete separation. I resigned. I didn't get any pay from the governor's office. I was paid by the campaign. There was no hanky-panky. I just wouldn't go along with it. They didn't suggest it.

Morris: That seems to be the way it goes.

Walton: Most of them, I'm sure.

Morris: Tom Reed was not comfortable in the governor's office, but he did come back to be chairman of the budget committee in 1970.

Walton: On the campaign.

Morris: Yes. His disaffection was not that great?

Walton: He liked campaign work. He just didn't like office work. Maybe there were other reasons. I don't know.

Morris: Was there any discussion about who should leave the governor's office and go over to the campaign? Who made those kind of plans?

Walton: I really don't know. I know that Ed Meese and Mike Deaver asked me if I'd--I think it was Ed. We had lunch at the whatever the name of that hotel is on that side street--the Mansion House. They asked me if I'd consider--because I felt that some things in the campaign were being mishandled, I guess. I don't know. They said, "Fine, Tom wondered if you would be willing to go." I said sure.

Morris: What was getting--?

Walton: I don't recall what it was at that time. I just felt that they were not taking advantage of some of the Governor's strong points. I just don't remember.

Morris: Did anybody come back from Washington to help on the campaign?

Walton: Yes, I think so. You mean campaign management?

Morris: Ed Gillenwaters was back in Sacramento, and he'd been in the Washington office.

Walton: Yes, I guess he did. I don't remember.

Morris: Okay. There was a unit called Students for a Creative Society. Did you work with them?

Walton: That was Skip's [Norman Watt's], wasn't it?

Morris: I don't know.

Walton: He had an involvement.

Morris: Skip was the coordinator.

Walton: Yes. Under Tom.

Morris: Under Tom, and Holmes Tuttle was co-chairman.

Walton: Yes, I see. I remember them, and some of them worked in our office down in L.A. They had a button that looked like a ying-yang. They did it; we just helped them produce a couple of brochures. I just don't remember that much about it.

Morris: They were more the foot soldiers rather than involved in--

Walton: Worked on campuses and rallies and so forth, as I recall.

Morris: Was that organized for the campaign, or had they existed earlier?

Walton: I think so. I don't know.

Morris: That chart says the executive director was an M. Kuhl in Los Angeles. Does that ring a bell?

Walton: No.

Morris: I'm really interested, because one of the big questions in the '70s was the eighteen-year-old vote and getting young people involved. I'm just trying to track whether it was a major piece or it came and went.

Walton: My impression is that it was something that was created for the campaign, and that after the campaign, it faded.

VII OBSERVATIONS ON POLITICAL LIFE

The Governor and His Lieutenants

Walton: But then, see, I left the Reagan administration in January of '71, so I don't know.

Morris: Because you felt you'd been there enough?

Walton: Partly that. Partly because I felt that this thing we discussed on the Commission on the Seventies and the interlude, that nothing was really changing, that they capitulated too easily to the so-called status quo of Sacramento. I was quite upset about the abortion bill. I just did not think that they were doing the job that needed to be done or that could be done.

Morris: Was that shift in the group in the governor's office collectively, or was it somebody in particular that was making--?

Walton: I think part of it was energy, I guess I would say. When they started in '67, the '66 transition team into '67, they were full of this energy and drive and vision and hopes and aspirations. Then one by one, the team sort of dropped off. Then when Bill left-- You see, Ed Meese had never been in politics really. He was what, deputy DA or something down in Alameda.

Morris: Right. He'd been the lobbyist for the district attorney's association, so he'd been involved in the legislative politics.

Walton: In my opinion, you can correct me if I'm wrong, because I do not follow the Washington scene, but Ed is not an ideologue in any way, or he doesn't--his political--

Morris: The mechanics of government and organization.

Walton: Yes. Rather than philosophy. I think that tells. It's fine to be a mechanic, but unless you know where you want to drive the car or steer the ship--

Morris: How about Michael Deaver's role?

Walton: Mike is a pragmatist, in my opinion, a taint of philosophy.

Morris: A taint of philosophy.

Walton: Taint, yes. But more dedicated to serving the Reagans first and foremost.

Morris: Does this relate to what you mentioned earlier, and I didn't quite understand, the business about Reagan himself and to what extent he rolled up his sleeves and got involved in the hassle of getting ideas cranked out?

Walton: Yes. I think he was overly protected. Not that I necessarily fault many of his decisions, although I do fault some. I don't really feel that you can arrive at sound--I'd rather say that the chances that you will arrive at sound, defensible decisions on the basis of many memos and surface opinions by your lieutenants is kind of unlikely. I think you have to live it. I think you have to eat it. You can say what you want to, and I am no fan of Richard Nixon's or Lyndon Johnson's, but you can say what you want to about either of the two men, they knew the workings of this nation. And they lived it, and they ate it, and they slept it.

Morris: They also had spent a lifetime in working politics.

Walton: Sure. See, this gets into the qualifications for a candidate and an officeholder. I know we've all said it before, when you look for a doctor or an attorney or an architect, you look for a man that's had experience and whose record is strong and unblemished. But you chase after a guy on a white horse to run the country. It's suicide. [laughs]

I don't know where you're going to find someone else. I don't see anybody on the scene today. I don't know whether I subscribe to the great man theory or not, but the fact is that we do commit the destiny of the nation for four years or a state for four years quite often to someone who has not been tried and proven.

Morris: From your experiences for the years that you were in Sacramento, how much involved was Mr. Reagan as governor in the nuts and bolts? How much time did--?

Walton: I don't think he was involved in the nuts and bolts. I don't mean to be picking up a phrase, but I don't think that a governor should be as much involved in the nuts and bolts as in the broad sweep and clear, definitive, established policies which will be implemented. If you don't implement them, get the hell out.

Morris: By nuts and bolts, I meant in the give and take of thrashing out what the policy will be.

Walton: Not enough.

Morris: How often, say, would you and he have a chance to sit down and talk about some of these ideas that you were developing?

Walton: Not that much. They accepted what I did. And that could be as much--I was going to say as much my fault as his, I'm sure.

I felt that I was, at the beginning, probably closer to him than a lot of the people there, and yet I just do not like people who take advantage of friendships, you know, in that sense. So I tended to stay away from him, maybe too much. I don't know. Maybe I should have tried to see him more often. I don't think that that necessarily resulted in a lack of influence, because the speeches that he gave, and the papers that he issued, influenced him, committed him in a sense.

Morris: And by and large, he worked from the drafts that you put together and gave him?

Walton: Oh, yes. Even in the '70 campaign, when I was doing the other stuff, I still wrote the speeches. And I had no reticence to speak out in the cabinet meetings. As a matter of fact, as I laughingly said a little while ago, George Steffes and I were the guys that always gave him trouble.

Morris: By raising points that he hadn't thought about?

Walton: Yes, or disagreeing with somebody and saying, "That's crazy. What about this?" So as much as I had any right to expect, I think my imprint was felt. I just--.

Working with the Legislature

Morris: How were your working relationships with the legislature? You mentioned Lagomarsino and--

Walton: Very well. Deukmejian was there. We get along fine. See, I was brought up in that atmosphere, "brought up" in my professional life, both as a newsman and at NAM and UROC, and so forth. I had lots of friends up there. So I got along pretty well. Some of the guys liked me, and I liked them, and some didn't. [laughs] That's politics.

Morris: That's human nature. But in the first term, there's been a lot written about Reagan being uncomfortable with the legislature and there not being much give and take between the governor's office and--

Walton: There wasn't enough. What was there was a little bit brittle.

Morris: Was that one of the things that you would raise? Did you feel that the legislature had a role?

Walton: Yes. I don't know that I raised it, but it definitely has a role. That was Vern Sturgeon and George and the other guys. That was their job. I think part of it was, again, the sense that in a way he was an outsider, which could have been a good thing. We need some outsiders. Carter ran as an outsider. So did Reagan; the boss ran as an outsider. But once in there, you've got to work together. I'm very close to Bill Richardson. You ought to talk to Bill. Have you talked to Bill?

Morris: We haven't, but I would like to.

Walton: Talk to him about the night that they called him out to the mansion at midnight because he wouldn't vote for the budget.

Morris: He wouldn't vote for Mr. Reagan's budget?

Walton: Yes. That was '68, '69, back in there somewhere.

Morris: Because of the amount, or because of the allocation?

Walton: Both the amount and allocations. And with the promises made. See, a lot of us are naive enough to think that campaign promises should be kept.

Morris: I believe they keep a book on promises and what's happened to them.

Walton: They do.

Morris: In the governor's office.

Walton: Yes. I suppose they're doing it in the White House.

Morris: I believe that there have been some calls to the Hoover Institution to say, "What did we say and what did we do on those in California?"

Conservatism and the Far Right

Morris: On the outline I sent you, there's a question I would like to get to, and maybe we could wind up with that, Cannon's comment that you, "as well as any Californian, understand the fundamental anti-pathy between the principles of conservatism and the philosophy of the Far Right."*

Walton: [laughs] It goes back to my hassles, doesn't it. Yes, I think the conservative philosophy is a very positive, strong, forward moving, even if it's measured, but nevertheless forward moving, philosophy, that encompasses a great many facets, including not just the political, but the moral and the spiritual. I feel that the far right, maybe out of their frustration and their anxieties and concern, tend to be negative, rather destructive, or dismantling rather than building, and goodness knows, there's a lot of the apparatus that should be dismantled. But they tend to cut too wide a swath too quickly. I think there is a very unfortunate, and I hope I'm wrong, but an unfortunate animosity toward the minorities. I suppose I would, but I believe that the conservative philosophy really offers the most to minorities. I would simply point to the so-called War on Poverty and other things, which have not helped minorities, but have feathered the bureaucrats' nests. I think perhaps we've passed the point now, but I felt that the conservative philosophy, position, had a great deal to offer in rebuilding the country.

I don't see it articulated today. You see, when you get into the nuclear situation, both the pro and anti nuclear freeze people have some points to make. I don't think we are any better off now with quote "forty thousand missiles" than we were with thirty. I don't think we're any safer. And I don't think that we were any less safe when we had ten thousand than when we had twenty thousand. I don't think that the number of warheads makes the point. At the same time, I think the anti-freeze people have a

* Lou Cannon, Ronnie and Jesse, Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1969, p. 307.

point when they say that the primary function of government is to defend the nation, to defend the people, to protect the people.

I don't think either side has approached what is really the key here. And that is the fact that we don't have to continue to engage in a missile race or an arms race. We don't have to deplete our natural resources and our finances and certainly not our boys by extending ourselves to be the world's policeman. Ever since [Woodrow] Wilson said, "We're going to make the world safe for democracy," we've extended ourself little by little, so that we're so distended now, and this world is not safe for democracy. I think we ought to take care of our own democracy. Now, call it isolationism if you want to, but I think our purpose should be to defend this country, and not get into the missile race. But to spend our money to develop, and I think technology could do it, an anti-missile missile, so that if any missiles came toward us, we could knock them down. And we could say to our NATO friends, "Look, you're big fellows now. Germany, you've been rebuilt. We helped rebuild you. You other countries, you're rebuilt. It's time for you to stand up on your own two legs. We don't want to dictate your policies internally or externally. But grow up and take care of yourself." We could then start pulling back from the brink in this madness.

But that's my conservative philosophy on foreign affairs. It doesn't include selling wheat to the Russians. Now, that's a broken promise.

Morris: Selling wheat to the Russians?

Walton: Yes. Because he [Reagan] said when they invaded Poland--they didn't invade it, but they invaded it. Who's kidding whom? When they got [Wojciech] Jaruzelski in there and put in martial law and so forth, that was as good as an invasion. What difference does it make if the tanks don't have red stars on them? But he said, and I'm almost quoting, when he slapped on the grain embargo, this will stay on until human rights are returned to Poland. Right? Something like that he said.

Morris: Yes.

Walton: What's changed in Poland?

Morris: Aside from the wheat crop in the United States?

Walton: Sure. You bet. So for a bloc of farmer votes in the Midwest, we are aiding the guy that we're screaming about and building missiles against. It's asinine. I don't know whether you can call that conservative or not, but that is what I mean when I say that there

is a difference between conservatism in this sense--and I know it doesn't apply to the far right--but I think conservatism is a very constructive, measured approach to things.

Input from the Public

Morris: When you were in the governor's office, to what extent were you aware of the views of various citizen organizations or individuals that could be called constituents, who had a position? To what extent did Mr. Reagan build that in?

Walton: We tried to take those things into account and balance them and represent their views. As far as they were compatible to a constructive whole. I'm not sure we succeeded, but we were aware of it.

Morris: Were there mail counts or people coming in to talk to the Governor, and you'd sit in on that and hear some of that? How did that work in Sacramento?

Walton: No. I sat in on the minority conferences. I kept in pretty close touch with Pat Gayman and the appointments to see what the playback was on speeches. Not mail counts as such, but we were pretty aware of how the mail was going. For all their shortcomings, you can get a pretty good picture of society by reading the papers and following television. I had my--guys like Lou Cannon and Harry Farrell and the guys on the L.A. Times and Sacramento Bee, Marty Smith and so forth. We used to have press barbeques and sit around shooting the bull. Off the record stuff. You learn a lot. Not just where you were weak, but maybe some great ideas. Because sometimes guys that are not involved with it in the sense of day-to-day say, "I wonder why they're not doing this," and by golly, they're right.

Morris: Were there any cases where there was a strong enough public response picked up from whatever source that it would change or cause the Governor to take an action--?

Walton: Withholding is an example, I guess. [laughs]

Morris: That seems to be almost in the area of an idea whose time has come.

Walton: Only because government is insistent on spending more than it has, and therefore needs it more rapidly than it should get it. I think it's inequitable. I'd be sort of like Don Quixote now trying to

fight withholding, but it doesn't make it right. Depriving a man of his earnings because-- You don't get any interest on it.

Morris: True. But most people don't get that much back from the tax year. Are you depriving me of it if I'm going to have to give it to you in April?

Walton: Yes, because you could earn interest on it. Of course, I look on it from a religious standpoint, and the Bible makes it clear that the first fruits go to the Lord. In other words, the tithe. And this in essence puts Caesar ahead of God. Because you tithe after your withholding, see.

Morris: I see. Was religion as important to you in Sacramento as it is here in New Hampshire?

Walton: No, but it was getting to that point.

[End of Interview]

TAPE GUIDE - Rus Walton

Date of Interview: May 10, 1983

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tape 1, side B	16
tape 2, side A	30
tape 2, side B	43

APPENDIX A: SELECTED CAMPAIGN AND PROGRAM MATERIALS, 1962-1970

The following speeches, reports, and campaign materials relate to political and administrative matters discussed by Mr. Walton in his interview and were drafted, planned or reviewed by him. Unless otherwise noted, they were donated to the project by Mr. Walton. All items listed are in Mr. Walton's papers in the Reagan Collection at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California.

1. Joseph C. Shell speech, May 23, 1962. 10 pp.
2. Sample 1964 campaign materials.
3. Governor Ronald Reagan's 1968 State of the State speech, 15 pp. Courtesy of the Reagan Archive at the Hoover Institution.
4. "The California Commitment (An agenda for the Creative Society -- some goals, dimensions and priorities both long-range and short-term)," n.d. [early 1968?], 8 pp.
5. "Governor's Action Program (GAP), To encourage constructive participation and creative thinking on pressing problems of State government by students in California's colleges and universities. And, to begin building the image that this Administration cares about our college students, wants their ideas and their support," November 18, 1968, 10 pp.
6. Transcript of Governor Ronald Reagan's Report to the People (higher education), December 8, 1968, 9 pp., and letter from Rus Walton to Ruric A. Todd, December 27, 1968, explaining that this talk was the first in a series of television Reports to the People organized by the Governor's Program Development Section. Donated by Mr. Todd. Mr. Walton noted in October 1983 that he had written the final script.
7. "The Philosophy and Goals of the Reagan Administration," draft, February 19, 1969, 14 pp. See Appendix B.
8. "Governor's Commission on the Seventies," program proposal and budget, March, 1970.
9. "Team for the '70s" campaign materials, n.d. Hoover Institution. In response to a query by letter on use of media by the Reagan people, Mr. Walton replied that "we did the 1970 campaign TV."
10. "Dr. Brian vs. Medi-Cal Mess," editorial by Rus Walton, The Sacramento Union, early 1971.
11. Plymouth Rock Foundation, informational materials, 1983.
12. "Names Building," West Morris [N.J.] Star, November 1983 [?].

APPENDIX B

RUS WALTON
Box 425
Marlborough, N.H.
03455

THE PHILOSOPHY AND GOALS
OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Draft
February 19, 1969

FOREWORD

This statement is set forth

- to restate the philosophy of the Reagan Administration and
- X - to fulfill the promises made by the Governor (both during his campaign and during his first two years in office).

stimulate
accelerate
facilitate

In line with the Governor's announced public posture on vital issues of the day, these goals are a commitment to a Creative Society . . .

. . . a commitment to restore the proper function of government,

. . . a commitment to get on with the essential reformation of government in California.

Government was instituted and exists to serve the people. In that context, we should design not simply the least, but also the best government possible. Further, any design of good government in a free society must be concerned with the problems of people -- not just the problems of government -- lest government become an end unto itself.

In attempting to cast government in its proper role, the Reagan Administration is committed to the idea that local government has an essential part to play in meeting public needs. Services that can be provided as well or better by local agencies should be handled at that level rather than at the State level. State Government's responsibility in such cases should be to assist local government in strengthening its capacity to provide these services and in obtaining the financial resources required to do so.

The Administration also believes that the people of California should rely more heavily on the private sector to meet public needs. In the past, government has not made enough use of the talent and resources available in the business and industrial community that can be directed toward the solution of major social and economic problems. These complex problems are of a magnitude that calls for

the mobilization of all available resources, public and private, to find workable solutions that meet public needs.

This statement of the philosophy and goals of the Reagan Administration is based on an assessment of the major "people problems" in California. It is directed toward those things which a government "of and by" the people can and should do to help find solutions to these problems.

The "people problems" fall into six general areas:

ECONOMIC

The day-to-day matter of the citizen's earning a living and providing for personal and family financial security and improvement -- and the proper role of State Government as it relates to taxing, collecting, and spending a certain amount of the citizen's resources.

HEALTH

Including the need for reform in such critical areas as health care services, mental health, and related rehabilitative and social services -- and the government's proper concern with the health and well-being of all citizens (including but not limited to the indigent, the disabled, the incapacitated, and the needy).

EDUCATION

Relating not only to those years of formal education (in public and private institutions) but also to continuing education, which is becoming more and more necessary in a changing society -- and the need for basic reform in priorities, practices, philosophy, and financing of the public education system.

ENVIRONMENT

Relating to preservation of the quality of the physical environment (pollution abatement, scenic, recreational, and cultural enhancement).

SAFETY AND SECURITY

Protecting the citizen and his property from harm and violence resulting from acts of man or nature.

TRANSPORTATION

Enabling people and goods to move quickly, and easily *and safely* throughout the State.

It is important to keep several points in mind while reviewing these major areas of public concern:

First, there are obviously many interactions involved among these problem areas. Just as each individual lives and exists in all of these areas to varying degrees, so the different State agencies and their operations will have an impact in many, or most, of the areas. This, then, calls for coordination and direction that can increase program effectiveness, streamline governmental operations, eliminate program duplication of effort, and establish a "synergistic" effort.

An example of this is the direct tie between increased jobs and job training and the resultant transfer of individuals from welfare rolls to payrolls. Not only does this transaction diminish the cost of welfare to the taxpayer; it also increases

tax revenues, has a relationship to law and order, and has other beneficial effects for the individual and society. This interaction can be optimized in all proper governmental activities with sound planning, direction, and coordination.

Second, the desires, needs, demands, and problems in the six basic program areas must be assessed and approached within the context of a rapidly changing society.

- a society which is becoming more and more affluent (yet more and more resentful of government's increasing cost, inefficiency, and unresponsiveness),
- a society in which the young and the minorities have become more aware, more restive, and more volatile,
- a society in which large blocs of the young and the minorities are demanding change and a more effective voice in policy decisions that directly affect them, yet have little or no appreciation of, or training in, responsibility and accountability,
- a society which is organized to the point where the individual must struggle constantly to preserve his identity and dignity and to realize his full creative potential,
- a society which has made it clear that it wants reform but says that it has yet to see what it considers to be real and relevant progress,

- a society which faces a serious threat to the traditional two-party political system . . . with all the ramifications and factional displacement involved, and
- a society which is burdened with a number of costly programs initiated some thirty years ago, many of which are inappropriate and ineffective in meeting the accelerating demands of a changing age . . . demands that must be met and will be met either constructively or destructively, depending upon what power structure in America takes the leadership in the years immediately ahead.

Leadership is a heavy burden. And now, at this point in history, the leadership of California is an awesome task. It is essential that this Administration recognize the dynamics of the situation; that it be willing to redirect the forces already in motion; that it be capable of accommodating and harnessing the pressures involved; and that it be equal to the task of guiding California in carrying out essential reforms.

A CREATIVE AGENDA

To a large degree, Governor Reagan was elected because voters believed that he would make a change, a real difference, in State Government . . . that his Administration would engage in a program of basic reforms. It is time to move ahead with these reforms.

Program Priorities

If the Administration is to do the job expected of it by the majority of Californians, it must establish new program priorities. It must also reorder those priorities which, by the fact of their existence, largely dictate the major operations of State Government and make reform difficult or impossible.

For one thing, the Reagan Administration inherited -- and in some areas has frankly extended -- the priorities of previous administrations. While significant progress has been made in improving administrative techniques, the Administration must now concentrate on analyzing and revamping major spending programs, such as welfare, health care services, and public education, giving full consideration to the needs and priorities of today.

Second, the changes occurring in today's society are not simply changes in method or approach to the same old problems. They are seemingly based on a change of priorities in the mind of the public. Government has a responsibility not only to recognize these changes but to influence them as well. The failure of government to be responsive to change (in the sense that it is aware of the change and works to guide and channel it constructively) contributes to the alienation of government from its society; of an administration from its constituents. That is what occurred in 1966, when the people of California voted for a change.

Change Requires Changes

It is obvious that this Administration cannot build the Creative Society without changes in government operations. It is also obvious that changes in one program area often require concomitant changes in other areas.

A case in point is the need to change our elementary and secondary educational system -- not just the fiscal structure (revenue source and allocation) but also the emphasis in programs and budgets. It is generally agreed that more effort and resources should be concentrated in the lower grades. This has ramifications not only in subsequent education, but also in welfare, crime prevention, individual productivity, and tax-burden.

But there is just so much money in the pot. Adjustments in the field of basic education cannot be made unless adjustments are also made in such areas as welfare spending. To oversimplify, the question is: should the State continue to spend so much of the taxpayers' money to care for people after they are in trouble, or should it focus the expenditure of more of its resources on the early years, when there is a better opportunity to break the welfare syndrome? This is an important question. The answer may well require some basic changes in programs and resource allocation. Perhaps this kind of change cannot be accomplished within a two-year span, but the Administration must make a start in that direction now -- and in such a way that the public understands and supports its reforms.

Again, within the area of education -- and again, against the backdrop of changing priorities in a changing society -- decisions must be made as to whether the State is going to give additional emphasis (and therefore appropriations) to vocational training and technical instruction . . . enabling thousands upon thousands of young people to train themselves in those skills required for nonprofessional but high-paying jobs. Is it a fact, for example,

that a disproportionate amount of today's education dollar is spent on college and precollege training? Many young people will never go to college and would actually be happier, more productive individuals in technical, skilled, and semi-skilled jobs. If this is so, then perhaps the Administration should give serious thought to a new concept which would utilize or modify parts of the existing educational structure to provide a pace-setting system of technical institutes throughout the State.

And so it goes. There are momentous -- imperative -- decisions to be made. What is the proper "mix" between highways and other forms of mass transit for our sprawling, urban areas? Should the State accelerate the development of parks and recreational facilities in urban and suburban areas? How can the State better marry the power of the free enterprise system, with its high quality, broad-based medical care programs with the necessary governmental health care programs? How can the State regear and reform its programs to take advantage of breakthroughs in medical economics, management techniques, and electronic technologies?

These and many other difficult questions are facing the Reagan Administration today. All of them demand answers in a Creative Society. All of them demand a reassessment and, in most cases, a restructuring of priorities.

Economic Goals

It is the Administration's aim to stimulate a dynamic economic climate in California -- in concert with the private sector -- and thus expand the derivative source of government revenues. As more and more Californians are employed in productive jobs, as people begin receiving paychecks instead of welfare checks, and as the wages and incomes of our citizens increase, there is a widening of the tax base and a more equitable distribution of the tax burden. In other words, the Administration wants to maintain the revenues necessary to support essential governmental programs while spreading and minimizing the per capita burden of those revenues.

Some of the Administration's goals in carrying out this basic purpose are:

Education +

1. To provide opportunities and incentives for people dependent on welfare checks to become self-sufficient.
2. To encourage business and industry to create jobs for the disadvantaged.
3. To expand the opportunities for employment of minority groups and disadvantaged persons in State Government.
4. To develop a plan to facilitate the eventual conversion to a peacetime economy in California.

Health Goals

Health care is requiring an increasing share of the tax dollar, and this trend will probably continue. In planning health programs, the State must be ready to take advantage of breakthroughs in science and technology that will make it possible to provide more and better services with the available funds.

The Administration's health goals may be stated as follows:

1. To continue to shift treatment of the mentally ill from State hospitals to community facilities.
2. To improve the delivery of health care services at the local level.
3. To establish more effective controls over Medi-Cal expenditures.
4. To effect better coordination in the planning and administration of health, rehabilitation, and related social service programs.

Education Goals

~~X~~ The State spends more of its tax dollars on education than on any other public activity. ~~H~~ Education should continue to have the highest priority. It is time, however, to face up to the need for a complete review of the public education system in California -- its priorities, its effectiveness in meeting the needs of today, and its financing. The Reagan Administration is committed to the idea of spending available dollars first where they will accomplish the most good -- at the very beginning of the educational experience -- in the early grades. The Administration is also interested in emphasizing basic education, accelerating the development of technical institutes and regional occupational centers, and upgrading the entire concept of continuing education.

Within this context, the Administration has set the following goals:

1. To rationalize and make more equitable the present method of school financing.
2. To develop a better balance between public and private higher education.

3. To make educational opportunities from elementary through college more available to the disadvantaged.
4. To develop better vocational education programs for *technical* persons who do not plan to go to college.
5. To improve the quality of the school program, especially in the lower grades.
6. To insure that all schools are safe for both students and teachers and that persons seeking an education are not prevented from gaining it by dissident elements.
7. To promote more efficient use of school facilities.
8. To develop ways of attracting and retaining well-qualified persons into the teaching profession.

Environmental Goals

For too long Californians have taken for granted such things as clean air, pure and abundant water, parks and open space, and pleasant physical surroundings. All are parts of the environment. All demand the attention and application of a creative government in a Creative Society.

In recent years Californians have been witnessing the gradual deterioration of their environment. Smog, polluted water, garish neon signs and billboards, and noise are among the more obvious manifestations of this. These problems reach their most aggravated form in the congested, urban areas where ninety percent of the people live. State Government must be concerned . . . must move to forestall problems before they assume the gigantic proportions now pressing on eastern cities and states.

In order to deal with these problems, the Reagan Administration plans:

1. To explore the usefulness of the "New Towns" concept in California and determine the feasibility of renovating older cities.
2. To assist local government in finding better ways of dealing with the problems of solid waste disposal and control of air and water pollution.
3. To take steps to preserve and enhance the scenic quality of the environment.
4. To establish and maintain adequate open space areas.
5. To encourage the development of parks and recreational facilities that are easily accessible to persons living in congested urban areas.
6. To support the enactment of effective billboard controls.

fed.

Safety and Security Goals

State and local governments are facing challenges today that exceed both in number and magnitude anything they have had to face in the past. For example, problems of crime and delinquency control have become more complex and more widespread. And new problems, such as racial conflict and riot control, have added a whole new dimension to the traditional law enforcement responsibility.

To meet these challenges, the Administration has set the following goals:

1. To improve the effectiveness of local law enforcement personnel.
2. To strengthen State and local delinquency prevention programs.

3. To promote the enactment of more effective crime control laws.
4. To reduce the incidence of traffic accidents resulting from driving while under the influence of alcohol. X
5. To take the appointment of judges out of politics.
6. To streamline the judicial process.

Transportation Goals

California can be justly proud of its system of freeways, which ranks among the best in the Nation. But there are increasing signs that traditional ways of meeting public transportation needs are not adequate. There is a tremendous need for creativity and innovation in finding answers to such problems as urban traffic congestion, airport delays, and inadequate parking facilities. State Government must take an increasingly active role in dealing with these and related transportation problems.

Some of the specific transportation goals of the Administration are:

1. To assist the urban centers in finding solutions to the problem of traffic congestion. X over
2. To ensure that highway construction does a minimum of damage to environmental values.
3. To plan highway projects so that they promote desirable patterns of urban growth.
4. To improve the State's ability to conduct integrated transportation planning. plan, finance & problem

*Social
Cultural*

Government Administration Goals

The Administration bears a great responsibility to hold down the costs of government and to ensure that tax revenues are spent wisely and with maximum effectiveness. It must work unceasingly to reduce the cost of government in every area possible -- in the administration and also the scope of various programs -- and to resist the tendency to permit program expansions that consume any increase in revenues.

Within this framework, the Administration's goals are:

1. To improve the allocation of resources among State programs to the end that maximum public benefit is realized.
2. To place greater reliance on local government to carry out public programs.
3. To take full advantage of the latest developments in management technology in order to hold costs down.
4. To effectuate genuine tax reform.
5. To operate State Government as economically as possible without sacrificing essential services.
6. To modify existing programs in such a way that additional taxes are not required and, if possible, rebate some of the taxes now collected.
7. To organize State programs and services in a way that promotes efficient administration and the attainment of program objectives.

*federal
decent
local program*



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